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It has commonly been argued that drugs have been securitized, however relatively little in-depth 
analysis has been carried out on this subject.  This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by using a 
combination of Foucault’s concept of the dispositif and a sociological interpretation of securitization 
theory to examine how drugs have become constructed as existentially threatening to humankind and 
the state by the United Nations (UN) and the United States of America (US). The two securitizations 
analysed here - the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Single Convention) and 
US President Reagan’s 1986 National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-221) -took place 
within the wider historical context of a control-oriented dispositif, it is argued, but also re-shaped the 
international drug control system and the drug control dispositif in profound ways.  The thesis 
concludes that the drug control dispositif has continued to evolve through time and across space, and 
that the securitization of drugs by the US and UN has limited the range of options available within 
international and domestic drug policies, often exacerbating the harms to humans and the state – the 
very referent objects that these securitizations aim to protect.  Discourse analysis of archival 
documents from the British National Archives, the US National Archives and the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library and Museum, and process-tracing of media sources are used to examine the ways 
in which drugs became securitized and how these securitizations affected the drug 
control dispositif.  In order to understand the context in which the securitization(s) of drugs occurred, 
this thesis firstly identifies the various forms of control that were used during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  It then analyses how the Single Convention and NSDD-221 established drugs as 
being threatening to humankind and the state through securitizing speech acts and non-discursive 
practices and how these securitizations re-oriented the drug control dispositif towards a prohibitionist 
paradigm.  Finally, this thesis explores how various discourses and practices are challenging the ‘drugs 
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Drugs, both legal and illegal, have been prohibited in various forms in different states at different 
points in time.  However, since the beginning of the twentieth century there has been a movement, 
led largely by the United States of America, to prohibit the production, trade and use of specific drugs 
for non-medical and non-scientific purposes at the international level.  This reached a point of global 
acceptance after the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (hereafter referred to as the 
Single Convention) was ratified.  The Single Convention identified illicit drug use as “evil”1  and as a 
threat to humankind.  Though the Single Convention is neither the beginning nor the end of the 
development of the international drug control system, it is the corner-stone of what Ethan Nadelmann 
calls the ‘global drug prohibition regime’.2  It is one of the most ratified UN conventions3 and the 
accepted interpretation of the convention established a punitive prohibition regime that most states 
still see as the basis for their national drug policies.4  Whilst the Single Convention itself does not 
specifically demand the prohibition of drugs for non-medical and non-scientific purposes – it merely 
suggests that if states deem it necessary, they should prohibit – a global consensus has been created 
whereby prohibition is the most likely outcome.  This interpretation has been promoted largely by 
global drug control bureaucrats, such as the United Nations Office on Drug Control (UNODC) and the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) - which was established under the auspices of the Single 
Convention - and the United States.5  Between the INCB who regard themselves as the ‘guardians of 
the treaties’6 and often speak out against states that they believe are defying either the provisions or 
                                                          
1 United Nations, The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, (New York: United Nations, 1964), p. 11. 
2 Ethan Nadelmann, ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society’, 
International Organization, Vol. 4: 4, 1990, pp. 502-513. 
3 At time of writing, treaty adherence currently stands at 186 countries out of 193 UN member states 
according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  See, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), Status of treaty adherence, UNODC, [online]. Available from:  
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6&clang=_en> 
(accessed 14/01/18). 
4 Constanza Sanchéz-Avilés and Ondrej Ditrych, ‘The Global Drug Prohibition Regime: Prospects for Stability 
and Change in an Increasingly Less Prohibitionist World’, International Politics, 2017, p. 3. 
5 Sanchéz-Avilés and Ditrych, pp. 8-10. 
6 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report for the International Narcotics Controls Board for 2001, 
E/INCB/2001/1, (New York: United Nations, 2002), p. 1. 
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the ‘spirit’ of the conventions, and the US, who have often acted as the enforcer of the treaties,7 there 
is a strong motivation for states to abide by the most commonly accepted interpretation – based on 
punitive prohibition - of the international drug control system. 
   
Before the Single Convention was enshrined in international law, there was little unanimity about how 
drugs should be controlled, although since the beginning of the twentieth century there has been a 
recognition that these substances should be subject to some kind of international and domestic 
controls.  At the international level, these controls were largely limited to trade and manufacturing 
restrictions for licit drugs; at the domestic level states used a range of different mechanisms to manage 
drugs including regulatory systems, prescriptions, licencing, taxation and criminalisation.  The Single 
Convention, created, on the surface, a more uniform way of managing drugs but also limited the 
options available to states through the commitment to restrict drug use to medical and scientific 
purposes only.  It was originally proposed in order to merge and rationalise the previous conventions 
that had been drawn up under the League of Nations, as well as address the lack of controls around 
the production of raw materials such as coca, opium and cannabis.  It was also supposed to be “a 
convention to end all [drug] conventions”,8 however in the 1970s and 1980s new concerns arose 
firstly, about psychotropic drugs (those substances not included in the Single Convention) and 
secondly, about illicit trafficking, leading to two new conventions – the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, 1971 and the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988 (hereafter referred to as the 1988 UN Convention).  The Single Convention itself 
was also amended in 1972 at the behest of the Americans to include additional controls over the 
production of raw materials.    
Analysing the substance of the Single Convention, the wider context that it emerged from and the 
practices that shaped or reinforced it, shows how the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse became 
institutionalised through the UN and how prohibition became the primary form of drug control across 
most of the world.  The acceptance of this discourse resulted in drugs becoming securitized at the 
                                                          
7 Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International 
Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 38 & p. 43; Jurg Gerber and Eric L. Jensen, ‘The 
Internationalization of U.S. Policy on Illicit Drug Control’, in Drug War American Style: The 
Internationalization of Failed Policy and Its Alternatives, ed. by Jurg Gerber and Eric L. Jensen, (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 2001), p. 11. 
8 Herbert May, ‘Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; Comments and Possibilities’, Bulletin of Narcotic Drugs, 
Issue 1, 1955 [online].  Available from: < https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1955-01-01_1_page002.html > (accessed 28/10/11). 
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international level and a reorientation of the drug control dispositif.  This securitization was then 
reconstituted by the Reagan administration with a new referent object - the state -  and a new threat 
- illicit trafficking - that was then incorporated into the 1988 UN Convention reorienting the drug 
control dispositif once more.  This thesis will use a combination of the securitization framework first 
elucidated by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde and Foucault’s concept of the dispositif9 in order to analyse 
the development of international drug policy and the accompanying ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.  By 
using securitization theory, particularly the work of ‘second generation’ securitization scholars who 
emphasise a more context-laden, process-orientated approach, the thesis identifies key points in the 
development of the ‘drugs as an existential threat’ narrative and shows how they have re-shaped the 
drug control dispositif. The two primary speech acts to be analysed here are the 1961 UN Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and US President Reagan’s 1986 National Security Decision Directive 
221.  Each of these speech acts, it will be argued, illustrates a key stage in the development of the 
securitization of drugs as well as the international drug control system.  NSDD-221 has been chosen 
as a speech act because it highlights the evolution of a new referent object that is threatened by drugs: 
where the Single Convention was concerned about the threat to humanity, NSDD-221 - and the 1988 
UN Convention that followed it - identified the state as the referent object.  NSDD-221 also established 
a new role for the military in combatting the ‘drug threat’ which was replicated internationally.    
Securitization theory helps explain how the consensus on international drug policy was established 
and maintained, it also helps explain why it has been so hard to challenge this perspective. Some of 
the key themes to be explored using the securitization framework are the creation and power of the 
international drug control system (with the referent object being the ‘the global self’), the way that 
those countries that have deviated from the prohibitionist norm have been criticised (which reinforces 
the idea that prohibition is the only effective policy) and how drugs have been ‘framed’ as a threat to 
humankind and the state over time and through space.  Analysing the securitization(s) of drugs within 
a pre-existing dispositif of control does a number of additional things.  Firstly, deployment of the 
dispositif highlights the overwhelming acceptance and longevity of these securitizations, secondly, it 
illuminates how these securitizations established, and then reinforced, prohibition as the primary 
form of accepted drug control across the globe.  Finally, it draws attention to the range of drug control 
                                                          
9 Foucault defines the dispositif as “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid.”  Michel 
Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-
1977, ed. by Colin Gordon, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 194. 
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options that have existed throughout time, and therefore, shows how these securitizations analysed 
in this thesis have reduced the range of tools available to states when devising policies to deal with 
drugs and drug use. 
Whilst some scholars, particularly those that are critical of the system, refer to the drug conventions 
as part of a ‘global drug prohibition regime’,10 the bodies that oversee these treaties, such as the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the 
United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) refer to them as the international drug control 
system(s).11  This is important within this thesis because control and prohibition are not 
synonymous; indeed, there are many forms of drug control and prohibition is only one of them.  This 
thesis, therefore, will explore the struggle for the meaning of drug control across time and space, 
and how prohibition became a hegemonic form of control, in spite of continued contestation.  The 
two case studies analysed in this thesis have contributed to an increasingly securitized, and 
therefore punitive, prohibition stystem being established across much of the world and this has 
limited the range of options for control open to states.       
2. Research questions and reflexivity 
This thesis analyses two research questions, one empirical and the other, theoretical.  The first 
research question is: how have drugs been constructed as an existential threat at the international 
level and how has this construction changed over time?  In order to answer this question a series of 
sub-questions need to be asked: firstly, what aspects of drugs have been securitized? Secondly, how 
have practices contributed to these securitizations?  Thirdly, what effects have these securitizations 
had on the drug control dispositif?  The second research question asks: to what extent does the 
‘sociological’ interpretation of securitization theory, in conjunction with deployment of the concept 
                                                          
10 Nadelmann, pp. 502-513; David R. Bewley-Taylor, The United States and International Drug Control 1909-
1997, (London: Continuum, 1999), p. 14; Eva Herschinger, Constructing Global Enemies: Hegemony and 
Identity in International Discourses on Terrorism and Drug Prohibition, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 63; 
Eva Herschinger, ‘The Drug Dispositif: Ambivalent Materiality and the Addiction of the Global Drug 
Prohibition Regime’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 46: 2, 2015, pp. 183–201. 
11 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), International Drug Control Systems: Control of Narcotic Drugs, 





of the dispositif, provide a better understanding of the processes of threat-construction than the 
original Copenhagen School framework? 
Whilst there is an abundance of scholarly literature that acknowledges that drugs have, in one way or 
another been securitized,12 very little of it identifies what exactly has been securitized, i.e. drug 
addiction, drug use, drug trafficking or drugs per se.  Furthermore, much of the academic writing that 
refers to the securitization of drugs fails to place the securitizations that they deal with – whether drug 
trafficking in Central Asia or US-led drug policy in the Americas – within an international drug control 
system that favours prohibition.13  This leads to a confusion between the existential threat (drugs, 
                                                          
12 For example, Nicole Jackson, ‘International Organizations, Security Dichotomies and the Trafficking of 
Persons and Narcotics in Post-Soviet Central Asia: A Critique of the Securitization Framework’, Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 37: 3, 2006, pp. 299-317; Herschinger, Constructing Global Enemies, pp. 60-98; Nicholas Dorn, 
‘UK Policing of Drugs Traffickers and Users: Policy Implementation in the Contexts of National Law, European 
Traditions, International Drug Conventions and Security After 2001’, Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 34, 2004, pp. 
533-550; Ralf Emmers, ‘Securitization’, in Contemporary Security Studies, ed. by Alan Collins, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 120-121; Kyle Grayson, Chasing Dragons: Security, Identity, and Illicit Drugs in 
Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Alba Hesselroth, ‘Struggles of Security in US Foreign 
Drug Policy Towards Andean Countries’, Peace, Conflict and Development [online], Vol. 5, 2004.  Available 
from: < https://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/peace-conflict-and-development/issue-
5/StrugglesofSecurity.pdf > (accessed 03/02/11) ; Volker Franke, ‘Framing Security: A Matrix for Measuring 
Threats’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian 
Village, Honolulu, Mar 5th, 2005 [online].  Available from: < https://works.bepress.com/volker_franke/78/ > 
(accessed 03/02/11); William, P. Bloss, ‘Comparative European and American Drug Control Policy: An 
Examination of Efficacy and Contributing Factors’, Ethics, and Social Philosophy Online Quarterly Review, Vol. 
2: 2, 2005, pp. 1-18; Sayaka Fukumi, Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008), pp. 93-111; Barry Buzan and Olé Wæver, Regions and Powers; the 
Structure of International Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 296, p. 328; Barry 
Buzan and Olé Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation 
Theory’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, 2009, p. 258; David Campbell, Writing Security: United 
States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 198-
222.   
13 For example, Hesselroth, Franke and Buzan and Wæver in both Regions and Powers and 
‘Macrosecuritisation’ all refer to the US ‘war on drugs’ without placing the policies discussed within the 
international system of drug control that has given legitimacy to US counter-narcotics policies.  By laying the 
blame solely on the US, they fail to recognise the role of the UN Conventions in maintaining and promoting 
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drug use, drug trafficking) and the impacts of the extraordinary measures (a growing illicit trade in 
drugs and increased violence and corruption resulting from that trade, i.e. the ‘drug problem’) as one 
becomes conflated with the other.  Even when the literature is critical of certain aspects of the 
securitization of drugs, such as Nicole Jackson14 and Alba Hesselroth,15 the question of whether the 
securitization of drugs is necessary or appropriate, or indeed is capable of bringing about the desired 
results – be that reduction in the production and use of drugs, or reduction in the harm caused to 
humans, states and regional or international security - is never asked.  For example, Hesselroth 
reminds us of Olé Wæver’s warning that whilst labelling a problem as a ‘security issue’ may allow it to 
be given a higher priority, securitization is not without its own dangers: the range of options with 
which to address a securitized issue becomes limited to “threat, defence and state-centred 
solutions”.16  He then argues that the US approach to drugs in the Andean region is problematic 
because it has been blighted by a similarly militarised, threat-based approach.17  Whilst he notes that 
this form of securitization has had dangerous consequences for the Andean countries, he then argues 
that “given the threatening effects of the drug problem, its securitisation – in a more appropriate, less 
harmful way – is crucial.” 18  The question of whether the securitization of drugs can alleviate the ‘drug 
problem’ is important because as Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Olé Wæver note, when something is 
securitized there are implications “‘internally’ (for instance by inhibiting debate and democracy) and 
‘externally’ by often stimulating conflict, security dilemmas and escalation.”19  This critique seems 
particularly pertinent to drug policy.  Those that attempt to debate alternatives, including harm 
reduction methods, to the current policy are often labelled as ‘pro-drug’20 and discussions surrounding 
                                                          
prohibitionist policies.  Jackson analyses the role of the UNODC in securitizing drug trafficking in Central Asia 
without mentioning the 1988 UN Convention at all. 
14 Jackson, p. 299-317. 
15 Hesselroth, [online]. 
16 Olé Wæver, ' Securitization and Desecuritization' in On Security, ed. by Ronnie Lipschutz, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), p 25; Hesselroth, [online]. 
17 Hesselroth, [online]. 
18 Hesselroth, [online]. 
19 Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Olé Wæver, ‘In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization’, 
Millennium, Vol. 29, 2000, p. 708-9. 
20 The Executive Summary of the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2009 argues, “Why unleash a drug epidemic in 
the developing world for the sake of libertarian arguments made by a pro-drug lobby that has the luxury of 
access to drug treatment?” See, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 
2009, (Vienna: UNODC, 2009), p.1. 
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decriminalisation/legalisation are often dismissed out of hand.21  The external implications are even 
plainer to see: the rhetorical ‘war on drugs’ at times becomes a very real war as in Colombia, Mexico 
or Afghanistan, for example.  Whilst practices on the ground are challenging both the prohibition 
system and the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, at the international level there is little willingness to 
move beyond the status quo.22 
The intention of this research is threefold: to improve upon the current academic literature on the 
securitization of drugs through an in-depth analysis of two key speech acts, to place the 
securitization(s) of drugs within a broader drug control dispositif that encompasses a wider range of 
control options than just prohibition, and to contribute to the development of securitization theory.  
By doing so, this thesis aims to show that ‘second generation’ securitization theory provides a more 
in-depth framework for analysisng empirical examples of threat-construction.  It also aims to 
identify the processes by which drugs became constructed as a threat and to highlight how drug 
prohibition is both the result of geo-political, economic and moral concerns as well as being only 
one option out of many that have been used to control drugs.  The thesis will analyse the speech 
acts in order to consider the processes through which drugs became securitized, what was 
securitized and by whom.  This approach offers useful explanatory power in understanding the 
hegemonic discourse of prohibition.  
                                                          
21 Article VII of the United States’ Office of National Drugs Control Policy (ONDCP) states that the director and 
deputy director, “shall ensure that no Federal funds appropriated to the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy shall be expended for any study or contract relating to the legalization (for a medical use or any other 
use) of a substance listed in schedule I of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812) and 
take such actions as necessary to oppose any attempt to legalize the use of a substance (in any form)”, 
United States’ Office of National Drugs Control Policy (ONDCP), Article VII, 1998, [online]. Available from: 
<http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/about/98reauthorization.html> (accessed 10/07/12); In 2009, 
President Obama’s Drugs Czar, Gil Kerlikowske announced that “legalization is not in the president's 
vocabulary and it’s not in mine.” See, Paul Armentano, ‘Meet Obama’s Drug Czar, Same as the Old Czar’, 
Texas NORML, 24th July 2009 [online].  Available from: <https://www.texasnorml.org/meet-obamas-drug-
czar-same-as-the-old-czar/> (accessed 10/07/12). 
22 See the reluctance of the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 2016 to explicitly 
mention harm reduction as an example of this.  See, Ann Fordham and Martin Jelsma, ‘Will UNGASS 2016 Be 
the Beginning of the End For the ‘War on Drugs’?’, Open Democracy, 16th March 2016 [online].  Available 
from:  <https://www.opendemocracy.net/drugpolicy/ann-fordham-martin-jelsma/will-ungass-2016-be-
beginning-of-end-for-war-on-drugs> (accessed 28/03/16).  
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Drugs as a threat discourse 
Drug policy as a problem 




























   X X  X 
Dutch coffee 
shops 
    X  X 
Portuguese 
decriminalisation 
  X X X X X 
Harm reduction - 
NSPs and OSTs 




    X X  
Swiss heroin 
prescription 
   X X X  
Harm reduction - 
focussed 
deterrence 
    X   
The 'British 
System' 
   X  X  
1961 UN Single 
Convention 
X X X X    
1988 UN 
Convention 
X X X X    
NSDD-221 and 
US federal drug 
policy 
X X X X    
Russia's 'war on 
drugs' (2006 to 
present) 
X X X X    
Mexico's 'war on 
drug cartels' 
  X X    
Philippines 'war 
on drug users' 
X X  X    
Table 1: The Drug Control Dispositif. 
Table 1 (The Drug Control Dispositif) illustrates which aspects of the ‘drug problem’ are 
problematized23 in the speech acts considered in this thesis and various national drug policies that 
                                                          
23 Carol Bacchi explains that Foucault used the term ‘problematization’ in two ways: firstly, to describe his 
mode of analysis, which explores how the issue is presented, managed and classified; secondly, he uses the 
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will be discussed in Chapters Three and Six.  On the surface, it seems as if the first speech act 
analysed in this thesis – the Single Convention – was specifically aimed at the threat posed by the 
addiction of narcotic drugs, but as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four, this is not the 
case.  Rather, the Single Convention was concerned with all illicit drug use, whether it caused 
addiction or not, and this was made explicit in the 1972 Amending Protocol with its emphasis on 
‘drug abuse’.  The same is true of the second speech act - Reagan’s 1986 National Security Decision 
Directive 221 - although its predominant focus was on how the illicit trade in drugs threatened the 
national security of the US and other states, this cannot be separated from the illicit use of drugs 
within the US, as will be discussed in Chapter Five.  Indeed, within government and public discourse 
at the time, drug use in the United States was frequently portrayed as being a threat to the American 
way of life as well as a source of funding for US enemies abroad.  Not only do the speech acts address 
broader threats than are explicitly stated, but also, the word ‘drug’ itself is not clearly defined and 
means different things in different situations, as will be explored below.  Both speech acts, and the 
practices24 that accompanied them, problematized ‘drugs’ as the threat and were predicated on the 
goal of a “drug-free world”.25   
The problematizations represented in Table 1 have been divided into those that represent ‘drugs’ 
(or drug use, drug trafficking and drug production) as a threat and those that attempt to mitigate 
some of the negative outcomes of drug policy (prohibition).  Practices that operate as part of, and 
reinforce, the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse tend to be more prohibitionist in nature and see a ‘drug-
free world’ as the overall aim.  Conversely, practices such as ‘harm reduction’, decriminalisation or 
legal regulation recognise that a ‘drug-free world’ is not a realistic aim and are more likely to be 
concerned with the public health and social impacts of drugs.  They therefore focus on alleviating 
                                                          
term as a way of understanding how an issue becomes identified as a problem and how it is formed as an 
object of concern.  See, Carol Bacchi, ‘Why Study Problematizations? Making Politics Visible’, Open Journal of 
Political Science, Vol.2: 1, 2012, p. 1  
24 Balzacq argues that practices encompass either regulatory instruments that aim to normalise groups or 
inviduals’ behaviour (e.g. national drug laws) or capacity tools that aim to facilitate decision-making by groups 
or individuals (e.g. police databases).  See, Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core 
Assumptions and Variants’, in Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. by 
Thierry Balzacq, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 17.  
25 In 1998 the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Drugs used the slogan “A drug-free world, we 
can do it”.  See, United Nations International Drug Control Programme, General Assembly Twentieth Special 
Session: World Drug Problem, 8-10 June 1998, United Nations, 1998) [online]. Available from: 
<http://www.un.org/ga/20special/> (accessed 15/08/17). 
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some of the negative impacts of the illicit drug trade, whether that is violence, conflict, mass 
incarceration, human rights abuses or overdoses and HIV/AIDS infections.26   
Table 1 also places these discourses and practices on a spectrum ranging from legal regulation to 
prohibition to illustrate the myriad modes of control that exist within the drug control dispositif.    
The systems of legally regulated cannabis in the Americas operate at one end of the spectrum with 
highly repressive drug policies such as those of the Philippines, Mexico and Russia at the other end, 
but in between these lie a range of policies that are not always so easy to place.  For example, the 
Dutch system of ‘coffee shops’ functions both as a form of regulation – the ‘coffee shops’ have to 
be licensed by the local government and pay taxes – and decriminalisation – because the use of the 
drug is still technically illegal and the ‘coffee shops’ have to purchase their supplies from the illicit 
market.  Furthermore, ‘harm reduction practices’ such as needle and syringe exchange programmes 
(NSPs), opiate substitution therapies (OSTs) and drug consumption rooms (DCRs), as well as the 
Swiss model of heroin prescription ultimately continue to function within the prohibitionist system 
because illicit drug use is still illegal.  However, these policies, and those of decriminalisation – 
whether formal (Portugal) or informal (the Netherlands) -  all recognise that this illegality contributes 
to the harms caused by non-medical drug use and therefore attempt to mitigate some of the 
negative impacts associated with the criminalised markets.  Like Swiss heroin prescription, the 
‘British System’ that allowed for the prescribing of drugs to dependent users, functioned within a 
‘medico-penal’ framework.27  The range of options other than prohibition will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapters Three and Six.       
3. What are ‘drugs’? 
The term ‘drug’ does not have an objective meaning, therefore it is important to examine what is 
meant by the word, and some of the normative assumptions associated with it.  The word ‘drug’ is a 
signifier, which in the twentieth century came to mean something ‘bad’28 and became associated with 
danger and threats to individuals and to societies, but this was not always the case.  The questions 
surrounding what substances are described as ‘drugs’, which ‘drugs’ should be controlled as well as 
                                                          
26 Steve Rolles, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Nicky Saunter, Jane Slater and Emily Crick, The 
Alternative World Drug Report, 2nd edition, (Bristol: Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2016), pp. 10-14. 
27 Virginia Berridge, ‘The ‘British System’ and its History: Myth and Reality’, in Heroin Addiction and the British 
System, Volume 1: Origins and Evolution, ed. by John Strang and Michael Gossop, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2005), pp. 7-8 
28 Sanchéz-Avilés and Ditrych, p. 11; Herschinger, ‘The Drug Dispositif’, p. 193.  
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how they are controlled, are crucial to understanding the evolution of the drug control dispositif and 
the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.  The term ‘drug’ can be used to describe medicines, whether over-
the-counter or prescribed products, and all psychoactive substances.  As such the term includes licit 
substances – in the case of medicines, as well as alcohol, tobacco and caffeine – and substances that 
are controlled or ‘illicit’.29  The international drug conventions (1912-1988) were concerned initially 
with opium, but this was expanded later to include other opiates, cocaine and cannabis; other 
psychoactive substances were incorporated into the drug control system in 1971.  Despite the broad 
range of substances that are technically drugs, the word is more generally associated with illicit 
substances.  In trying to determine what constitutes a ‘drug’ and the political motives behind such 
definitions, it has been argued that the term “drug is not a descriptive but an evaluative concept…”30 
and that “what distinguishes a ‘drug’ is its legal status and the moral and social disapprobation it 
evokes”31 rather than its health and social impacts.  As Nadelmann and Andreas note:  
That alcohol and tobacco have retained their legal status in international society while opium, 
coca and cannabis were delegitimated, stigmatized, and prohibited did not, it should be 
stressed, reflect any objective calculation of their potential harms, as in many respects the 
former present greater health and societal risks than the latter substances.32   
In relation to the term ‘harm’, it should be noted that the word encompasses both physical and social 
effects.33  Though it is fair to say that the negative health impacts of tobacco were not recognised until 
                                                          
29 Nigel South, ‘Debating Drugs and Everyday Life: Normalisation, Prohibition and ‘Otherness’’, in Drugs: 
Cultures, Controls and Everyday Life, ed. by Nigel South, (London: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 3. 
30 Vincenzo Ruggiero, ‘Drugs as a Password and the Law as a Drug: Discussing the Legalisation of Illicit 
Substances’, in Drugs, Cultures, Controls and Everyday Life, ed. by Nigel South, (London: Sage Publications, 
1999), p.123.  
31 Sue Pryce, ‘The State of Discipline: Politics and Drugs’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
Vol. 8, 2006, p. 603. 
32 Andreas and Nadelmann, pp.44-45. 
33 For more details on the various range of social and physical harms caused by drugs and drug policy, see 
Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times and Places, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 101-127; David Nutt, Leslie A King, William Saulsbury, 
Colin Blakemore, ‘Development of a Rational Scale to Assess the Harm of Drugs of Potential misuse’, The 
Lancet, Vol. 369, March 2007, pp. 1047-1049. 
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the mid-twentieth century,34 alcohol has long been associated with deviancy and social and health 
harms.35  Nevertheless, Pryce argues that “A drug, therefore, is not a medical or scientific construction: 
it is an enemy to be identified in all its many guises, feared, fought and routed to safeguard a nation’s 
citizens and way of life.”36 The implicit normative assumptions surrounding which drugs should be 
subject to strict controls and which are not, can be further seen in stereotypes of drug use by minority 
groups in developed nations, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
It is not only which drugs are worthy of being prohibited that should be explored, but also how these 
substances are described.  Early on in the development of the drug control dispositif these substances 
were described as ‘dangerous drugs’ but gradually this has changed to ‘drugs of abuse’ and the use of 
such substances has become described as ‘drug misuse’.37  For example, in the US and UK this shift is 
reflected in the names given to domestic drug laws: in the US, the language of the legal code changed 
from ‘narcotics’ to ‘Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act’ of 1970; in the UK, the ‘Dangerous Drugs 
Act’ of 1920 was replaced by the ‘Misuse of Drugs Act’ of 1971.38 It is also reflected in the 1972 
amended version of the Single Convention whereby the conflation between drug ‘addiction’ and the 
illicit use of drugs became explicit (see Chapter Four). This shift reflected increased concern 
surrounding the use, and ‘misuse’, of these substances.  The Single Convention defines ‘narcotic drugs’ 
as any substances which it lists in Schedules I, II and III of the Convention.39  During the period under 
                                                          
34 Robert N Proctor, ‘The History of the Discovery of the Cigarette Lung Cancer Link: Evidentiary Traditions, 
Corporate Denial, Global Toll’, Tobacco Control, Vol. 21, 2012, pp. 87-91. 
35 For example, during discussions of the ‘Gin Craze’ in 18th century England links were made between poor 
parenting and deviancy and alcohol misuse. See, Henry Yeomans, Alcohol and Moral Regulation: Public 
Attitudes, Spirited Measures and Victorian Hangovers, (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), pp. 35-42.  Similar 
discourses surrounding alcohol and deviancy continue to this day alongside scientific evidence concerning 
the negative health impacts of the substance.  See, Rebecca A. Ferrera, Amanda J. Dillard and William M.P. 
Klein, ‘Projection, Conformity and Deviance Regulation: A Prospective Study of Alcohol Use’, Psychology and 
Health, Vol. 27: 6, 2012, pp. 688–703; Robin Room, ‘Normative Perspectives on Alcohol Use and Problems’, 
Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 5: 4, 1975, pp. 358-368. 
36 Pryce, p.604. 
37 Kane Race, ‘Recreational States: Drugs and the Sovereignty of Consumption’, Culture Machine, Vol 7, 2005 
[online].  Available from: <https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/28/35> (accessed 
14/11/17). 
38 Race, [online]. 
39 The INCB identifies the substances under control as follows.  “Schedule I includes substances that are highly 
addictive and liable to abuse, or are convertible into drugs that are similarly addictive and liable to abuse. 
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investigation in this thesis, these substances have become constructed as threatening, as will be 
discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Five.  This is important because identifying something as a 
threat does something more than merely identifying the issue as causing fear or unease.40 
The moral dimensions of drug use have become inherently connected to forms of drug control (see, 
Chapters Three, Four and Five) and drugs have often been the subject of ‘moral panics’.  According 
to Stanley Cohen, Eric Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda there are five key factors involved in 
producing a ‘moral panic’: a suitable enemy, one that has little power and is easy to denounce; a 
suitable victim, that is easy to identify with; a consensus that the issue threatens or at least, could 
pose a threat, to society and that ‘something must be done’;41 disproportionality, whereby an 
impression is given that the threat is more widespread than it actually is; and, volatility - moral panics 
tend to be short-lived and often arise, seemingly out of nothing, and while they may have long-lasting 
impacts in terms of norms and practices, the hysteria tends not to last for long.42  The media often 
plays a significant role in the transmission of ‘moral panics’, as will be seen in Chapter Five.  The 
media facilitates this transmission in three ways: setting the agenda by selecting stories that reflect 
the problem; transmitting images, by highlighting or downplaying the claims of claim-makers; or 
breaking the silence by making the claim, whereby the media identify the threat themselves and then 
                                                          
This includes cannabis and cannabis resin (and extracts and tinctures), narcotic raw materials (coca leaf, 
concentrate of poppy straw, opium), the stronger opiate analgesics (morphine, oxycodone), the drugs of the 
ecgonine-cocaine group and a large number of synthetic drugs (fentanyl and its analogues, methadone). 
“Schedule II includes substances that are less addictive and liable to abuse than those in Schedule I, such as 
codeine and its derivatives.  
“Schedule III includes preparations containing narcotic drugs that are intended for legitimate medical use and 
are compounded in such a way that the preparation is unlikely to be abused and that the base drug cannot 
be easily extracted. 
“Schedule IV includes selected drugs listed in Schedule I that are considered particularly harmful in terms of 
their addictive properties and abuse potential. Substances in Schedule IV are supposed to be rarely used in 
medical practice and may be subject to special control measures by countries. All drugs in Schedule IV must 
also be included in Schedule I. Countries may also choose to prohibit drugs in Schedule IV, if it is deemed 
necessary.”  International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Training Material, 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs Part 1: The International Control System for Narcotic Drugs, E/INCB/2005/NAR_1, (New York: 
United Nations, 2005) pp. 5-6.  
40 Suzanne Hindmarch, Securing Health: HIV and the limits of securitization, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p. 29. 
41 Stanley Cohen, Folk devils and moral panics, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), p. xii. 
42 Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance, (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 36-41. 
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broadcast it.43  Nigel South has summarised Nils Christie’s exploration of the ways in which drugs and 
their users make ‘suitable enemies’ for society.  He argues that there are five key characteristics that 
define suitable enemies: the problems will not threaten existing power structures and interest 
groups; they will be seen as “dangerous, often inhuman”; they must be seen as being so dangerous 
that extraordinary powers must be granted to defeat them; good enemies never die, and are often 
vaguely defined so that they can include or exclude a wide range of targets; the more ‘evil’ an issue, 
the better it can be used to unite or undermine other conflicts within society.44  According to South, 
Christie then goes on to identify three key features that make drugs a useful enemy: there is no clear 
definition of what a ‘drug’ is so the enemy can evolve as necessary; ‘drugs’ become threatening when 
they are used by people so these people can be seen as threatening; ‘drugs’ are also grown by people 
and therefore they can also be seen as threatening.45 
The questions surrounding which drugs should be prohibited are worthy of being explored within 
security studies because drugs are closely bound up with ideas of (national) identity and (national) 
security and thus have been securitized and re-securitized across nation states, regions and 
internationally. Further analysis will also be made of discourses surrounding ‘drugs as a threat’ to 
human and national security.  Pryce argues that the identification of some drugs as needing to be 
prohibited can, in part, be explained by their ‘otherness’ because many ‘new’ drugs that were 
introduced into the West by immigrant communities were demonised through lack of understanding 
and fear.46  The implicit prejudices associated with which drugs are acceptable and which are not can 
be seen in stereotypes of drug use by minority groups in industrialised nations.  In the US, for 
example, certain drugs became vilified in relation to specific ethnic groups: the Chinese with opium 
smoking, African-Americans with cocaine and  Mexicans with cannabis.47  Indeed, the first anti-opium 
law in the US, the San Francisco Opium Ordinance of 1875, was aimed purely at restricting opium 
smoking by Chinese.48  In Canada, Britain, the Netherlands and Australia, similar discourses arose that 
                                                          
43 Cohen, pp. xxviii-xxix. 
44 South, pp. 9-10. 
45 South, pp. 9-10. 
46 Pryce, p. 604. 
47 Campbell, p.205. 
48 James Windle, ‘How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition’, The International History Review, Vol. 35:5, 2013, 
p.1187; Craig Reinarmann, ‘The Social Construction of Drug Scares’, in Constructions of Deviance: Social 
Power, Context and Interaction, ed. by Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler, (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth 
Publishing Co., 1994),  p.157; David Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 6. 
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painted the Chinese opium smoker as a danger to society, and particularly as using opium in order to 
seduce young white women.49  It is through this lens, of opium-smoking being foreign to Western 
society, that concern about the international trade in drugs was initially seen.  As with opium use, by 
the beginning of the twentieth century, stories were circulating associating cocaine use with ethnic 
minorities.  The prohibition of these substances, then, was underpinned by xenophobia and racism.  
Kyle Grayson has also explored these themes of ‘othering’ and drugs in relation to the formation and 
promulgation of national identities in Canada.50  As well as ethnic minorities and immigrants, illicit 
drug use came to be associated with counter-culture movements51 and the lower classes.52  Those 
that used these drugs were identified as ‘deviant’53 and therefore threatening.  Furthermore, non-
medical and non-scientific drug use is also seen as producing experience of ‘other’ realities54 which 
can lead the user to question and challenge the status quo, and is also often portrayed as threatening.  
Identifying ‘drugs’ and drug users/producers/dealers as the ‘other’ places them within “zones of 
danger and exclusion” and therefore, it is seen as rational to subject them to various responses, 
whether medical or criminal, to reintegrate them back into society.55 
In the US the use of such drugs was portrayed as a threat to the American national identity and those 
who used/sold them were seen as the ‘other’.56   The idea that drugs were a threat to the American 
                                                          
49 Melissa Bull, Governing the Heroin Trade: from treaties to treatment, (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2008), pp.43-47; Musto, p.43; Virginia Berridge, Opium and the People; Opiate Use and Drug 
Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England, (London: Free Association Books, 1999), 
pp. 260-61; Marcel De Kort and Dirk J. Korf, ‘The Development of Drug Trade and Drug Control in the 
Netherlands: a Historical Perspective’, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 17, 1992, p. 136. 
50 Grayson, Chasing Dragons pp. 56-94. 
51 Dan Baum, Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure, (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1997), 
p. 8; Gerry V. Stimson and Rachel Lart, ‘The relationship between the state and local practice in the 
development of national policy on drugs between 1920 and 1990’, in, Heroin Addiction and the British 
System, Volume 1: Origins and Evolution, ed. by John Strang and Michael Gossop, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2005), p. 178; Dirk J. Korf, Heleen Riper, Bruce Bullington, ‘Windmills in Their Minds? Drug Policy and Drug 
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way of life had been prevalent since the late nineteenth century but was increasingly popularised by 
‘moral and political entrepreneurs’ such as military hero Captain Richmond Hobson and US Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) chief Harry Anslinger in the early twentieth century.57  This discourse was 
revived by US President Richard Nixon when he coined the phrase ‘war on drugs’ and publicly labelled 
drug addiction as “public enemy number one”.58  This announcement followed the beginning of what 
Nixon perceived to be the ‘GI heroin epidemic’, which led to  
the Nixon administration and other US officials attempt[ing] to promote an antidrug American 
identity by identifying GI heroin users in Vietnam, domestic addicts, and foreign traffickers in 
Southeast Asia as sources of danger that threatened not only to spread crime and societal decay 
within the U.S. but also threaten the contingent national identity.59   
Epstein argues that Nixon also used the ‘heroin epidemic’ of soldiers returning from Vietnam as a way 
of expanding his control over, and creating a more unified structure for, the multitude of law 
enforcement agencies in the US,60 though the federal government still spent the bulk of their budget 
on treatment and education.  However, Ronald Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’ led to a greater focus on 
drugs as a threat to national security - rather than societal security - and it was the success of this 
discourse that paved the way for the National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-221) which 
linked drug production and trafficking to terrorism, insurgencies and corruption, thereby reinforcing 
their status as a threat to the state.  This argument was articulated at an international level two years 
later through the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances.61    There are a whole range of actors that gained money and power by pushing the ‘drugs 
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61 The 1988 UN Convention says, “Recognizing the links between illicit traffic and other related organized 
criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and 
sovereignty of States, Recognizing also that illicit traffic is an international criminal activity, the suppression 
of which demands urgent attention and the highest priority, Aware that illicit traffic generates large financial 
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as a threat to national security’ discourse, including but not limited to, law enforcement officials, CIA, 
FBI, DEA, the US military, politicians.  Furthermore, in more recent years, by utilising the ‘narco-terror’ 
threat (see Chapter Five) in order to establish Forward Operating Locations, largely but not exclusively 
in Latin America, the US has gained a foothold in these nation states under the guise of the ‘war on 
drugs’.  The bases have been used to boost US operational capacity and there is evidence they were 
used to monitor arms trafficking and promote other foreign policy aims.62   
4. Thesis structure 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the first research question interrogates how drugs have been 
constructed as an existential threat at the international level and how this has construction changed 
over time.  The aim is to improve upon current scholarship on the securitization of drugs, show how 
the drug control dispositif has, at times, included a wide array of options for controlling drugs, and 
show that the securitization(s) under analysis in this thesis have limited this range of options so that 
prohibition has come to be seen as the most appropriate way of addressing the drug problem, whilst 
at the same time exacerbating the harms caused by illicit drugs (see Chapter Six).  The second research 
question compares the utility of different variants of securitization theory, notably the ‘sociological’ 
variant and the original Copenhagen School framework, when applied to empirical examples of threat-
construction.  The aim is here to contribute to the development of securitization studies and provide 
an example of how the ‘sociological’ interpretation of securitization theory, in conjunction with 
deployment of the concept of the dispositif, can be used to explain the processes through which an 
issue becomes constructed as a security threat.      
Chapter One has introduced some of the key ideas within the thesis and laid out the overarching 
hypothesis.  Chapter Two establishes the theoretical and methodological frameworks and argues that 
combining the concept of dispositif with a sociological variant of securitization theory is useful in 
highlighting how the securitization(s) of drugs sits within a continuum of control-oriented practices 
and discourses that have evolved over time and space.  The chapter also outlines how discourse 
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analysis and process-tracing by using archival documents and media sources are used to examine the 
relationship between the drug control dispositif and the securitization(s) of drugs. 
Chapter Three examines the historical development of the drug control dispositif that evolved within 
industrialising nations in the mid-nineteenth century and became internationalised through the 
League of Nations in the early twentieth century, as well as exploring how the ‘drugs as a threat’ 
discourse was initially articulated at the international level.  This chapter shows that whilst there was 
some consensus that the ‘drug problem’ needed to be dealt with at the international level, there was 
no agreement about what forms of use constituted ‘legitimate use’ and whether a ‘drug-free world’ 
was a necessary goal.  This chapter argues that during this period a wide range of options for 
controlling drugs - regulation, prescriptions, licensing and prohibition - were in operation.     
Chapter Four provides in-depth analysis of how the 1961 UN Single Convention constructed drug 
addiction as threatening to humankind by stating that it was “a serious evil”63 and argues that due to 
its acceptance by the overwhelming majority of states this came to be seen as the predominant way 
of perceiving the ‘drug problem’.  The convention created the conditions of possibility for the 
international prohibition of drugs for non-medical/non-scientific purposes by demanding that 
signatory states limit drug production, manufacture, supply and use solely to medical and scientific 
purposes.  The 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention explicitly expanded the threat beyond 
that of addiction to ‘drug abuse’, meaning all illicit drug use.  The convention reconstituted the drug 
control dispositif as a prohibitionist system where states that enacted practices that did not concur 
with this system of control were criticised; it was based on the premise of a ‘drug-free world’.        
Chapter Five then argues that NSDD-221 identified drug trafficking as a threat to “the national security 
of the United States” by undermining “the integrity of democratic nations”64 and outlined how the US 
military and intelligence services should participate in drug law enforcement overseas.  This discursive 
construction of the illicit drug trade as threatening to national security, along with various US law 
enforcement practices, was then incorporated into the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.  During this period the drug control dispositif 
was reoriented once again with a focus on a new referent object – the state – threatened by illicit drug 
trafficking.  The accompanying speech acts made by the Reagan administration, the US First Lady, the 
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media and Congress, also identified drug use as a threat to American society and the ‘family’ and 
argued that the most effective solution to this was to ‘Just Say No’.  Internationally, the Reagan era 
securitization of drugs established the ‘certification’ policy that gave US presidents the power to 
punish states that they believed were not abiding by the UN conventions; this effectively established 
the US as the ‘global enforcer’ of the drug conventions.      
Chapter Six examines how various developments in discourse and practice are challenging the ‘drugs 
as a threat’ discourse and its associated desire for a ‘drug-free world’.  The chapter also shows that in 
some cases these policies can be seen as examples of desecuritizations and counter-securitizations, 
but that they still sit firmly within the drug control dispositif.   
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis, arguing that the drug control dispositif has continued to evolve 
through time and space but that, at the present time, the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse remains 

















Chapter Two.   
Securitization as a political process: theory and method 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the theoretical and methodological frameworks that 
underpin the analysis throughout this thesis and explain how they contribute to answering the 
research question.  It is the contention of this thesis that during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, a dispositif evolved around the need for drugs to be controlled and a wide range 
of options were available for governments to do this.  As the twentieth century progressed, different 
actors have at different points attempted to securitize the ‘drug problem’ both nationally and 
internationally, framing ‘drugs’ as an existential threat and these securitizations have affected the 
drug control dispositif.  As has been explored in more detail in the Introduction (Chapter One) to this 
thesis, ‘drugs’ have, over time, come to be seen as substances that need to be controlled in order to 
facilitate their beneficial uses (medical and scientific) and also limit their negative effects (dependency 
and overdose).  In establishing this dichotomy whereby ‘drugs’ have both beneficial and negative 
effects, the threat shifts from the substances themselves to various forms of use and types of users.  
A case can be made that at certain points in time an international consensus has existed and that this 
securitized perspective has become the dominant paradigm that underpins the international drug 
control system.  However, the ways and contexts in which these securitizing moves have taken place, 
the degree of agreement they have generated, and the effects they have had vary greatly over time.  
The overall acceptance of this discourse has had significant national and international policy 
ramifications, not least because it has limited the range of policy options available.  Nevertheless, the 
global securitization of drugs has been, and continues to be, widely variegated both historically and 
geographically.   
In terms of developing and contributing to securitization theory, this research focusses on the 
processes of securitization, emphasising the role of actors and audiences as parts of the agent of the 
securitizing moves, as well as the importance of context and practices in creating the conditions for 
‘successful’ securitizations. In order to do this, this thesis, firstly, analyses the historical evolution of 
the drug control dispositif.  It then analyses two case studies of securitizations of drugs that have had 
profound effects on the drug control dispositif.   Finally, this thesis examines the ways in which the 
‘drugs as a threat’ discourse(s) is being challenged.  The two case studies analysed here are the 
evolution of the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the protocol that 
amended it (hereafter referred to as the 1972 Amending Protocol) and US President Reagan’s moves 
to internationalise and militarise US drug law enforcement through National Security Decision 
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Directive 221 (NSDD-221).  These two securitizations, it will be argued, operate within the drug control 
dispositif, which will be established and examined in more detail later on in this chapter and in Chapter 
Three. 
This chapter will initially explore what the purpose of securitization theory is and how it is distinctive; 
it will then investigate the relationship between securitizations and the dispositif, arguing that 
securitizations are a combination of contextually situated speech acts and practices that exist within 
the dispositif.  The chapter will then scrutinise the discourses and practices that contribute to the 
sedimentation of the securitization(s).  This will include analysis of the function and importance of the 
‘speech act’, as well as its constituent elements: the referent object, the existential threat, the 
extraordinary measures; before moving on to discuss the discursive and rhetorical strategies used by 
the agents of securitization.  It will then explore the contribution of practices to the securitizing move.  
Next it will evaluate the roles of the ‘actor’ and ‘audience’ as agents of securitization.  The chapter will 
then consider the importance of the context in which the securitizing moves are made, arguing that 
this is crucial to understanding the processes through which an issue becomes securitized.  It will then 
explore whether it is important to identify when a ‘successful’ securitization occurs, before moving on 
the discuss responses the securitizations including desecuritizations, counter-securitizations, silence 
and resistance.  Finally, this chapter will outline the methodology used in this thesis. 
2. What is distinctive about securitization theory? 
The securitization framework evolved during the post-Cold War period and involved the synthesis of 
Barry Buzan’s regional security complex theory and Olé Wæver’s multi-sectoral security and 
securitization analysis.65  Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, known collectively as the Copenhagen School 
(CS),66  argue that “security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues.  And it 
offers a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of 
politicization – for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions.”67  Buzan et al. 
claim that by making something a security issue, it becomes framed as a “special kind of politics or as 
                                                          
65 Barry Buzan, Olé Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder, CO.: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998), p. vii.  
66 Bill McSweeney coined the term ‘Copenhagen School’ in reference to Buzan, Wæver and other societal 
security analysts.  See, Bill McSweeney, ‘Review: Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 27, 1996, pp. 81-93.  
67 Buzan et al., p. vii. 
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above politics”.68  They argue that ‘security’ cannot be defined as an analytical or philosophical 
concept, rather it is defined by the way in which it is used, and is thus a “self-referential practice” 
whereby something becomes a security issue not because it is a self-evidently ‘real’ existential threat 
but because it is presented as such.69  For the CS then, ‘security’ is the presentation of an issue as an 
existential threat.70  The CS argue that there is a specific grammatical process in play when a 
securitization occurs: a securitizing actor identifies an ‘existential threat’ in relation to a ‘referent 
object’ and ‘extraordinary measures’ are articulated in order to counteract that threat.71  Thus 
‘security’ is conceived of as a ‘speech act’ and they note that “[the] invocation of security has been 
key to legitimizing the use of force, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats.”72   
The CS defines three types of units of analysis that are relevant to security analysis.  The first are the 
referent objects which are “things that are seen to be existentially threatened”.73  The second unit of 
analysis for the CS is the securitizing actor; this refers to a person or group of persons that identifies 
the referent object as being existentially threatened and therefore performs the security speech act.74   
The third unit of analysis is the functional actor who impacts upon the dynamics of the sector but is 
neither the securitizing actor nor part of the referent object.75  Buzan et al. provide a few examples of 
functional actors: a polluting company that could play a central role in the environmental sector but 
not be involved in trying to securitize specific environmental issues,76 and in the military sector an 
arms manufacturer could be considered as a functional actor.77  O’Reilly suggests that the media could 
play the role of functional actor,78 however this thesis argues in Chapter Five that the media functions 
as part of both ‘actor’ and ‘audience’.  Within the securitization(s) of drugs, it could be argued instead 
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that pharmaceutical companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and drug trafficking 
organisations (DTOs) play the role of functional actor. 
The CS argue that the securitization framework can help the analyst “understand the processes of 
constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a 
threat”.79   The securitization framework allows the security analyst to trace when there is a case of 
securitization, who the actors were and how the securitization came about.80  Buzan et al. argue that 
the framework allows the analyst to classify what is and what is not a security issue, how such issues 
become securitized and to locate the various security dynamics on levels ranging from local to regional 
and global.81  The CS, and Wæver in particular, see ‘security’ as a negative outcome that undermines 
openness and democratic politics, and they argue that the aim should always be for desecuritization.82 
As is discussed in more detail below, so-called ‘second generation’83 securitization scholars have 
interrogated the CS framework and proposed innovations to it that broaden the scope of analysis far 
beyond that which was originally conceptualised. However, while there are many variations, there 
remain some distinct elements to ‘securitization theory’.  Securitization studies explore how the 
concept of ‘security’ has been broadened beyond the traditional conceptualisation of military 
threats.84  All securitization scholars agree that threats are intersubjectively constructed rather than 
being objective facts and that this threat construction is agreed between ‘actors’ and ‘audiences’.  
They also tend to concur that the field of ‘security’ is paramount and that securitized issues will tend 
to take precedence over non-securitized issues.85  
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3. Securitizations as combination of contextually situated speech acts and practices within the 
drug control dispositif 
This thesis argues that a securitizing move is a constellation of speech acts and practices that are 
embedded in discourses but that also shape them.  These speech acts and practices are performed 
through the interactions between actor(s) and audience(s) that have the social and political capital to 
carry out and accept such moves.  The securitizing move can reinforce or shape the actors and 
audiences as it progresses.  The grammar of security (claim, warning, result) is important but it is not 
everything.  For the securitizing move to be accepted, factors external to the speech act – context, 
power, legitimacy – are needed to reinforce the discursive aspects.  This perspective is influenced by 
the ‘sociological’ view of securitization as expounded by Thierry Balzacq but will also incorporate 
elements of other ‘second generation’ scholars’ works, including Stritzel, Salter and Christou et al.86  
This ‘sociological’ perspective allows for an exploration of the processes of securitization beyond 
merely the speech act event into the social and historical context in which the speech act(s) are made 
and the practices that contribute to their enunciation.  This interpretation helps explain the processes 
through which drugs became securitized within the drug control dispositif in a more comprehensive 
way than a ‘philosophical’ view could do as will be discussed in more detail below.  
Balzacq identifies three core assumptions of securitization theory: the centrality of the audience, the 
co-dependency of agency and context, and importance of the dispositif.  He advocates analysing the 
congruence of these three factors as this can help the analyst identify the importance of one or other 
of them within a “network of causality”.87   He argues that Buzan et al.’s three units of analysis (the 
referent object, actor and functional actor) ignore the crucial role not only of audience, but also of 
context; therefore, he proposes analysing three ‘levels’ of analysis instead.88  ‘Level one’ – the agent 
– relates to actors and structures that impact on the securitizing move, and it has four facets: those 
who support or restrict the designation of ‘security’, which can include securitizing actors, audiences 
and functional actors; the power relations of the agent(s); personalities and social identities that can 
legitimise or limit the behaviour of the agent(s); and, the referent object and the threat, in other 
words, who is threatened by whom.  ‘Level two’ – the act – involves practices, whether discursive or 
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not, that facilitate the securitizing moves.  This level also has four aspects: the language or grammar 
used to perform the securitizing move, which he identifies as ‘action-type’; the rhetorical strategies 
or ‘heuristic artefacts’, such as analogies or metaphors, which are used to create the environment for 
a securitization, as well as which ‘frames’ are used; the dispositif which includes a collection of 
practices and tools to lay the groundwork for a successful securitization; and the policies created by 
the securitization.  ‘Level three’ – the context – allows the analyst to situate the discourses both 
socially and historically within the relevant contexts.89  Balzacq’s ‘levels’ of analysis thus seek to 
develop a more holistic view of the securitization process by emphasising the role of the audience, 
context and practices.  
A number of scholars have drawn on Foucault’s concept of the dispositif as part of the securitization 
process.90  The dispositif is useful to securitization scholars – particularly those who emphasise a more 
‘sociological’ version of securitization theory – because it brings to light the connections between the 
wide range of practices and discourses, agents and contexts, that play a part in producing a successful 
securitization.  The dispositif is a constellation of elements, both discursive and non-discursive, that 
develops in response to “an urgent need”,91 it is inherently unstable and constantly changing, and as 
a result it can produce unintended consequences.92  It has been argued that the dispositif can be seen 
as “the operator of archaeological research, conducted from a genealogical perspective.”93  
Identification of the dispositif helps one to analyse “the strategically oriented overall coherence” of 
an issue because the dispositif “allows for the construction of a particular issue … into a (problematic) 
given … and legitimates the development of procedures that the very orientation of the dispositif turns 
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into appropriate ones.”94  Using the dispositif pushes the analyst to think beyond “causal or linear” 
explanations whereby problems existed before their solutions came into being or were caused by 
them, instead it contributes to the analysis of how the orientation of the dispositif itself creates 
convergence between problems and solutions which reinforce each other and the “strategic 
orientation of the dispositif”.95   
Balzacq argues that securitization processes exist within practices as well as at the discursive level96 
and that securitization “consists of practices which instantiate intersubjective understandings and 
which are framed by tools and the habitus inherited from different social fields.  The dispositif 
connects different practices.”97  He suggests that identifying such practices and instruments of security 
can contribute to analysis of the threat, but it can also elucidate preferred policies that the actor 
proposes to deal with the threat.98  Bigo similarly argues that analysis of the dispositif can illuminate 
the discursive and non-discursive practices involved in the process of securitization and that such 
processes can highlight the forms of knowledge and power relations that underpin them.99  He argues 
that networks of “managers of unease” ranging from policemen to border guards and from 
intelligence agents to military officers contribute to the dispositif through the sharing of knowledge 
and practices.100  Using the dispositif allows the analyst to trace the network that connects the texts 
and practices together in order to explore how these various components interact with each other 
and to see what effects the dispositif itself has on these components.101          
Whilst the dispositif is unstable and constantly evolving, it is also a “self-sustaining strategy of 
power”102 that has a “dominant strategic function”,103 which, this thesis argues, in the case of drugs is 
the control of these substances.  The Single Convention and NSDD-221 are securitizing moves that 
exist within this dispositif of controlling drugs.  The Single Convention was concerned with tightening 
up the licit market in order to restrict drug production, trade and use to medical and scientific 
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purposes only.  NSDD-221 and the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances that followed shortly after in 1988 were attempts to reconstitute the 
elements of the drug control dispositif to address the perceived threats posed by the illicit trade in 
drugs.  This growing trade was an unintended consequence of the prohibition of non-medical/non-
scientific use of drugs that had been established by the Single Convention.   
In her work on the ambivalent nature of ‘drugs’ and the development of the ‘global drug prohibition 
regime’ (GDPR), Eva Herschinger argues that  
… the particular constellation of discourses, institutions, practices, and beliefs created by the 
dispositif produces conditions of possibility in a field like drugs and, thereby, creates the 
capacity for governance.  The drug dispositif renders specific spaces governable on the basis of 
specific norms, primarily the differentiation between illicit and licit drug use.104  
She argues that the GDPR is the cornerstone of the drug dispositif and that it has produced a certain 
type of knowledge and practices which identify drugs as a security threat.105  This development, she 
notes, is indicative of what Foucault described in relation to the dispositifs of security: throughout the 
development of the system of drug control the pre-eminent way of perceiving drugs was that they 
were dangerous and therefore needed to be controlled.106  Building upon Herschinger’s analysis, this 
thesis develops the argument that through a heterogeneous range of historical, political and scientific 
experiences, the previously lenient and flexible drug control dispositif evolved to the point that the 
securitization of drugs, exemplified by the prohibition paradigm, became overwhelmingly 
predominantly accepted. 
As the dispositif evolves, various aspects become amplified and others fade into the background, 
creating new forms of ‘governmentality’,107 for example, the merging of the internal (police) and 
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external (military) security practices.108  This amalgamation of internal and external security practices 
can clearly be seen in the securitization of drugs when US President Reagan amended the Posse 
Comitatus Act to allow for the US military to participate in law enforcement, which then led the US to 
take an increasingly militarised approach to enforcing international drug control outside US borders.  
These practices were then actively exported to countries in Latin America such as Colombia (Plan 
Colombia) and Mexico (the Merida Initiative), with devastating consequences.109  
Both the securitizing moves analysed in this thesis are crucial to understanding how drug control is 
interpreted even today.  The international drug control system that is laid out in the three UN 
conventions on drugs110 is an essential part of the drug control dispositif111 that encompasses diverse 
practices ranging from pharmaceutical regulations, medical practices and trade policies to criminal 
law, law enforcement practices, military and intelligence activities and territorial expansion 
programmes combined with discursive strategies that continually reinforce the idea that drugs are a 
threat.  As will be shown in Chapter Three, the drug control dispositif began to coalesce around the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as industrialising states became concerned about the 
negative impacts of the uncontrolled trade in opiates and other psychoactive substances.  Growing 
concern about drugs led first to domestic controls on the sales of these substances and then to a series 
of international agreements to control the trade in drugs.  The two securitizations analysed here 
reflect shifts in the drug control dispositif: the Single Convention (Chapter Four) marks the period 
during which the vast majority of UN member states agreed to limit the production, trade and use of 
certain substances to medical and scientific purposes only, effectively prohibiting the non-medical, or 
recreational, use of drugs; NSDD-221 (Chapter Five) transformed the ways in which the internation 
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al drug trade was dealt with by the US, proposing a militarised solution to drug law enforcement 
outside US borders.  Chapter Six analyses how challenges to the securitized orientation of the drug 
control dispositif are evolving through practices aimed at mitigating some of the negative outcomes 
of the prohibition of non-medical use of drugs.   
4. The relevance of a ‘sociological’ approach to the securitization of drugs 
The two securitization processes analysed in this thesis are very different.  One of the key ways that 
they differ is that the first securitization – the Single Convention – operated at the international level 
and was carried out ostensibly by a multilateral body, although some states played a greater role than 
others. The second securitization – US President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 221 – 
operated at the national level and was carried out under one president over two terms.  The 
Copenhagen School approach could be employed to analyse the securitization of drugs by the Reagan 
administration which was carried out over a comparatively short period of time by a limited range of 
actors and in which the discursive aspects were particularly evident. In contrast, it is less useful when 
examining the international securitization of drugs by the UN which had multiple actors and 
audiences, was carried out over a considerably longer period of time and in which practices played a 
far greater role.  For this reason, this thesis uses a ‘sociological’ interpretation of securitization theory, 
influenced largely by Thierry Balzacq’s work.   
Buzan et al. recognise that securitizing an issue at the international level is challenging because they 
argue that it is very difficult to create a global referent object.112  This thesis argues that not only is it 
difficult to securitize an issue solely through discourse at the international system level, but it is also 
difficult to analyse an international securitization process using the Copenhagen School framework.  
There are three key facets of the securitization processes that appear relevant in my two case studies 
that are not fully accounted for within the CS framework: the intersubjective relationship between 
actor and audience; the role of context in creating the conditions for a successful securitization; and 
the role of practices in establishing the securitization.  Also, because the CS concern themselves with 
‘emergency’ or ‘extraordinary’ measures, they exaggerate the difference between ‘emergency’ and 
‘normal’ politics and therefore fail to account for the everyday practices that contribute to an issue 
being accepted as a security threat.113  These practices, whether law enforcement, border control or 
pharmaceutical and medical practices, are all relevant facets of the securitization processes that can 
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be identified in my case studies.  Furthermore, whereas the CS framework lends itself to a concern 
with ‘moments’ of success,114 my research suggests that a successful securitization evolves over time 
through a multitude of interconnected speech acts and practices that are contextually situated as well 
as intersubjectively agreed.  The ‘sociological’ perspective, therefore, captures the various aspects of 
the securitization of drugs at the international system level more comprehensively than the CS 
framework because it allows for a more thorough examination of the relationship between actor(s) 
and audience(s), the practices that accompany the speech acts, and the context in which they occur.  
In the case study chapters (Four and Five) within this thesis, I will initially examine the speech acts 
from a CS perspective before following a ‘sociological’ perspective by analysing the practices that 
contribute to the securitization(s), the relationship between the ‘actors’ and ‘audiences’ as part of the 
agent of the securitizing moves and the context in which these moves are made in order to 
deconstruct the processes through which drugs became securitized.     
Other analysts who have also looked at attempted securitizations at the international level, such as 
securitization of the environment,115 HIV/AIDS116 and drugs,117 have also tended towards using a more 
expansive conceptualisation of the framework than the CS allows for.  Some have adapted the CS 
framework, arguing that securitization should be seen as a continuum rather than a binary situation 
whereby different audiences can perceive of the issue as being situated at different points along the 
continuum at the same time,118 or that in some cases an issue may be securitized in order to highlight 
an issue rather than in order to carry out ‘emergency’ measures.119  Other scholars have used various 
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Foucauldian approaches to analyse the securitization of non-traditional security issues such as drugs 
or HIV/AIDS, for example by looking at the securitization of HIV as international biopolitics120 or 
through a focus on the dispositif.121  The role of hegemonic orders as part of the securitization 
process122 and the normative choices that are taken when deciding to securitize an issue such as 
HIV/AIDS123 have also been highlighted.  It has also been suggested that by using a policy process 
model, one can resolve some of the tensions between the CS framework and the ‘second generation’ 
securitization theorists’ formulations, which allows for the CS and sociological variants to be seen as 
a two-stage process rather than as the two distinct forms of securitization.124   
As well as considering other empirical explorations of international securitizations, it is worth 
examining the work of analysts who have considered the securitization of drugs at either the national, 
regional or international level. In analysing such securitizing moves, they have placed considerable 
focus on the range of practices that have been outcomes of, or contributed to, the securitization of 
drugs.  These practices include domestic enforcement policies such as border controls, criminalisation 
and law enforcement training (Grayson,125 Bloss,126 Jackson,127 Buzan and Wæver,128 Dorn129), foreign 
and military policies (Jackson,130 Hesselroth,131 Franke,132 Bloss,133 Herschinger,134 Fukumi,135 Buzan 
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and Wæver,136 Dorn137) and development and aid policies (Hesselroth,138 Volker,139 Bloss,140 Fukumi141 
and Dorn142).  What is quickly noticeable when analysing the literature is how few of the articles 
identify specific speech acts for the securitizing moves.  The fact that when empirically examining the 
various securitizations of drugs, so few analysts actually pinpoint the speech act, reinforces the point 
that the CS’s focus predominantly on the speech act is too narrow.  It also supports a move to pay 
additional and particular attention to the practices that contribute to the securitization, the context 
in which the securitizing moves play out, as well as conceptualising the ‘actor’ and ‘audience’ both as 
integral parts of the securitizing agent.    
5. The securitizing ‘acts’: speech act(s) and practices   
As has already been discussed in this chapter, the securitizing move is conceptualised as being made 
through a range of discourses and practices, or ‘acts’.  This section will then firstly, analyse the function 
and importance of the speech act within the securitization.  Secondly, it will analyse the individual 
elements of the speech act itself, i.e. the referent object, existential threat and ‘emergency measures’ 
that follow.  Thirdly it will analyse the rhetorical and discursive strategies that can be used to persuade 
the audience(s) of the need for the issue to be securitized, and finally it will scrutinise the role of 
practices as securitizing ‘acts’.    
5.1. Function and importance of the speech act 
In this thesis, it will be shown that a securitization is established through a combination of discursive 
and non-discursive practices that together contribute to creating a shared understanding of drugs as 
a security threat.  This results from more than just a ‘performative’ speech act event.  In neither of my 
case studies did one single speech act construct drugs as a threat. Rather, there were multiple 
subsidiary speech acts within the main speech act143 that were carried out by a range of different 
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actors and intersubjectively agreed upon amongst the ‘agent’.  Because these speech acts were 
intersubjectively negotiated this thesis sees the speech act as perlocutionary. 
For the CS, the speech act is an illocutionary act and it “is not interesting as a sign referring to 
something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act.  By saying the words, something is 
done…”.144  Their emphasis on the speech act owes a cited debt to John L. Austin’s work on speech act 
theory145 in which he identifies three different types of speech act: the locutionary; the illocutionary; 
and the perlocutionary.  Austin states that  
a locutionary act… is roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in the traditional sense…. We also perform 
illocutionary acts such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking… [these are] utterances 
which have a certain (conventional) force… we may also perform perlocutionary acts: what we 
bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and 
even, say, surprising or misleading.146   
Simply put, Austin defines the differences between these three speech acts as follows: “we can… 
distinguish the locutionary act ‘he said that…’ from the illocutionary act ‘he argued that…’ and the 
perlocutionary act ‘he convinced me that…’”.147  However, Bourdieu has critiqued Austin’s 
interpretation of the illocutionary by arguing the “the illocutionary force of expressions cannot be 
found in the very words, such as ‘performatives’, in which that force is indicated, or better, 
represented… [italics in the original text]”.148  Bourdieu points out that only in very rare cases is 
speech actually ‘performative’; instead, the power of language comes from the authority and 
position of the speaker to say those words rather than any inherent performativity of the words 
themselves.149  Whilst Buzan et al. do recognise the role that the political agency of the speaker 
plays in creating a successful securitization among their ‘facilitating conditions’, they still claim that 
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‘security’ is a “self-referential practice”150 which illustrates their emphasis on the illocutionary 
speech act. 
A number of second generation securitization theorists argue that by relying on the illocutionary act, 
the CS undermines the role of the audience and the intersubjective nature of securitizations, which 
they claim play an important role in making a securitization successful.151  Balzacq notes that because 
the CS only identify three units of analysis - the referent object, the securitizing actor and the 
functional actors152 - and exclude the audience as a unit of analysis, for the CS the process is not 
actually intersubjective and therefore for them the illocutionary act is appropriate.153  If the process is 
truly intersubjective and the audience’s role is important in creating a successful securitization, the 
speech act should be seen as being perlocutionary because this allows for the actor to persuade or 
convince the audience.154 Rita Taureck, however, defends Buzan et al.’s use of the illocutionary act: 
she argues that Wæver was well aware of Austin’s work and consciously chose the illocutionary act 
that, she suggests, indicates that the intersubjective relationship between audience and actor is less 
relevant than some have stated.155  In the securitizing moves analysed in this thesis, the threat 
construction is intersubjectively negotiated between elements of the ‘agent’ (actor and audience) 
which leads me to see the speech act as perlocutionary.  The speech acts themselves are not simply 
performative; instead, they function as tools to persuade the audiences of the necessity to do 
something.  
The CS has identified three ‘facilitating conditions’ that must be present in order for a securitization 
to be successful.  These are based on Austin’s six ‘felicity conditions’ that produce the performativity 
of the speech act: the utterance must follow the recognised procedure; the actor(s) and 
circumstance(s) must be relevant to the procedure invoked; the procedure must be carried out 
correctly; it must also be carried out completely; the actor must be sincere in its utterance; and finally 
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an actor must continue to support the utterance and its implications thereafter.156  Buzan et al.’s first 
‘facilitating condition’ is an internal condition of the speech act whereby using the grammar of security 
is crucial to constructing a successful securitization.157  This means that the securitizing actor must not 
only identify the existential threat, referent object and extraordinary measures but also use sector-
specific language, for example speaking identity in the societal sector, sovereignty in the political 
sector and so on.  The second and third ‘facilitating conditions’ are external to the speech act in that 
they are contextual and social and relate to the power of the securitizing actor vis-à-vis the audience 
and the recognisable nature of the threat.158  It is in these second and third ‘facilitating conditions’ 
that Buzan et al. incorporate the importance of the agency of the speaker when performing the speech 
act as well as highlighting that the discursive strategies need to be contextually relevant to the 
situation.  However, the CS still see the speech act event as the predominant aspect of the 
securitization.   
Various scholars have critiqued this reliance on the speech act event159 and some have proposed 
broader, more ‘externalist’ frameworks that can incorporate the historical and social contexts in which 
the speech act is made, non-discursive practices and the power dynamics between actors and 
audiences that are inherent in the securitization.160  Balzacq proposes that from a speech act, or 
‘philosophical’, perspective security can be seen as a conventional procedure in which all ‘felicity 
conditions’ must be met for a successful securitization to occur; the ‘sociological’, or context-laden 
perspective, in contrast, is more concerned with the process of securitization, the context in which it 
occurs and the ‘rules’ underlying its success or failure.161  Furthermore, he notes that, though the 
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audience is important for both groups of securitization scholars, it is conceived of differently: for those 
of a ‘philosophical’ view, the audience is a distinct group who is often primed to be receptive; from a 
‘sociological’ standpoint, the audience and actor(s) are mutually constitutive, and can be seen to 
evolve through the securitization process.162  Balzacq argues that the ‘sociological’ perspective allows 
for a broader conceptualisation of securitization which  
can be discursive and non-discursive; intentional and non-intentional; performative but not ‘an 
act in itself’.  In short, security problems can be designed or they can emerge out of different 
practices, whose initial aim (if they ever had one) was not in fact to create a security problem.163   
Other securitization analysts have also criticised the reliance on a speech act theory-based perspective 
because it does not fully consider the positional relationship of actor and audience164 and therefore 
fails to account for repression,165 and presupposes a situation where speech is possible.166  
Furthermore, focusing on the speech act also suggests that speech is the only relevant form of 
discourse to be analysed.  However, Williams and Hansen both argue that images can be used to create 
the securitizing move167 and others have pointed out that protest or physical migration could be seen 
as expressing security concerns as well as law enforcement and other forms of practices.168  The ways 
in which practices can contribute to a securitization either independently or in conjunction with 
speech acts will be explored in further detail later in this chapter.  The following sections re-evaluate 
the conceptualisation of ‘referent object’, ‘existential threat’ and ‘extraordinary measures’ using a 
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sociological approach to the study of securitization, with specific reference to the case studies in this 
thesis.     
5.1.1. The referent object  
As mentioned earlier, for the CS, the referent object is one of the three key units of analysis and they 
define it as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened”.169  Buzan et al. argue that in 
traditional security studies the referent object is usually the state, if sovereignty is threatened or the 
nation, if identity is threatened.  However, the utility of the securitization framework is that it allows 
the analyst to explore a much broader remit whereby almost anything can, in principle, become a 
referent object.170  Buzan et al. claim that scale and size are crucial in determining a referent object.  
They argue that although theoretically anyone can securitize anything, in practice the ‘facilitating 
conditions’ limit what can and cannot be successfully securitized.  Therefore security is usually spoken 
on behalf of “middle-scale or limited collectivities” such as the state or the nation, though they 
recognise that there have been some examples of successful securitizations at the international level 
– most notably attempts to create humankind as the referent object threatened by nuclear 
annihilation during the Cold War171 and more recently with the Global War on Terror.172  The global 
securitization of drugs and the international drug control system laid out in the UN Single Convention, 
like the securitization of the nuclear threat during the Cold War, clearly identified humankind as the 
referent object and has been ratified by over 90% of members states,173 making it another example of 
a large-scale collectivity being made a convincing referent object.  In the second case study analysed 
in this thesis, the referent objects were both the (US) nation and the state. 
5.1.2. The existential threat 
The CS argue that existential threats are not based on any objective universal standards, rather, they 
only become a threat when they are presented as one.174  Buzan et al. state that a successful 
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securitization has three elements: the identification of existential threats; the articulation of 
extraordinary measures; and ensuing impacts upon “interunit relations by breaking free of the 
rules.”175  They view issues as sitting along a spectrum on which they can be plotted: at one end are 
issues that are non-politicised – i.e. not debated within the public sphere – then there are issues that 
are ‘politicised’ – i.e. managed within the political system – and at the other end sit securitized issues 
– i.e. ones that need to be dealt with outside of the state’s normal political processes.176   Issues may 
be moved along this spectrum from problematic to existential threat and back again by different 
actors.177  However, the translation of threats can be interpreted differently in different places,178 as 
will be seen in Chapter Four, particularly with discussions around what constituted ‘medical and 
scientific use’ and the position of non-Western forms of medicine.     
Hindmarch argues that identifying an issue as an existential threat rather than as something that 
causes fear or unease is crucial because “threat does specific discursive work that fear and unease do 
not”.179  In the case studies in the thesis, illicit drug use and the trade that accompanies it have been 
clearly discursively constructed as existential threats that cause “evil”180 and are “destabilizing 
democratic allies”.181  Designating an issue as a threat therefore has important consequences 
however.  Once an issue has been discursively constructed as being threatening, it is necessary to take 
action against this threat and there are only a limited number of ways to react to an existential threat: 
defence, containment or elimination.182 In the first case study analysed in this thesis, the articulated 
aim was for elimination of illicit drug use; in my second case study, the objectives were to contain and 
defend against the threat posed by illicit drugs and its related trade.  As has been shown in Table 1. 
(the Drug Control Dispositif, p. 18), there are a wide range of problems and threats identified in 
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relation to drugs.  In the case studies under analysis in this thesis, ‘drugs’, illicit drug use, drug 
trafficking and illicit drug production are all identified as being threatening.  These issues sit clearly 
within the securitized range of the drug control dispositif and those issues that are identified as 
‘problems’ are dealt with through ‘normal’ politics rather than securitization. 
5.1.3. Extraordinary measures – politics, security and emergency 
For the purpose of this thesis, I argue, contra to the CS, that ‘security’ is not necessarily separate from 
‘politics’ and that everyday practices like those of policing, customs and border controls, sharing 
information and monitoring of seizures of illicit drugs and arrests as well as submitting drug estimates 
and statistics can be seen as contributing to the construction of drugs as an existential threat.  Whilst 
the CS suggest that once a securitizing move has been accepted, it is no longer debated in the political 
arena, Salter and others, argue that many solutions to the threat are in fact discussed, and sometimes 
challenged within the public sphere.183  This occurred during the Reagan era when there was an 
ongoing debate about whether the military should have the power of arrest or not. 
For the CS, portraying an issue as an existential threat that requires emergency measures raises issues 
out of the realm of “normal politics”.184  However a number of scholars have raised questions about 
whether this dichotomy between ‘normal’ and ‘exceptional’ politics is useful.185  It has been argued 
that Buzan et al.’s emphasis on existential threats and their definition of ‘security’ as a “special kind 
of politics, or above politics”186 is underpinned by a Schmittian understanding of the politics of 
emergency and decision-making.187  In support of this interpretation, Taureck posits that “just as the 
nature of the ‘political’ is determined by the division between friend and enemy, the nature of 
‘security’ is determined by division between normal democratic rule obeyed politics and extraordinary 
politics beyond rules and regulations.”188  However, as Guzzini notes, Olé Wæver has argued that 
whilst for Schmitt exceptionalism is the basis of the ‘political’, for securitization theory exceptionalism 
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is the antithesis of the political.189  Though the CS framework see emergency measures as a ‘breaking 
of the rules’ and therefore exceptional, it has also been posited that securitizations can evolve through 
continuous practices rather than only through exceptional policies, particularly through institutional 
competition within “the professional security field”,190 as will be discussed later in this chapter.   
Buzan et al. themselves do not define extraordinary measures, they merely state that such measures 
are “beyond rules that would otherwise bind”.191  Such actions therefore can only be identified in 
relation to the referent object and existential threat and they are also sector-specific.  The CS argue 
that the articulation of ‘emergency action’ and a ‘breaking of the rules’ is an essential part of a 
securitization.  Although Wæver does not define ‘special powers’, in all societies there are ‘rules’ 
which come from specific historical and social contingencies and securitizations can be seen as the 
breaking of these rules “to reproduce the political order, for renewing discipline, and for controlling 
society and political order”.192  Roxanna Sjostedt questions whether the emphasis on ‘extraordinary 
measures’ and ‘breaking the rules’ is overplayed.  She points out that apart from military issues 
(including terrorism), policymakers - at least in democratic countries - are most likely to deal with the 
issue through normal democratic means; therefore, she proposes that the securitization occurs when 
an issue is framed as an existential threat and a strategy to act is proposed even if rules are not 
broken.193   
5.2. Discursive and rhetorical strategies 
When analysing securitizing speech acts, as well as identifying the individual elements, it is useful to 
explore what discursive strategies are used.  This mode of analysis can shed light on how actors tailor 
their messages to specific audiences and contexts in order to increase the likelihood of the 
securitization move being accepted.194  Senn defines the narrative strategies of securitization as “the 
inclusion and treatment of narrative elements (such as events, characters, and perspectives) at 
                                                          
189 Stefano Guzzini, ‘Securitization as a Causal Mechanism’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42: 4-5, 2011, p. 332. 
190 Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration’, p. 73. 
191 Buzan et al., p. 5. 
192 Vuori, p. 69. 
193 Sjostedt, p. 10; Jef Huysmans, ‘Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security 
Studies Agenda in Europe’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4: 4, 1998, p. 10. 
194 Martin Senn, ‘The Art of Constructing (In)Security: Probing Rhetorical Strategies of Securitization’, The 
Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 19, 2016, p. 2. 
51 
 
different narrative levels to achieve specific perlocutionary effects on the audience”195 and Vuori notes 
that complex speech acts can contain “narration, argumentation, and description.”196  Actors may use 
‘heuristic artefacts’ or dramatic language to elicit emotions from the audience and heighten the 
threat.197  They may also rely on pre-existing narratives in order to place their securitizing move in the 
relevant historical and social context.198     
These strategies can clearly be seen in the two case studies in consideration in this thesis.  In both the 
securitizations analysed here, the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse had been in existence for a long time 
before the securitizing process became fully accepted.  As Chapters Three and Four show, the Single 
Convention relied in a large part on the discourses surrounding the danger of drugs and addiction that 
already existed within the drug control dispositif.  Furthermore, although the international nature of 
drug prohibition was new, drug prohibitions themselves had been in place at different times and in 
different countries for centuries.199  In the case of Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 221 
(Chapter Five), arguments about the threat caused by drugs to American society had been previously 
made by Harry Anslinger of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) and US President Richard Nixon in 
the 1930s and 1970s respectively.  Additionally, in both of my case studies dramatic language was 
used to support the securitizing move – drug addiction was described as ‘evil’ in the Single 
Convention200 and the illicit drug trade was identified as “potentially destabilizing democratic allies”.201  
In a subsidiary speech act, Reagan equated drugs with “enemy planes and missiles”.202  The rhetorical 
and narrative strategies used by the various actors in my two case studies will be explored in depth in 
Chapters Four and Five because as indicated above the levels of dramatization in the speech acts is 
illustrative of the fear that was attached to drugs. 
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Rhetorical strategies may not only be used to appeal to the audience’s fears and emotions, they may 
also be used to rhetorically coerce their listeners into agreement.203  Krebs and Jackson have argued 
that rather than being persuaded, the audience may find itself rhetorically boxed into a corner, unable 
to formulate an acceptable rebuttal to the argument.204  There are two crucial reasons why an actor 
may succeed in rhetorically coercing their opposition into supporting them: firstly, political actors have 
to justify their policies and they do this by using ‘frames’ and meanings that already exist within the 
discourse; secondly, actors cannot speak out of context – all speech is limited to “rhetorical 
commonplaces” which are notions that are shared, even if only weakly.  Therefore, rhetorical 
contestation is placed within local boundaries and the actor and its opponents cannot introduce 
completely new arguments (rhetorical innovation) without potential costs.205  Krebs and Jackson posit 
that rhetorical innovation is unlikely for three reasons: discourse is structured and whilst it is fluid it is 
not constantly in flux – “rhetorical stabilities” remain; creating and disseminating a new concept takes 
a lot of time and resources; new rhetorical commonplaces will be up against existing frames and 
arguments.206   
This idea of rhetorical coercion partially explains how the US managed to persuade the European 
colonial powers of France, the Netherlands and Britain to give up their opium monopolies in their 
Asian territories (see Chapter Four).  In Britain for example, domestic drug use and drug dealing207 had 
been seen as dangerous since the early twentieth century208 even though it was not seen as overly 
problematic in the colonies such as Burma and India, and there was growing antipathy at home to the 
colonial opium monopolies.209  Once the US put explicit political and military pressure on the British 
to eliminate their colonial opium monopolies, this combined with pressure that was already being felt 
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domestically encouraged them to give way on the issue.210  Though rhetorical coercion is not the only 
explanation for this development - the change in political circumstances during World War II must go 
a considerable way to explaining the change in policy - it does contribute to understanding why the 
British agreed to commit to ending their opium monopolies.  This reinforces the idea that the linguistic 
act is not the only act involved in the securitizing process.  Changing geo-political contexts and non-
discursive practices were also important in creating the securitization. 
5.3. Securitization through practice 
As mentioned above, the securitizing ‘acts’ also include ‘security’ practices that operate within the 
drug control dispositif and have contributed to the securitizations analysed here in important ways.  
‘Security’ practices are primarily carried out through policy tools.211  These practices cover a range of 
different policy areas from health to criminal law and customs and border enforcement, as well as 
more traditional security practices such as military engagement.  Such practices contribute to the 
securitizing move by sharpening the identification of an issue as an existential threat even though they 
may not be considered as necessitating the kind of ‘emergency measures’ that raise an issue out of 
‘normal politics’.  A prime example of this is the requirement set out in the 1931 Convention for 
Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs for all states to submit 
estimates of licit drugs required for medical purposes, which created a clear demarcation between 
the licit and illicit drug trade.  The establishment of a distinction between licit and illicit drug 
production and use created the boundaries of what is considered threatening as well as how to 
manage the threat.212  Other examples of securitizing practices that will be discussed later are the way 
in which national interpretations of the Single Convention had the effect of drastically limiting access 
to essential medicines (Chapter Four) and the legal reforms initiated by the Reagan administration 
(Chapter Five).       
Balzacq proposes that recognising such practices and instruments of security can show the analyst 
something about the threat but also highlights the preferred policies and how the actor attempts to 
deal with the threat.213  In his analysis of the dispositif as a factor in the development of securitizations, 
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Bigo posits that networks of ‘managers of unease’ share their knowledge and practices as part of the 
evolution and maintenance of the dispositif.214  These shared networks and practices can contribute 
to the securitization, or at the very least make the securitization seem normal and therefore harder 
to challenge.  The emphasis given to the role of practices within the securitization process is another 
area where Balzacq’s framework provides greater utility for the case studies in this thesis than a pure 
CS conceptualisation does.    
6. Agents of Securitization 
Balzacq argues that although Buzan et al. recognise three units of analysis, not only does this 
designation ignore the crucial role of the audience but in fact these units can be seen as falling into 
one ‘level’ of analysis, that of the ‘agent’.215  This section will explore the two of the key facets of the 
‘agent’ as described by Balzacq - the actor(s) and the audience(s) - that contribute to the securitization 
process. 
6.1. Actor(s) 
In the two case studies under examination here, there are a number of different, but often connected, 
actors ranging from governments to bureaucratic actors, and the wife of the US president in the case 
of NSDD-221.  Sometimes these actors operate in conjunction with each other, sometimes they work 
in opposition and often their roles as actor and audience are blurred.  Buzan et al. recognise that 
security is “a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power”,216 which means 
that some actors are better able to speak security than others.217  They also note that the securitization 
will usually only be deemed successful if the actor has the power and legitimacy to speak for the 
referent object.  This is one of the reasons that the US failed to securitize drugs through the League of 
Nations: they refused to join the organisation and had not yet reached the point of being a global 
hegemon, which meant that they did not have the power and legitimacy to speak convincingly for the 
referent object. 
Buzan et al. make it clear that although it is possible for individuals or small groups “at the micro end 
of the scale” to securitize an issue, it is unlikely that they will have the power to get their voices 
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heard.218  This means that the state is privileged in identifying an issue as an existential threat because 
governments have the power and capabilities to influence people.  In democratic regimes, the 
government has some level of in-built legitimacy to speak for the citizenry due to the fact that the 
political representatives are elected, and if the public disagrees with an act carried out by a 
government, they can vote said government out of power,219 though this rarely happens.  In 
authoritarian or non-democratic systems, the actor still needs to appeal to an audience even if it is 
made up exclusively of members of the political/military elites who rely on the regime for their 
positions.220  However, this blurring between actor and audience can occur in democratic systems as 
well, for example in cases of national security when the ‘audiences’, or groups that need to be 
convinced, are often military officials and the political elites and as such they are already part of the 
securitizing actor (when it is the state),221 or when the audience is also the referent object.222  In both 
of my case studies there were blurred lines between the actor and the audience: for example, the 
relationships between members states and the drug control bureaucrats during the drafting of the 
Single Convention is difficult to delineate and the US, which began the process as the ‘actor’, became 
an ‘audience’ during the ratification process.  There is also a lack of clear boundaries between the 
Reagan administration (actor) and the military and security professionals (audience) during the 
drafting of NSDD-221.  The media and general public can be seen as functioning as both actor and 
audience within the Reagan era securitization. 
Salter argues that the ‘statist model’ does not fully explain the complex social dynamics involved in 
creating a successful securitization and that it is important to recognise that non-state actors can also 
securitize.223  Some analysts have shown that the media, NGOs and private groups can be actors as 
well as security professionals such as customs officers, police, intelligence services and the military.224  
Other “common players in this role [as the securitizing actor] are political leaders, bureaucracies, 
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governments, lobbyists and pressure groups”,225 and collections of states, such as the United Nations 
(UN).  Bigo argues that whilst ‘amateurs’ (e.g. churches, NGOs etc.) can also become involved in the 
process of defining security, security professionals have the edge because they are invested with 
institutional knowledge and authority.226  Security professionals or ‘professional managers of unease’ 
can securitize or at the very least support the state when they attempt to carry out a securitizing move 
because the professionals are able to define, prioritise and categorise threats.227  The ‘managers of 
unease’ are situated within a habitus, and they have a shared sense of the threat.  Their field, 
therefore, is the management of fear and security and this allows them to claim ‘security’ as a 
legitimate object of their discourse.228  Securitization can, therefore, be created between political 
actors in the national field and security professionals at the transnational level.229  As Bigo notes, “the 
security process is thus a result of a field effect in which no actor can be the master of the game but 
in which everyone’s knowledge and technological resources produce a hierarchy of threats.”230  The 
importance of the role of security professionals in defining threats is particularly relevant in both the 
case studies under analysis here.  In the Single Convention case study, many of the key drug control 
bureaucrats came from a ‘security’ background in the broadest sense including policing, 
pharmaceutical or customs and excise rather than from medical backgrounds which might seem more 
relevant given that the substances of concern have major health impacts – indeed they worked to 
keep medical professionals out of the process of designing the international drug control system.231  
In the NSDD-221 case study, the CIA played an important role in identifying the threats posed by the 
illicit drug trade to US national security.  Whilst amateurs need to prove their claims, professionals can 
rely on their authority to establish their claims and they also share such knowledge with other 
professionals: this shared sense of authority and agreement creates “a community of mutual 
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recognition”.232 As Bourdieu notes, it is the authority of the speaker that gives their words power and 
legitimacy.233 
In the political ‘field’ the ability to effect change through speech acts depends on the speakers’ 
authority, this is referred to as ‘linguistic competence’, i.e. who can speak or engage in the debate.234  
‘Linguistic competence’ works because there is an assumption that the actor knows what is going on 
and is concerned about the common good.235  The communication of speech acts achieves its aims 
when the speaker and listener agree on mutual knowledge that persuades the listener to do 
something, therefore the power involved is relational rather than “self-actional”.236  Those that ‘speak 
security’ must have the symbolic capital (knowledge and authority) to produce a convincing 
argument.237  Knowledge (cultural capital), trust and power relations (political and social capital) are 
all connected and are crucial to creating a successful securitization:238 for example, health care 
professionals and the police can support/maintain securitizations of HIV/AIDS and organised crime 
respectively.  Those with expert knowledge can securitize or be used to defend/maintain a 
securitization not because of their power but because of their authority within the system.239  Senn 
and Elhardt argue that when the actor has symbolic power and uses pre-existing narratives they are 
more likely to be convincing.240  It has been noted that it can be hard for ‘non-experts’ to challenge 
the knowledge of institutional authorities,241 however one way to do this is to either propose 
alternative knowledge or “expose the experts” and their role in producing/maintaining the 
securitization.242  Until the late twentieth century, there were few serious challenges to the prohibition 
paradigm.  However, as we shall see in Chapter Six, new practices such as needle and syringe exchange 
programmes (NSPs) and drug consumption rooms (DCRs) were introduced in order to mitigate the 
threat posed by rising HIV infections and overdose rates amongst injecting drug users.  These practices 
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were seen as a challenge to the international drug control system by the drug control bodies but were 
gradually accepted as evidence of their efficacy became recognised.   
As well as having ‘linguistic competence’ and social and political capital, the security process evolves 
through the ‘truth’ of institutions and experts, supported by security professionals and commonly 
used discourses within the media.  Security professionals therefore validate (or not) the discourses of 
political actors during the securitization process.243  Foucault states that ‘regimes of truth’ are based 
on “the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it.”244  According to Foucault 
those that are authorised within the “regime of truth” to speak are the “specific intellectual” and they 
have specific knowledge to speak on a specific subject.245  Within their domain of knowledge, they are 
able to produce relevant truths.  The institution in which the ‘specific intellectual’ is based gives the 
speaker their authority to speak and legitimises their discourse.246  There are several important facets 
to this idea; the discourse is accepted as ‘truth’ because it is situated within a specific ‘regime of truth’; 
the speaker is authorised to produce such ‘truths’ due to their position within a valid institution and 
their role as an expert; there exists a limited place in which the ‘truth’ operates; and finally, a specific 
set of practices that can produce the truth but are also effects of the ‘truth’.247  ‘Truth’ is determined 
both by the authority of the actor and the actual statement made.  Discursive strategies then shape 
how the argument will be received.248  Therefore, the securitization process occurs through the power 
positions of the actors rather than through the development of new frames, but it can also result from 
struggles both between institutions and within institutions regarding what can be conceived of as the 
legitimate ‘truth’.249  However, it should be noted that although security professionals and others 
claim that they are responding to increasing threats, the shift in focus from one threat to another can 
often be related to their own interests, such as competition for budgets and resources250 rather than 
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any objective ‘truth’.  This is illustrated by Harry Anslinger’s eagerness to commit to cannabis control 
in the US as a way of protecting the Federal Bureau of Narcotics’ budgets.251      
6.2. The Audience(s) 
According to the CS, ‘security’ is a self-referential practice but it is also an intersubjective process.252  
As mentioned earlier this seems somewhat contradictory, because if the securitizing process is truly 
intersubjective then it cannot also be self-referential.  A number of scholars therefore have noted that 
there is the lack of conceptualisation surrounding the relationship between the actor and the 
audience253 and that in empirical examples of securitizations it is often difficult to identify who the 
actors and audiences are or when the audience ‘accepts’ the securitizing move.254  However, the 
audience is only one aspect of the securitizing move, and too much focus on the audience can 
overshadow the role of other aspects of the securitization such as administrative and security 
practices.255  When attempting to identify the audience, it is important to recognise that the 
audience(s) must be relevant to the securitizing move and have the ability to legitimise the actor’s 
claims,256 but also that there is a mutual constitution between the actor and the audience257 and the 
speech act may shape the audience.258  Wilhelmsen argues from a post-structuralist perspective that 
the speech act creates/co-constitutes audiences and actors,259 however, I argue that it is the 
securitization itself, including both speech acts and practices, which can create or at least, co-
constitute actors and audiences.       
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It is important to emphasise here that not all audiences are equal and that they can play different 
roles in the securitizing moves.260  While some studies on securitization assume that the audience is 
the general public,261 others point out that the audiences are often more likely to be political and 
military elites.262  Roe identifies two forms of support that can be provided by the different audiences: 
moral support (e.g. the general public) and formal support (e.g. legislatures).263  Even where the 
general public does make up part of the audience, they are likely to only be able to provide moral 
rather than formal support.264  This is because, though securitizing actors may appeal to the general 
public for moral support, it is the formal support given by the legislative branch of government, the 
political and military elites or at the global level, the UN Security Council for example, that actually 
legitimises the securitizing move.265  Even here however, the formal audiences carry differing amounts 
of weight: governments can dispense with the UN Security Council, for example, as Tony Blair did 
when attempting to securitize Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in 2003, but they cannot go to war 
without the support of the legislative body.266  These ideas around formal and moral support, and the 
differing weight given by different audiences, are pertinent to my research because in my first case 
study of the international system, even once the national representatives had signed the UN Single 
Convention, they had to go back to their national governments to get the treaty ratified and 
incorporated into domestic legislation.  My second case study highlights the two levels of support 
more clearly: Reagan appealed to the general public for moral support through his public addresses, 
but it was the formal support, not of Congress but of members of his own administration, that he 
needed in order to legitimise NSDD-221.      
Although the audience is an active participant in the intersubjective process rather than a passive one, 
they can acquiesce to the actors’ claims as well as accept them,267 or as we saw earlier, they may be 
coerced through rhetoric.268  Oren and Solomon advocate the idea that ‘acceptance’ can also consist 
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of the audience(s) joining in with the actors in “ritualised chanting” rather than truly accepting the 
securitization; ritualised chanting, they argue, can stretch the moment of the act over time.269  This 
idea of ritualised chanting as acceptance helps describes the period in between when states signed 
and ratified the Single Convention and when they enacted legislation to incorporate the treaty’s 
policies into domestic law and subsequently reiterated and embedded the prohibitionist paradigm. 
In both securitizing moves analysed here the intersubjective relationships were important.  During the 
League of Nations period there was genuine intersubjective engagement around whether drugs 
should be seen as a threat and during the drafting period of both the Single Convention and NSDD-
221, the audiences were active in shaping the proposed practices even if they played a lesser role in 
debating the necessity of threat designation.  In order to analyse the levels of audience engagement 
in my case studies I will be guided by a series of questions put forward by Côté: which aspects of the 
securitizing move does the audience agree/disagree with, and why?  Did the audience manage to 
modify the securitization process?  What response, if any, did the actor take to the audiences’ 
reactions?  Did this have any effect on the securitizing move?  What effect does the power relationship 
between actor and audience, the level of the audiences’ perceived knowledge, the level of 
engagement or the audience’s cohesiveness have on the influence of the audience to shape the 
securitizing process?270 
7. Context: more than just a facilitating condition  
The importance of context within the securitization framework is another of the key areas where 
‘second generation’ scholars have challenged the CS.  The context in which the speech acts were made 
is crucial for my case studies and their relationship with the drug control dispositif.  The drug control 
dispositif began to evolve in industrialising states in the mid- to late-nineteenth century as these 
societies formalised their medical and pharmaceutical professions and through the collection of data 
became aware of the risk of overdose and dependence on opiates (see Chapter Three).  At this point, 
control of drugs was a domestic issue, but this changed in the twentieth century when the US called 
for international cooperation on the ‘drug problem’.  Whilst the US was successful in internationalising 
the drug control dispositif in the first half of the twentieth century, it was far less successful at 
encouraging states to sign up to an international prohibition of non-medical/non-scientific drug use 
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during this period.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, this opposition faded away for a range 
of political, social, cultural and economic reasons.  Though the US had refused to join the League of 
Nations, with the creation of the United Nations, there was greater US willingness to engage with the 
international system.  Furthermore, during this period, the US established its position as a global 
hegemon, meaning that it had greater agency and power to speak for the referent object.  As US 
power grew, the position of the European colonial powers within the international order declined.  
Once Britain, France and the Netherlands lost their Asian territories, first to the Japanese during World 
War II and then through the process of decolonisation, their need to defend quasi-medical use and 
opium regulation waned.  In my second case study, it is important to understand how the Cold War 
and leftist revolutions in Central America shaped the securitizing move.  The Reagan Doctrine of 
supporting anti-communist resistance movements explains why the US particularly identified Bulgaria, 
Cuba, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua as regimes that were contributing to the illicit drug trade whilst 
ignoring allies such as the Nicaraguan Contras and Panama who had a long history of participating in 
illicit drug trafficking.  The emphasis on ‘family values’ during the Reagan era also contributed to the 
‘Just Say No’ campaign and the moral panic around crack cocaine.         
Whilst the CS does recognise the role of context within the ‘facilitating conditions’, it is one of the 
most under-developed aspects of the original securitization framework.271  A number of scholars have 
proposed revisions to the theory in order to highlight the importance of the social, political and 
historical contexts in which the securitizing move is made.  It has been argued that there is a need for 
a deeper consideration of “political agency, audience and context” than the CS interpretation allows 
for,272 and that the analyst must recognise the historical processes in which each securitization is 
situated.273  Therefore, it is useful to see all securitizations as existing within a historical context rather 
than focussing solely on the speech act, which fails to take the complex nature of securitizations into 
account.274  Hindmarch proposes that the way to resolve this tension between speech act and context 
is to see the speech act as the “analytical but not ontological starting point… [which then] emphasizes 
that speech acts are historically produced.”275  This then, allows the analyst to work backwards from 
the speech act in order to explore how the threat designation was produced and what antecedents it 
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may have had.  In line with this approach, Chapter Three provides the historical context in which the 
Single Convention and NSDD-221 were produced.           
Considering the context within which the securitizing move occurs can also highlight who is authorised 
to speak as much as what they can say.  Balzacq argues that agency and context are inextricably 
linked.276  In order to successfully alert an audience to a security threat, the actor needs to situate 
their language in the relevant context.277  As Balzacq notes, “success, that is, the possibility of 
marshalling the assent of the audience (the perlocutionary effect) rests with whether the historical 
conjuncture renders the audiences more sensitive to its vulnerability.”278  Therefore, the success of 
the securitizing move is dependent on the actor choosing the right time as well as the right words to 
communicate the threat.279  The circumstances, i.e. context, need to be right for the audience to 
recognise and fear the threat.  This is a crucial aspect to consider in my research: it is not just what is 
said or how it is said, but when it is said.  It is not only the context in which the securitizing move is 
made that is important to the success, the ‘resonance’ that it has for the audience is also crucial.  As 
Watson notes, this is an area where securitization studies can learn something from the literature on 
framing: for both framing and securitizing moves, situating the issue within its social and political 
context is essential for success.280  The ‘frame’ is used to structure the properties of an issue and label 
the issue as a threat; therefore, it must be relevant to the audience.281  Speech acts then become 
heuristic cues that direct the audiences’ attention to a certain issue as a threat.282  In a related vein 
Stritzel posits that it is also important to acknowledge the relational dynamics of the social and political 
processes that create a successful securitization.283 In order to do so, he proposes three levels of “text, 
context and positional power”.284  His framework creates three layers of securitization: the 
performative force of the speech act; the actors’ situated-ness in the existing discourse; and the 
positional power of the actor.285  He further notes that analysis of the positional power of the actor 
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allows for the examination of hidden forms of influence that give the securitization framework a better 
grounding in social theory.286 
8. When does a ‘successful securitization’ occur, and does it really matter?  
‘Second generation’ scholars challenge the CS framework of securitization in relation to when an issue 
becomes ‘successfully’ securitized, or not.  There are two related issues here: some scholars argue 
that the CS is not clear about when an issue becomes securitized;287 others propose that a 
securitization should not be seen as a binary position of success/failure, rather that it exists upon a 
continuum and can move gradually through “normalcy, risk, threat” whereby the movement from 
‘normality’ to ‘emergency’ can be a gradual process.288  According to Hansen, the CS have resisted a 
firm definition around how one can identify the point at which a securitization has actually been 
successful.289  Buzan et al. state that  
discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent 
object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move [italics in original], but 
the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.290  
However, they also note that a securitization becomes successful when the securitizing actor is 
allowed to break free of existing rules that would normally govern their behaviour and that ‘security’ 
is a self-referential practice.291  It has been argued that this puts too much emphasis on the speech act 
event and the actors’ ability to persuade rather than what is done by securitizing an issue. 
Furthermore, it is not always easy to pinpoint when the audience actually does accept the threat.292  
Some scholars have therefore proposed identifying the point of success as being when there is a 
general recognition of threat and discourses surrounding it,293 or when a ‘critical mass’ of people 
accept the discursive construction of the issue as threatening.294  In contrast, Salter argues that it is 
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not enough for the audience just to accept the threat, there must be policy change as well.  He 
recognises that this is a development away from the original CS conceptualisation of securitization.295  
McDonald argues that because the CS is not clear as to when an issue becomes securitized, it makes 
no sense to focus on ‘the moment’.  He notes that there are a number of reasons why it may not be 
clear or useful to focus on when an issue has become securitized: issues can come to be seen as a 
threat over time; focussing on ‘the moment’ does not help us understand how or why the securitizing 
move succeeded at that moment; emphasis on ‘the moment’ can equate to ‘panic politics’ which 
suggests that there was an either/or moment which is not realistic.296   
In the first of my two case studies, it is impossible to identify a specific or single ‘moment’ of success 
because even once the convention was drafted and signed by member states, it took three years for 
enough states to ratify it for it to become international law and then it took even more time for these 
states to incorporate its provisions into domestic law.  The Single Convention can be seen, then, as a 
gradual securitization.  By contrast, my second case study has a clearer ‘moment’ of success – 1986 – 
however, this fails to fully encapsulate the dynamics of the securitization.  In this year NSDD-221 was 
signed, the US Foreign Assistance Act was amended to establish presidential ‘certification’ of drug 
producing and transit countries, the Drug Abuse Act introduced mandatory minimum sentences for 
drug offences and legitimised asset seizures by the law enforcement agents, and Executive Order 
12564 introduced random drug testing for federal employees.  Despite this ‘moment’ of ‘success’, US 
drug policy should still be seen as existing on a continuum that has included abstinence-based policy 
in combination with criminalisation (the Harrison Act and Reagan era policy), support for opiate 
maintenance under President Nixon and decriminalisation and tolerance during the Carter years.    
Salter notes that securitizations may be (un)successful at different times for different groups297 and 
therefore, in order to identify whether an issue has reached the securitization threshold, he proposes 
four questions that need to be asked: has the issue already been debated politically?; has the 
existential nature of the threat been accepted?;  has the solution proposed to counter the threat been 
accepted?; has the proposed solution involved new or extraordinary/emergency powers?298    
Answering these questions, he suggests, puts the emphasis onto the process of moving something in 
and out of the security sphere rather than merely identifying something as being ‘successfully’ 
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securitized or not.299  With one modification, these questions will be applied to the case studies under 
investigation in this thesis, in order to explore whether the securitizing move reached the threshold 
of securitization.  The modification I propose is that rather than the emphasis being on ‘emergency’ 
or ‘extraordinary’ measures, I have identified various policy instruments such as that of 
pharmaceutical and medical regulations as well as law enforcement practices that together form new, 
if not ‘extraordinary’, measures.  This is because, as discussed earlier in this chapter, many 
securitization – including the securitization(s) of drugs – operate through everyday practices that can 
serve to establish or reinforce the idea that an issue is threatening.      
9. Responses: desecuritizations, counter-securitizations and resistance 
After a securitization has been successfully established, there are a range of responses that can be 
carried out by those that might seek to challenge it.  These include desecuritization, counter-
securitization and resistance.  Chapter Six will analyse some of the responses to the securitizations 
brought about by the Single Convention and Reagan era drug policy.  These include harm reduction 
practices, decriminalisation, opiate maintenance and legal regulation of drugs.   For the CS, and Wæver 
particularly, securitizations are seen as being anti-democratic and therefore desecuritization should 
be the ideal.300  Aradau supports this interpretation to some extent by arguing that the speech act 
remains within normal democratic politics because the audience has to accept it, but once the speech 
act has been accepted the urgency of ‘exceptional’ politics means this is no longer democratic because 
the chances of judicial review, scrutiny and contestation no longer apply.301   Desecuritization, she 
notes, is therefore is a normative process that aims to re-democratise emergency politics.302  Roe 
argues that whereas ‘normal’ politics can be characterised by three ‘D’s’: discussion, debate and 
deliberation; ‘emergency’ politics can be characterised by three ‘S’s’: silence, secrecy and 
suppression.303  Wæver and Bagge Laustsen also identify some of the negative impacts of 
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securitization, noting that when an issue is securitized it has internal effects such as inhibiting debate 
and democracy, and external effects such as “stimulating conflict, security dilemmas, and 
escalation”.304  Desecuritization, then, can be understood as the democratisation of the non-
democratic politics of securitization.305   
The CS describe desecuritization as “the shifting of issues out of the emergency mode and into the 
normal bargaining processes of the political sphere”,306 which means that the issue is no longer framed 
in terms of “threats against which we have counter-measures”.307  Wæver, in his analysis of the end 
of the Cold War in Europe, describes two types of desecuritization: the first is a “negotiated 
desecuritization” whereby actors attempt to limit the use of the term ‘security’ and move issues back 
into the political realm; the second type he describes as “sudden desecuritization” or “speech-act 
failure”.308  He uses the example of the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and notes that “speech-
act failure” occurred because the elites that had maintained the securitization lost confidence in the 
system, he characterises this as “inside-to-outside collapse”.309   Roe notes that Wæver identifies three 
ways to desecuritize: not to talk about issues as security; to respond in ways that do not generate 
security dilemmas; and to move issues back into normal politics.  However, Roe suggests that options 
two and three are difficult; particularly within the societal sector because identity-related 
securitizations are so strongly self-reinforcing. 310  He also critiques the first option for not being 
feasible because de-securitization suggests that the issue was securitized in the first place but also 
argues it is more like non-securitization whereby the issue has never been framed as a threat.311  
Wæver describes this state as asecurity, whereby actors “do not feel insecure [and] … are more likely 
to be engaged in other matters”.312  Roe also summarises Huysmans analysis, noting that there are 
three ways that issues can be transformed: the objectivist strategy, whereby the audience in 
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persuaded that the issue is not really a threat: the constructivist strategy, which is characterised as 
‘the outside looking in’, where an understanding of how the securitization was constructed changes 
the status quo; and finally, the de-constructivist strategy, characterised as ‘the inside looking out’  
through which there is a breaking down in the distinction between ‘self’/’other’ and it is shown that 
how similar they both are.313   
In recent years some ‘second generation’ scholars have started to explore other responses to 
securitizations such as ‘resistance’ and ‘counter-securitizations’.314  They suggest that counter-
securitizations can be seen as forms of resistance and contestation.315  Stritzel and Chang define 
counter-securitizations as “moves resisting crucial elements of the securitization process” that follow 
the “ideal-type” of grammar of security - claim, warning, directive.  Counter-securitizations may 
therefore be seen as part of the intersubjective process.316  They suggest that resistance and counter-
securitizations can be carried out by “the securitized subject, outside actors or elements within a 
collective securitizing actor directed against the securitizing actor, the securitizing speech act, the 
referent object and/or emergency measures using the same or different referent objects.”317  The 
predominant ways of doing this, they argue, are through securitization or desecuritization and this 
usually involve processes of legitimisation or delegitimisation; the successful outcome tends towards 
preventing, undermining or reversing the securitization process.318  Chapter Six will analyse some of 
the responses to the securitization(s) of drugs, including desecuritizations (such as Switzerland and 
Portugal) and counter-securitizations (such as Uurugay’s move to legally regulate cannabis for 
recreational use).  
10. Methodology 
This section lays out the methodology used in this thesis and explains its usefulness in relation to the 
case studies under investigation in this thesis.  As Balzacq has noted, simply using discourse analysis 
to explore securitizations can limit the questions that are asked to whether a securitization has 
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happened and how it takes shape.319  As is discussed in more detail below, the thesis employs a 
‘sociological’ variant of securitization theory, rather than the CS model and in doing so, it combines 
and complements discourse analysis with process-tracing.  Balzacq notes that discourse analysis is one 
of the most common methodologies used in securitization studies.  This is because it is useful when 
mapping the development of discursive threat construction.320  Balzacq delineates two types of 
discourse analysis: the ‘philosophical’ variant which is a form of social linguistic analysis and focuses 
largely on what is said; and the ‘sociological’ which is similar to critical discourse analysis and therefore 
additionally focuses on power relations.321  Hindmarch attempts to reconcile these two approaches 
by suggesting that the speech act should be seen as the “analytical but not ontological starting point… 
[which then] emphasizes that speech acts are historically produced.”322  Laffey and Weldes also 
propose working backwards from the empirical case in question to identify the conditions of possibility 
that allow for the discursive construction of an issue in a certain way and how such representations 
are normalised.323  Taking this into account, and in order to address the key research questions of the 
thesis which aim to interrogate the processes through which drugs became constructed as a threat, 
how these constructions changed over time and which form of securitization theory is most useful 
when analysing these processes, the methodology of the thesis combines a discussion of discourse 
analysis and the speech acts, intratextuality and discursive themes and the relevance of process-
tracing as a tool for securitization studies.  This triangulated research design allows for more careful 
analysis of the development of the drug control dispositif, the political and social contexts that shape 
securitizations, the practices that contribute to them, as well as the evolution of the securitizing moves 
themselves.  Tracing the processes that drove the securitizing moves helps to analyse under what 
conditions securitizations happen and how they have affected the evolution of the drug control 
dispositif.   
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10.1.  Discourse analysis and speech acts 
Discourse analysis can potentially incorporate a wide variety of data sources including interviews, 
participant observations, archival material and media analysis.324  In order to make sense of the data 
the analyst needs to identify two key features: specific strings of words which Balzacq describes as 
intratextuality and the relationship between the texts, or intertextuality.325  Similarly, Hansen argues 
that all texts, either explicitly or implicitly, make reference to previous texts and in this manner they 
create their own meaning of past documents.326  She has recommended that the analyst: firstly 
identify how an issue – in this case, drugs - and related policy are spelled out in the original text; next 
one needs to look at how these constructions have been reproduced in later documents; and finally 
the re-readings need to be compared with the original source.327  This intertextual reading helps 
identify how the reinterpretations develop and change the meanings in the original texts.   
Balzacq recommends identifying ‘storylines’ throughout the texts to give coherence.  These 
‘storylines’ have three functions: they show the links between characterisations that highlight the 
threat construction; they gain their own momentum as the storylines are repeated; they can also draw 
together contrasting understandings into a coherent whole.328  They can be seen as elements of the 
dispositif.  In order to analyse the dispositif one must gather together a broad range of “reports, 
doctrines, laws and official statements” so as to identify the consistencies “in the enunciation of the 
constructed problem(s)” and also any irregularities that may signify changes in orientation.329  Initially 
one needs to analyse “these texts for their very positivity to observe the conditions of possibility they 
pose for non-discursive practices to develop beyond language”.330  These texts should be seen as part 
of a “much broader ensemble… that become a path towards the non-discursive dimension of the 
decidedly heterogenous set of practices…”331  Hansen suggests a number of decisions that need to be 
made when designing a research project that looks at the securitization of an issue: whether to analyse 
discourse relating to one ‘Self’ or multiple ‘Selves’; whether to look at one specific moment in time or 
                                                          
324 Balzacq, ‘Enquiries into Methods’, p. 41. 
325 Balzacq, ‘Enquiries into Methods’, p. 43. 
326 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 
55. 
327 Hansen, Security as Practice, p. 59. 
328 Balzacq, ‘Enquiries into Methods’, p. 43. 
329 Bonditti, p. 103. 
330 Bonditti, p. 103. 
331 Bonditti, p. 103. 
71 
 
a longer historical process; whether to identify one event or to compare discourse across a range of 
events.332  This research project analyses the development of the drug control dispositif over a long 
term historical period - from the mid-nineteenth century to early-twenty first century.  During this 
period, it deals with a number of ‘Selves’, both national and international.  The two case studies 
identify one ‘Self’ each: the ‘Global Self’ in the case of the Single Convention, and the (US) national 
‘Self’ in the case of NSDD-221.  The aim is to compare discursive constructions of drugs across a range 
of events in order to analyse how the threat construction and the drug control dispositif changed over 
time.    
Putting this methodology into practice initially involved identifying the key speech acts - the UN Single 
Convention and US President Reagan’s NSDD-221 - associated with the securitizations in question and 
then examining related texts in order to analyse the discursive themes contained within them.  The 
Single Convention was chosen as the first case study because it is widely seen as the cornerstone of 
international drug control system333 and was the international treaty that established prohibition as 
the primary form of drug control across the majority of the world; it reoriented the drug control 
dispositif from a regulatory system to a prohibitive one.334  NSDD-221 was chosen as the second case 
study because, although it was a piece of US domestic policy, it had ramifications for the international 
drug control system and the drug control dispositif.  Not only did it change the way US drug law 
enforcement was prosecuted overseas by introducing militarised counter-narcotics programmes that 
were copied in other countries, but its focus on drugs as a threat to the state was replicated in the 
1988 UN Convention which had the effect of integrating this perspective into global norms.  This thesis 
has focussed largely on official government voices in order to discover how the authorised discourses 
were constructed and communicated to the public and in international fora.  Such texts include direct 
and secondary intertextual links as well as texts that are supportive or critical of the status quo.  The 
sources of data collected for analysis were official statements by government representatives and 
international institutions, private papers from the archives that record the development of policy 
positions and newspaper articles from the period under investigation.     
Analysis of these texts highlights the development and stabilisation of official discourses on drug 
policy.  This helps the analyst to understand the social, political and historical contexts in which the 
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securitizations were carried out, as well as the roles played by the agent(s).  Hansen offers further 
methodological guidelines to researchers relying solely on analysis of official discourse: firstly, it is 
useful to recognise that official texts may be either single authored as in speeches and articles, or they 
may be developed in conjunction with others through dialogue; secondly, intertextual references may 
be either in support of, or critical of, events and contestations within the official policy; finally, it may 
be possible to highlight intertextual links that have been made explicit by political leaders or as 
secondary sources, which can further develop the intertextual links.335   
10.2.  Intratextuality and discursive themes 
The primary sources analysed for this thesis include the proceedings at the UN Single Convention 
plenipotentiary conference, various drafts of the Single Convention and the Commentaries to the 
Single Convention and Amending Protocol, as well as archival documents from the British National 
Archives, the US National Archives in Washington D.C. and Maryland, and the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library and Museum.  Due to the fact that I do not speak any other languages, I was limited 
to only visiting archives in English language-speaking countries.  Due to financial restraints, I was only 
able to visit archives in one country – the US - other than the UK, however I did carry out research in 
three different archives in the US, and it is worth highlighting that none of the academic studies on 
Reagan era drug policy have analysed documents in the Reagan Archives.  Only examining documents 
in UK and US archives could have resulted in my privileging their voices over others and therefore 
missing out relevant discourses put forward by other states.  However, in the international case study 
– that of the UN Single Convention – I was able to complement British and American archival sources 
with records from the UN plenipotentiary conferences that capture every states’ contributions to the 
proceedings and therefore mitigates this risk.  For the NSDD-221 case study I also relied upon 
President Reagan and Nancy Reagan’s public pronouncements to further expand on public and 
political discourses surrounding drugs during the period under investigation.  Media analysis has also 
been useful in the case of NSDD-221 because much of the material in the Reagan archives is still 
classified.  I have reviewed a range of autobiographies, memoirs and diaries of key players in the 
Reagan administration336 for the Reagan era case study, although these have provided little additional 
insight because they do not mention NSDD-221 and rarely mention drugs.  This lack of reference to 
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such a key issue at the time could suggest that drugs were not a high priority for these members of 
the Reagan administration.  
Examining the intratextuality in these texts involved distinguishing repeated strings of specific words 
that reflected how drugs, drug users and drug dealers have been represented over time.  An initial 
reading of the texts was undertaken in order to identify potential key terms.  A more in-depth analysis 
of these words and the context in which they were used was then carried out in order to illuminate 
the discursive themes, both within the texts and across them.  For example, in the case study of the 
UN Single Convention, the search terms utilised were ‘opium’, ‘opiates’, ‘narcotics’, ‘drugs’, 
‘regulation’, ‘taxation’, ‘addict’, ‘addiction’ and ‘prohibition’.  Because the preamble of the Single 
Convention states that “addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil”,337 the use of the words 
‘evil’, ‘vice’, ‘contagion’ and ‘deviant’ were also analysed.  Examples of the discursive themes identified 
in the Single Convention case study were the need for the drug trade to be controlled in various ways, 
the importance of international cooperation, the challenge of balancing international control 
measures with national sovereignty, the importance of the concept and definition of the term 
‘legitimate’ use, but also that drug users were the ‘other’ and that illicit drug use immoral.  These 
themes were then analysed in relation to the questions of how drugs were represented in the 
international drug control system, how illicit drugs came to be constructed as threatening and what 
impact this threat-construction had on international drug control. 
When researching the US case study, the search terms used were ‘drug’, ‘narcotic’, ‘cocaine’, ‘heroin’, 
‘cannabis’, ‘marijuana’, ‘Bulgaria’, ‘Cuba’, ‘Nicaragua’, ‘Contras’, ‘Blast Furnace’, ‘drug trafficking’, 
‘family’, and ‘children’.  Analysis of newspaper articles on drug policy related issues throughout 1986 
from the New York Times and Washington Post was also employed here to complement the Reagan 
archival sources.  The Pro Quest archive based at the British Library (for the New York Times) and the 
Washington Post archive online were used in order to carry out the media analysis; the terms ‘drug’, 
‘narcotic’, ‘dope’, ‘heroin’ and ‘cocaine’ were searched for.  Analysing the context in which these 
words were used and their regularity, drew out the discursive themes within and across the texts that 
contributed to the construction of drugs as being threatening to the American way of life and national 
and international security.  These included the idea that drugs were foreign, drugs destroy lives and 
families, drugs were an enemy to be fought domestically and internationally, drugs were associated 
with terrorists and communists and that abstinence and a zero-tolerance approach were the best ways 
to deal with drugs.  As with the Single Convention case study, these themes were also analysed in 
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relation to how drugs were represented, how they were constructed as threatening to the state, and 
the effects that these discursive themes had on national and international drug control.  Finally, the 
themes that emerged from both case studies were analysed in relation to each other in order to draw 
out their congruence and how the threat-construction changed over time.   
10.3.  Process-tracing and the study of securitization 
This thesis has combined discourse analysis with process-tracing in order to develop a triangulated 
research design.  As Balzacq notes, process-tracing is one of the more under-used methodologies in 
securitization theory.  This is, he argues, partly because it is associated with positivist methodologies; 
however, he proposes that it can be used for certain types of securitization analysis.338  By using 
process-tracing an analyst can look at various interactions and identify how they impact upon the case 
study and also under what conditions the securitizing moves succeed or fail.339  Balzacq suggests that 
process-tracing is far better at accounting for the context in which a securitizing move occurs because 
discourse analysis does not address this question, only whether it has happened.340  Furthermore, 
whereas discourse analysis is more likely to focus on successful securitizations, process-tracing gives 
space to analyse failed securitizations as well as to understand why some fail and others succeed.341  
Balzacq posits that there are two assumptions that can be interrogated using process-tracing: the 
centrality of the audience; and the co-dependency of agency and context.342  He goes on to explain 
that these assumptions display identifiable processes and have distinct social mechanisms for 
example, persuasion can be seen as a social mechanism through which the audience engages with the 
actor, and learning is one of the social mechanisms through which to understand the co-dependency 
of agency and context.343  Through process-tracing, the analyst can examine the amount of congruency 
between factors that can support or limit the securitizing moves within the drug control dispositif and 
therefore one can identify the relative status of various forces within the ‘network of causality’.344  
Balzacq notes that it can be hard to pick one causal link, but by using ‘congruence’ between the moves 
of the actor, the relevant frames that speak to the audience and the context in which both are 
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situated, causal links can be identified.345  Process-tracing therefore helps place the securitizations 
analysed in this thesis within the wider dispositif of the control of drugs.  
Process-tracing involves examining the social and causal mechanisms that contribute to an outcome 
– in this case the construction of drugs as threatening to humankind and the state – being realised.346  
In practice this means identifying a series of hypotheses that could explain why a certain phenomenon 
was produced.347  Mahoney suggests that in order to carry out process-tracing, an analyst must have 
an in-depth historical knowledge of the case under investigation, good knowledge of pre-existing 
theories and studies of the case and the capacity to engage in logical reasoning by relating the case 
study to broader general knowledge.348  Analysis of the drug control dispositif, that pre-existed the 
securitization(s) of drugs, provides a historical background to the case studies as well as highlighting 
the range of drug control options that have existed across time and space.  A wide range of histories 
of national and international drug policy349 were used in conjunction with archival sources to provide 
this knowledge.    
Such an approach helps to explore under what conditions an issue becomes securitized as well as 
highlighting the contextual factors that contribute to making the securitizing moves successful.350  This 
is particularly relevant to my research because whilst each securitizing move was based in socio-
linguistic practices, in each of the case studies there were wider geo-political and domestic contexts 
that influenced why the actors framed their speech acts in specific ways and why the audience(s) were 
willing to listen at that specific point in time.  For example, when looking at the Single Convention case 
study, the rise of the US as a hegemonic power shaped their positional power and agency.  At the 
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same time, decolonisation in Asia impacted on the European colonial powers’ resistance to US 
proposals for tighter controls on non-medical drug use.  The domestic conceptualisations of 
‘legitimate’ use, the independence of medical and pharmaceutical practitioners to prescribe what they 
saw fit for their patients, and sympathy – or a lack of it – with those who became dependent on certain 
drugs, also played important roles in the ways that drug users were perceived and treated, as well as 
how the Single Convention was incorporated into national laws.  With regards to NSDD-221, the Cold 
War and the Reagan Doctrine, contributed to the identification of drugs as being threatening and the 
militarised response.  The Reagan administration’s emphasis on ‘family values’ as well as high-profile 
drug deaths, influenced the general public’s willingness to accept the message of a zero-tolerance 
approach of abstinence and criminalisation.  It would be difficult to draw out these factors using 
discourse analysis alone which is why it has been used in conjunction with process-tracing.   
11. Conclusion 
This chapter has established the theoretical and methodological frameworks that will be used to 
analyse the securitization of drugs.  It has argued the case for using a ‘sociological’ variant of 
securitization theory that explores the processes that contributed to the securitizations rather than 
the original Copenhagen School perspective that is more concerned with the speech act event.  The 
‘sociological’ interpretation allows for greater emphasis on the context in which the speech acts are 
made and the practices that accompany, or precede, them.  It also incorporates an exploration of the 
relationship between the dispositif and the securitizing moves.  Finally, a ‘sociological’ analysis of 
securitization gives greater depth to the analysis of the intersubjective relationship between actor and 
audience, the context in which the speech acts were carried out and the practices that contributed to 
the securitizations, which have been underdeveloped in the CS version of the theory. 
With regard to the drug control dispositif, the historical, social and political contexts in which the 
securitizing moves took place were highly influential in shaping who could speak, what was said and 
how the audience received the discursive construction of drugs as a threat.  The practices that exist 
within the drug control dispositif shaped the boundaries between which forms of drug use were 
considered acceptable and which were not. This allowed for the identification of threatening forms of 
drug use, users, producers and traders.  Further practices then accompanied the discursive 
construction of drugs as a threat which hardened the dichotomy between ‘good’ drug use (medical 
and scientific) and ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ drug use (non-medical/non-scientific) as well creating whole groups 
of people who were identified as threatening because of their participation in the illicit drug trade.  
The ‘success’ of the international drug control system is measured through data that further 
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constitutes drugs and the people involved in the drug trade as being threatening: for example, 
measuring the amount of land from which drug crops have been eradicated, recording the amounts 
of drugs that have been seized by law enforcement, and the number of people arrested for related 
offences.  Within the international drug control system this data takes precedence over health and 
social care related statistics: despite the preamble of the Single Convention stating that it was 
“concerned with the health and welfare of mankind”,351 health-related measures such as (lack of) 
access to essential medicines and levels of HIV infections and overdoses are not seen as failures of the 
system; rather, they are portrayed as reasons to maintain and improve the current system.352 
Though at times in my two case studies it is difficult to clearly identify the actors of the securitizing 
moves and sometimes the actors and audiences become blurred, both securitizations involved an 
intersubjective relationship between the various elements of the agent.  As will be shown in Chapter 
Three, in the early twentieth century, during the League of Nations period when the drug control 
dispositif fully came into being, there was contestation over the threat posed by drugs and the form 
of practices needed to control them.  However, by the time of the Single Convention, there was little 
attempt to challenge the idea that illicit drugs were threatening, the intersubjective relationship at 
this point focussed on how far to restrict the market and how harshly to treat drug users (see Chapter 
Four).  In the Reagan case study that will be analysed in Chapter Five, again there was little actual 
challenge about whether drugs were threatening, but there was a live debate over how far the military 




                                                          
351 United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 1. 
352 Antonio Maria Costa, Making Drug Control ‘Fit for Purpose’: Building on the UNGASS Decade, (Geneva: 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 7th March 2008), pp. 10-12. 
78 
 
Chapter Three  
The Historical Evolution of the Drug Control Dispositif 
1. Introduction 
Using Foucault’s concept of the dispositif, this chapter will explore how ‘drugs’ became the subject of 
a control-orientated dispositif that evolved over time from domestic systems of control in 
industrialising nations to an international system and one that initially focussed on drugs being 
dangerous but gradually came to construct drugs as being threatening.  In terms of drug control, 
prohibition is often seen as the norm - that is, as the way drugs have always been controlled. However, 
until the mid-twentieth century it was not the standard.  Opium, cannabis and coca have been used 
for medical, ‘quasi-medical’,353 social and religious purposes for thousands of years.  Whilst 
prohibitions have been enacted in different territories at various times354 until the mid-nineteenth 
century, there were few controls placed on the use of such substances other than cultural and social 
norms.    
It has been argued that the fact that international drug policy prohibits some drugs and not others 
– such as alcohol and tobacco – reflects the power that Europe and the United States had over 
establishing global norms with regards to recreational substances.355  However, it should be noted 
that prohibitions of certain substances have occurred across the world at different points, so it is 
not accurate to say that drug prohibition is inherently or exclusively an American or European 
project.356  Set within a longer historical context, the prohibition of drugs is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  Before the twentieth century, opiates, cannabis and coca-based products had been 
used for a wide variety of purposes across spatial and temporal locations, only on occasion being 
subject to prohibition.  Drugs have been prohibited at certain times in different places for religious 
or moral reasons; for example, alcohol is currently prohibited in countries such as Afghanistan, 
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Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Sudan on religious grounds,357 as was opium in South East Asia 
during 1600-1800s .358  Drugs have also been prohibited because they are seen as ‘new’ and 
‘foreign’, such as tobacco in the Russia and German empires in seventeenth century359 and opium 
in the US in late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries.360  However, there have been other, 
alternative options for controlling psychoactive substances such as regulation, licensing and 
taxation, such as we see for alcohol and tobacco now or opium in the European Asian colonies in 
the early twentieth century.  
The purposes of this chapter are to show how the drug control dispositif evolved in its early forms 
and also to establish, through analysis of the League of Nations treaties, the broad social and 
historical context in which the Single Convention should be understood.  The chapter also analyses 
the early development of the ‘global self’ as a referent object.  This chapter will show that in the 
early phase of the drug control dispositif, the controls proposed related to improving the quality of 
substances and licensing the distributors, with little regard for who was using these drugs and for 
what purposes.  However, as moral and political entrepreneurs – particularly in the US – started to 
argue that drug use, including alcohol use, was a moral failing that also negatively affected a 
persons’ ability to participate in the economy and society, the issue of what forms of drug use should 
be acceptable became much more prominent.  From the beginning of the twentieth century, the US 
argued that the only legitimate forms of drug use were medical and scientific uses.  Whilst 
industrialising nations established some controls on drug use at home, the European colonial 
powers instituted opium monopolies abroad, arguing that regulatory systems could be as successful 
as prohibitions in reducing and managing opium use.  Furthermore, those states that had well-
developed pharmaceutical industries also had an interest in preventing overly restrictive regulations 
that could inhibit the growth of their business.  As this chapter will show, throughout the League of 
Nations period various states challenged the US interpretation of what constituted ‘legitimate’ drug 
use and US insistence that prohibition was the only acceptable form of drug control.  Nevertheless, 
certain forms of drug use began to be framed as dangerous and then potentially threatening, 
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particularly to Western notions of identity and security, and so the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse was 
born.     
2. The development of the drug control dispositif  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the dispositif is a system of relations that connects different practices 
together.361  The dispositif under analysis in this thesis is one of the control of drugs (and drug users, 
producers and traffickers).  Within the dispositif various “formations of power, such as law and 
coercion, surveillance and discipline, government and biopolitics”362 can be identified and as these 
power formations compete for dominance, they produce “ruptures”363 that can reorient the 
dispositif.  This is not to say that as one power formation took precedence, the others ceased to play 
a part - they continued to function within the dispositif, but their ability to shape the dispositif 
waned. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century a range of different policy tools have been used to control drugs: 
regulatory systems, prohibitionist systems and prescription regimes.  Regulatory systems include 
quality controls, labelling, licensed sales, taxation, age controls and where and when substances can 
be purchased and consumed.  Prohibitionist systems strictly limit access to the substance and in 
their purest form ban access to the substance altogether, such as heroin use in the United States.  
Prescription regimes, which can exist within a prohibitionist or regulatory system, allow a user to 
access specific substances only with permission from an authorised - usually medical and or 
pharmaceutical - practitioner.364  The drug control dispositif, and the international drug control 
system that has come to reinforce it therefore, encompasses diverse practices ranging from 
pharmaceutical regulations, medical practices and trade policies to law enforcement practices, 
customs and border controls, military and intelligence activities. These are combined with discursive 
strategies that continually reinforce the idea that drugs are dangerous or threatening and, 
therefore, must be controlled.      
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Opium, cannabis and coca have been used for millennia and for much of this time there were few 
controls placed on their production and use.  It is thought that opium originated around the 
Mediterranean and the earliest record of its use was in the Sumerian empire around 4000 BC, where 
it was referred to as the ‘plant of joy’.365  By the second century BC the Egyptians and Persians were 
using it to treat patients and later Hippocrates noted its healing properties.366  Galen (AD 130-200) 
noted what may be the first recorded incidence of opium overdose and by the eleventh century AD 
Arabic doctors had become aware of opium’s dependence-producing properties, although these 
were outweighed by its medical uses.367  Opium was subject to prohibition at various times in Asia: 
the first opium prohibition was instituted in Thailand in 1360,368 other Asian countries followed, with 
Japan carrying out opium prohibition in 1600, Vietnam in 1665, China in 1729 and Burma in 1781.369  
These prohibitions were largely influenced by moral and religious entrepreneurs who believed that 
opium use undermined Buddhist or Confucian (in China) ideals such as the goal of enlightenment.370  
These opium prohibitions were not permanent, but came and went according to political will and 
external pressures.371  Furthermore, these states either did not desire to, or did not have the power 
to, impose their perspectives on other territories.   
Like opium, cannabis has been used in societies for medical and socio-religious reasons for centuries.   
Cannabis is thought to have originated in Central Asia and has historical uses in China and India 
dating back for thousands of years.372  Herodotus, writing in the fifth century BC, mentions people 
using cannabis in social situations and early Arab writers do too, but it is possible that use predates 
this considerably, as it has been argued that cannabis is referenced in the Old Testament of the 
Bible.373  Cannabis grew in popularity throughout Islamic societies, and was used by Sufi mystics as 
part of their worship.374  However, in India and North Africa, cannabis use also had negative 
                                                          
365 Bull, p.4. 
366 Bull, p.4. 
367 Bull, p.4; Courtwright, p.32.    
368 Windle, ‘How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition’, p.1189. 
369 Windle, ‘How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition’, pp.1189-91.  
370 Windle, ‘How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition’, p.1189. 
371 Windle, ‘How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition’, pp. 1189-1191. 
372 Courtwright, p.39. 
373 Courtwright, p.40. 
374 Courtwright, p.40. 
82 
 
connotations and there was a belief that it could cause psychotic episodes.375  The British taxed the 
cannabis trade in India and experimented with its medical properties.376  Though British studies from 
mental asylums in India led to a fear that use of the drug caused insanity,377 the Indian Hemp Drug 
Commission concluded that moderate or occasional use could be beneficial and only heavy usage 
had negative effects.378 
Coca use also has a long history; there is evidence of coca chewing in the eastern Andes dating back 
to 3000 BC.379  It was, and is still, used to prevent hunger and fatigue and for medical reasons, 
especially at high altitudes.380  The Spanish tolerated coca use in their South American colonies and 
attempted to transport it back to Europe; however, the trade did not take off because the coca 
leaves rarely survived the long sea journey.381  Cocaine was isolated from the coca leaves in 1860 
and, shortly afterwards, the pharmaceutical company Merck began to produce it on a large scale 
which led to the drug becoming popular both for medical and recreational purposes.382  In 1878 the 
Dutch transported coca bushes to the Dutch East Indies in order to develop a reliable supply for the 
production of cocaine.383  Drinks companies began manufacturing cocaine-based tonics and as the 
popularity of these drinks increased, these companies, including Coca Cola, encouraged exploring 
the therapeutic possibilities of cocaine,384 but even in the late nineteenth century there was a 
growing awareness of cocaine dependence.385 
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The drug control dispositif began to evolve independently in European and North American states 
in the late nineteenth century.  In the twentieth century, this dispositif of control was gradually 
internationalised through the League of Nations and then United Nations drug control treaties.  
Within the evolution of the drug control dispositif, one can identify different ‘strategic functions’ 
that overlap with one another and at times reorient the dispositif.  Initially, in the mid-nineteenth 
century the predominant power formation was that of governmentality and biopolitics and it 
functioned through the collection of statistics and the licensing of distributors. During the early 
twentieth century, the dispositif was reoriented with law and coercion becoming the primary power 
formation, which functioned through trade restrictions and criminal laws.  The predominant power 
formation evolved yet again, as we shall see later on in this thesis (Chapters Four and Five), in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, as the dispositif became shaped by the securitization(s) of drugs.  
However, alongside these primary power formations were changing moral and social norms that at 
various points also played a significant role in the evolution of the drug control dispositif.  The 
perceived nature of drugs also evolved within the dispositif.  Initially, they were seen as being 
dangerous but gradually they became constructed as being threatening to both humankind and the 
nation state therefore became securitized.  The shifts in how drugs were controlled can be seen in 
British drug policy, which has been described as passing through three phases: the ‘lay/commercial 
system’ whereby drugs were freely available, the pharmaceutical system which came into being 
with the Pharmacy Act of 1868, and the ‘medico-penal’ or ‘British system’ which was introduced 
under the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) of 1916 and was formalised by the 1920 Dangerous 
Drugs Act and the 1926 Rolleston Committee.386  The ‘British System’ will be discussed in more detail 
below in comparison to the US Harrison Act to highlight some of the different interpretations of the 
term ‘legitimate medical practice’. 
2.1. Governmentality and biopolitics: statistics and licensing 
Foucault argues that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries modes of power over subjects 
and bodies evolved into ‘governmentality’ and ‘biopolitics’.387  As is discussed below, these changes in 
how populations were managed during the nineteenth century, led to drugs becoming 
‘governmentalised’ and drug users becoming subject to ‘biopolitics’ through regulatory controls.  
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Though the opium trade flourished in Asia, by the nineteenth century most of the trade was controlled 
by European states in their Asian colonies.388  These states, particularly France and Britain, but also 
the US, actively tried to undermine the opium prohibitions, especially in Vietnam, Burma and China.389  
Indeed, Britain went to war with China twice, in 1839-1842 and 1856-1860, in order to force the 
Chinese government to allow them to sell their opium in the country. 390  In the 1720s the East India 
Company was exporting about 15 tons of opium to China. By 1850 this had grown to 3200 tons, 
transforming opium from a luxury item to an ordinary commodity on a par with coffee, tea and 
cacao,391 and by the mid-nineteenth century London had become the centre of the global opium 
trade.392   
The use of opiates, whether poppy-head tea, laudanum or opium, was common in Western society by 
the nineteenth century.393  With limited access to medical practitioners, self-medication - or ‘quasi-
medical’ use - was common and therefore opiates were used for a wide range of common ailments 
from sleeplessness to stomach complaints, as well as to soothe children and as a stimulant for the 
working classes.394  The fact that use of opiates was extremely common, and that these substances 
could lead to dependency and accidental poisoning (overdose), gradually came to be recognised 
through the collection of statistical data, such as death certificates, life expectancy and mortality 
rates.395  The growing awareness of accidental poisoning and the risk of dependency brought concerns 
over the adulteration, sale and use of patent medicines, many of which contained opium.396  
Recognition that these substances could have negative effects, as well as beneficial ones, brought 
them into being as dangerous substances, leading to the idea that they needed to be controlled in 
some form.   
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Concomitantly to the growing awareness of the risks of opiates, the pharmaceutical industry began to 
develop new psychoactive substances: morphine was isolated from opium in 1805 and then 
commercially manufactured by German pharmaceutical company Merck from 1827 onwards.397 
Diamorphine (heroin) was developed in 1874 at St Mary’s Hospital in London and then commercially 
manufactured by Bayer, another German firm, in the 1890s.398  These more potent forms of the drugs, 
along with the invention of the hypodermic syringe in 1855,399 further contributed to a growing 
awareness of the potential for dependency and overdose.400   
Another factor in the growing body of knowledge of opiates in particular, but also of coca-based 
products and other psychoactive substances,401 was the gradual professionalisation of doctors and 
pharmacists.  Professional bodies of doctors and pharmacists were being formed in states across the 
industrialising world402 and as part of this professionalisation, these practitioners wanted jurisdiction 
over dispensing and prescribing drugs.403  Therefore these organisations pushed for the regulation of 
patent medicines and opium-based remedies, such as limiting sales to only those products that were 
approved by medical bodies, addressing adulteration and restricting the advertising of such tonics.404  
France instituted their first patent medicines act in the late eighteenth century.405  Similar legislation 
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was introduced in the UK with the Sales of Poisons Act of 1857406 and in the US after the American 
Civil War.407  The UK’s Pharmacy Act of 1868 created a system of registration for all those allowed to 
legitimately sell these products.408  It is important to emphasise here that the laws regulating patent 
medicine and ‘poisons’ were concerned with the availability and quality of substances as well as 
licensing those that distributed them, rather than who used them and for what purposes.409  This stage 
can be seen as the beginning of the drug control dispositif and the strategic function was to monitor 
and manage citizens’ drug use as well as reinforce the power of the medical and pharmaceutical 
professions to control access to these substances.  At this stage the dominant power formation was 
governmentality and biopolitics through the collection of statistics and the introduction of 
professional registrations and operating licenses. 
2.2. Surveillance and discipline: Moral and social controls 
At the same time as awareness was increasing about the use of drugs and the fact that some of them 
led to dependency and occasionally accidental poisoning, the Temperance movement was growing in 
the US and Britain.  Temperance societies encouraged the concept of sobriety in relation to alcohol 
and opiates, as well as the idea that dependence on psychoactive substances was a moral rather than 
physical failing.410  This led to moral and social approbation for those deemed ‘under the influence’ of 
substances such as alcohol and opiates.  There was a concern that over-indulgence of psychoactive 
substances could inhibit a persons’ ability to fully function in society, and that users would become 
enslaved by drugs.411  Furthermore, as medical professionals began to understand the spread of 
contagious diseases and became aware of mental health as separate to physical health, these 
concepts of ‘contagion’, ‘madness’ and immorality were applied to the misuse of drugs.412  These ideas 
continued to be evident during the drafting of the Single Convention where it was argued that “drug 
addiction was contagious in the sense that the addict tended to convert others to his morbid habit”413 
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and that addicts were likely to “corrupt” those around them.414 It has also been argued that another 
reason for an increased emphasis on sobriety was that as societies became more bureaucratised and 
industrialised drug use (including alcohol use) became more of a problem within the workforce.415  The 
emphasis on sobriety began to shift discourses on drugs from being concerned with the quality of 
substances to controlling access to them as well as who used them and why.  This was the start of a 
reorientation of the drug control dispositif.   
Moral norms surrounding drug use have fluctuated in importance throughout the drug control 
dispositif, and have, at times, played a crucial role in contributing to the construction of drugs and 
drug users as firstly dangerous and then as threatening, as we shall see later in Chapters Four and Five.  
The idea that substance use could hinder self-fulfilment and prevent the user from functioning in 
society was not new and can be seen across temporal and spatial locations.  For example, these ideas 
were used as a reason to prohibit opium in Asia during the 1600-1800s416 and emphasised in many 
emancipation movements ranging from the Russian Bolshevik Revolution to the Indian freedom 
movement that called for alcohol and opium prohibitions.417   
In industrialising nations, particularly the US, drug users became identified as the ‘other’ and therefore 
began to be viewed with increased hostility.  In the early years of the twentieth century, drugs were 
often associated with ‘other’ races but in the 1960s and 1970s, the drug using ‘other’ also included 
the working classes and ‘deviant’ sub-cultures such as ‘hippies’.418  This shift in perception of drug 
users coincided with changes in using populations.  It has been argued that “these drugs [opiates and 
cocaine] had been widely used for years, but were first criminalized [in the US] when the addict 
population began to shift from predominantly white middle-class, middle-aged women to young, 
working class males, African-Americans in particular.”419  A similar pattern was seen in Britain, 
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although not until the 1960s, when the drug using populations shifted from being largely middle class, 
middle aged women and professional men to young working-class men.420   Similar patterns of racist 
and xenophobic scare stories can also be seen in Britain and the US.  In 1920s Britain, newspapers 
reported stories of young white women being lured into death or degradation by Chinese men offering 
them cocaine and opiates;421 in the US, it was claimed that cocaine made black men impervious to 
bullets and facilitated their seduction of young white women.422  This ‘othering’ of drug users and drug 
dealers led to these people and the substances that they used being identified as threatening.      
At the same time, France, Britain, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands all had Asian colonial 
territories423 where opium was commonly used for medical, ‘quasi-medical’ and recreational 
purposes.  The common usage of opium in their colonial territories led the European states to establish 
opium monopolies in their Asian territories in order to control the trade.424  Furthermore, most of 
these states, along with Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, had well-developed pharmaceutical 
industries that relied on easy access to raw materials.425  Therefore, the European states had economic 
interests to protect when considering how drugs should be controlled.  Despite these vested interests 
abroad, by the end of the nineteenth century, industrialising states were turning against the domestic 
use of opium, cannabis and coca.  During this period, the use of these drugs in European and North 
American states gradually became constructed as dangerous and in need of some form of control. 
2.3. Law and coercion: international trade laws and criminalisation 
Whereas in the nineteenth century, industrialising nations were introducing controls on drugs 
independently, in the early twentieth century, the US argued that drug control was an international 
issue.  Under the League of Nations, a series of international drug conventions were instituted that 
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gradually tightened up the manufacture and trade in drugs.  Analysing the League of Nations treaties 
is important in order to understand how the ‘drugs as threat’ discourse developed, because it was 
during this period that the dichotomy between licit and illicit drug trafficking and use was established 
and the issue of what was considered ‘legitimate medical practice’ became highly contentious.  It was 
these concepts of illicit drug trafficking and use that brought into being these threatening forms of 
use, and associated with this, people who were threatening because they used such substances in 
illegitimate ways.  This laid the groundwork for the securitization(s) of drugs which will be analysed in 
more detail in Chapters Four and Five and led to a gradual acceptance that non-medical/non-scientific 
forms of drug use needed to be prohibited.  It was also during the League of Nations period that the 
drug control dispositif became formalised and internationalised through the international drug control 
system that was devised to deal with the drug trade from the beginning of the twentieth century to 
the end of World War II.    
During the last years of the nineteenth century, the trade in opium became a source of concern 
outside of Asia.  The British Quakers and then American and British missionaries raised the issue of 
the opium trade and addiction and pressed their governments to do something about it.426  The US 
government, keen to establish trading partnerships with China as well as under pressure from religious 
groups at home, took up the call to address the opium trade.427  The US therefore called a meeting in 
Shanghai of the European colonial powers and other Asian states in 1909 in order to discuss the opium 
trade.428  The US representatives argued that the use of opiates should be restricted to medical and 
scientific purposes only.  The Shanghai Opium Commission paved the way for the future drug control 
treaties and represents a ‘rupture’ and reorientation of the drug control dispositif because from this 
time onwards, the focus began to shift away from quality and distribution controls to what forms of 
drug use were acceptable as well as how the trade should be managed on an international level.  By 
identifying forms of drug use that were not acceptable, the US laid the foundations for development 
of the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse within the drug control dispositif.    
However, European states were reticent to commit to ending non-medical use of drugs in their 
colonies, particularly opium smoking, which they saw as acceptable for their colonial subjects.429  
Britain, the Netherlands, France, Portugal and Germany all had economic interests in the opium trade 
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whether via opium production and monopolies in their Asian territories or a burgeoning 
pharmaceutical industry, and therefore wanted to protect these activities.430  The Americans saw drug 
use, particularly the use of opiates, as being threatening and that users were immoral and criminal.431  
However European states, such as Britain and the Netherlands, by contrast, saw drugs more as a 
medical or social issue rather than a criminal one.432   Despite the differences in how they 
conceptualised the ‘drug problem’, many industrialised states, such as France, the US, UK and 
Netherlands, introduced domestic legislation to limit access to heroin, cocaine and cannabis in the 
early years of the twentieth century.433   
The ‘British System’ and the US Harrison Act: a comparison of competing interpretations and practices 
A short examination of the evolution of drug policy in the US and Britain in the early twentieth century 
is useful, at this point, because the alternative ways in which each country viewed the maintenance 
of dependent drug users and the role of medical professionals in this maintenance are illustrative of 
their different approaches to drug control.  It was during this period that the US became committed 
to the idea that ‘legitimate use’ of drugs applied only to a narrow conceptualisation of medical and 
scientific purposes, a position that was not accepted in Britain.  It was also at this time that the US 
began to experiment with the prohibition of alcohol and other drugs.   
Prior to The Hague Opium conference of 1912, the US had no federal drug laws, so after the 
conference a decision was made to rectify this situation.434  It was hoped that by instituting a strict 
federal law, this could be used as a model for other states.435 The Harrison Act of 1914 became the 
first federal law to criminalise drug use,436 and it was argued that the act was necessary under the 
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1912 Hague Opium Convention.437  The Harrison Act stipulated that everyone involved in the 
distribution of drugs had to be registered, pay tax and keep detailed records.438  The law was to be 
enforced by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, a section of the Treasury Department.439  The right of 
physicians to prescribe drugs as they thought appropriate was clearly stated in the act.440 However, 
when the Treasury Department issued enforcement guidelines in January 1915, these were far stricter 
than expected.  Medical professionals were to be the only source of licit drugs and through the 
necessity of keeping detailed records, it became far easier to monitor their prescribing practices.441  
Furthermore, the regulations made a distinction between a ‘normal dose’ and a ‘maintenance dose’ 
and pharmacists were expected to review all prescriptions.442  The Harrison Act expected doctors who 
prescribed substances to dependent users to gradually reduce the dose and therefore it aimed to 
strictly regulate, and eventually prohibit, the medical practice of prescribing for the maintenance of 
addicts.443   
The Federal Court initially disagreed with the Treasury Department’s interpretation that the act 
limited the ability of the medical practitioner to prescribe as they saw appropriate.444  In 1916 the US 
Supreme Court supported the view of the lower courts that the Harrison Act was a revenue act and 
should not interfere with the rights of doctors to treat their patients. However, by 1919, they had 
changed their view and accepted the Treasury Department’s far stricter interpretation.445  Throughout 
the 1920s this interpretation was questioned and a number of cases were brought to the Supreme 
Court that either challenged or upheld the strict reading of the Harrison Act.446  These cases eventually 
led, in 1928, to the Supreme Court accepting the Treasury Department’s interpretation that 
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‘legitimate medical practice’ did not include the maintenance of addicts.447  This led to thousands of 
doctors being prosecuted for prescribing maintenance doses to their patients.448   
It has been argued that the shift in legal opinion away from maintenance prescribing was partly shaped 
by America’s entry into World War I and the fear that drugs were undermining the war effort, as well 
as concerns about the threat posed by Bolsheviks and anarchism to American society as drug use 
became associated with anti-American sentiment.449  However, it is important to also note that the 
Harrison Act of 1914 was quickly followed by the Volstead Act, and the 18th Amendment, that 
prohibited alcohol production, sale and transportation.450  Within the US, prohibition of alcohol and 
other drugs was seen as the best way to control these substances and although alcohol prohibition 
only lasted until 1933,451 the federal government remained committed to prohibiting opiates, cocaine 
and cannabis. 
Although many similar concerns were raised in Britain as in America, the outcomes were very 
different.  Medical professionals retained their right to prescribe substances as they saw appropriate 
and were free from governmental interventions.  This became described as the ‘British System’, 
although it has been pointed out that this is not a clearly defined term,452 or indeed a ‘system’ in the 
true sense.453  Under the ‘British System’, drug addiction was viewed as an illness and therefore 
medical professionals were allowed the freedom to prescribe substances, most commonly opiates but 
in the early years also cocaine and amphetamines, to dependent users.454  During World War I fears 
that drug use - particularly cocaine - by soldiers was undermining their capacity to defend the nation, 
led to cocaine becoming a prescription drug under the 1916 Defence of the Realm Act (DORA).455  In 
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1920 after the 1912 Hague Opium Convention came into international law, the British government 
drew up the Dangerous Drugs Act which formalised the system of prescription access to cocaine and 
extended this to heroin and morphine as well.456   
The Home Office, however, felt that criminal laws could be used to eliminate drug addiction and 
looked at the US Harrison Act as a potential model for British drug policy, deciding that a review of the 
‘British System’ was necessary.457  This led to the establishment of the Rolleston Committee to review 
whether maintenance prescriptions were legitimate medical practice.  The Rolleston Report of 1926 
stated that the prescription of drugs to dependent users was “legitimate medical treatment”458 and 
so reinforced the ‘British System’ and medical professionals’ freedom to treat their patients as they 
saw fitting.459  This was in direct contrast to the US Supreme Courts’ decision in 1928 to curtail the 
right of medical professionals to prescribe substances for maintenance.  Whilst the ‘British System’ 
allowed the use of drugs if they had been prescribed, it has been described as a ‘medico-penal’ 
system460 because those that did not have a prescription for the use of these substances could be 
criminalised.    
This system still exists within British law today, although heroin prescription is less common, with 
more people being prescribed the synthetic opiate methadone.461  The ‘British System’ was allowed 
within the international drug conventions because it framed prescribing drugs to dependent users as 
a form of medical use and non-medical use was criminalised.  However, within British drug policy, 
treatment and control should be seen as interconnected facets462 of the drug control dispositif.  
Medical knowledge is fundamental to the evolution of disciplinary power because it shapes 
understandings of people as individuals and populations as collective bodies,463 just as criminal laws 
establish the bounds of acceptable behaviour for citizens within the state.    
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3. The ‘foundational treaties’: cooperation, control and threat 
This section charts the evolution of the internationalised drug control dispositif through the 
‘foundational treaties’464 that include the Shanghai Opium Commission, The Hague Opium Convention 
and the League of Nations conventions.  It will explore the arguments for and against strict 
international controls, the importance of ‘legitimate use’ as a facet of the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, 
the establishment of expert bodies as well as the system for monitoring the drugs trade and debates 
around what forms of control were necessary.  
3.1. The need for international cooperation 
During the opening session of the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909, the Chinese representative 
noted that  
...this Conference will be principally guided by feelings of reason, benevolence and philanthropy 
in its desire to eradicate a poison and a bane to mankind. This being universally recognized, it 
becomes us to put aside all prejudices of nationality and race, and be guided solely by that 
world-wide philanthropy and enlightenment which have brought about this International 
Conference.465   
This speech exemplifies both the humanitarian objectives of international drug control and the need 
for global cooperation, as well as identifying opium as a threat to humankind.  It was the first step 
towards establishing a ‘global self’ as the referent object that needed to be protected from drugs.  The 
US also emphasised the need for global cooperation to defeat the “opium evil”466 and proposed a 
number of resolutions to combat the problem of opium.  The first resolution proposed that “a uniform 
effort should be made by countries represented at once or in the near future to confine the use of 
opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations to legitimate medical practices in their respective 
territories”; the sixth and seventh resolutions stated that even though each country had national laws 
to deal with opium, there was a need for collective action by all states to fully resolve the issues, 
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therefore all states should work together.467  The US maintained these objectives continuously from 
the Shanghai meeting through the Single Convention conference and beyond.  Herbert May, US 
representative to the Permanent Opium Control Board (PCOB), highlighted the importance of the 
commission when he stated that “the danger of addiction to manufactured drugs was for the first time 
recognized by an international body.”468   
The US emphasised the need for global cooperation but did not always engage themselves, having 
refused to join the League of Nations.  However, by 1923 US antipathy to the League was softening 
somewhat, and concerns around global arms control and domestic and international drug issues 
convinced US policymakers that international cooperation was needed.469  This shift in attitude to 
international engagement led the US to sending an observer to the Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) 
meeting in January 1923 and a bigger party of representatives to the June 1923 OAC meeting: they 
included US Congressman and chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Stephen Porter, 
Bishop Charles Brent and Edwin Neville of the US State Department, all of whom attended in an 
“advisory capacity”470 and were staunch prohibitionists.  However, the US took a confrontational 
approach to the League of Nations meetings and when they failed to gain acceptance for their 
positions, such as during the 1925 Geneva Convention conferences, they walked away altogether, 
which undermined their emphasis on the necessity for global cooperation in controlling drugs.  As well 
as being uncompromising, the US took a rather hypocritical stance when challenging the Indian 
governments’ argument that opium use in their territories was a domestic issue and therefore not 
relevant for international discussion, in light of the fact that the US had used a similar defence to 
protect their stances on trade tariffs and immigration.471   
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In contrast to the US attitude, for the representatives of European states the issue of non-medical use 
of drugs were less of a concern than creating an international system of regulation for the licit 
manufacturing and trade in drugs.  Therefore, they supported the need for an international framework 
to control the manufacture and trade in opium and cocaine and to restrict illicit trade.  British 
representative Sir Malcolm Delevingne put forward the British perspective quite clearly: “the problem 
was seen to be an international as well as national one…. International because it became obvious 
that only by international co-operation could the operations of illicit traffickers be defeated….”472  
However, one country that refused to participate in the conferences was the USSR.  The Soviet 
government turned down an invitation to attend the Second Geneva Opium Conference, arguing that 
“By its own efforts on its own initiative, the Soviet Government has obtained results which the 
Conference being held to combat the evil can only contemplate to as an objective to attain in the 
distant future”.473    
By the 1930s it was becoming clear that illicit smuggling of drugs was growing rapidly as the licit market 
came under tighter control; therefore, discussions were instituted about a treaty that would create 
uniform penalties across the world for illicit trafficking, as well as improving the extradition process.474  
The aim of the 1936 Convention was to make signatory states adopt universal criminal sanctions to 
deal with the ever-growing illicit trade.  This proved impossible, however, largely because it was 
considered too broad for the control-orientated states and too specific for states that shied away from 
expanding the drug control system.475  As a result of these unsuccessful negotiations, the treaty was 
considered so unappealing to most states that it was only ratified by 19 countries.  During this period, 
whilst it was recognised by many states that international cooperation was necessary, there was 
contention about how much national sovereignty should be given up in order to achieve a robust 
system of drug control.  
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3.2. National interest versus international controls 
The financial benefits of the trade in drugs played a significant role in the formulation of the drug 
control dispositif in the early years as states sought to protect their national interests.  The Soviet 
government encapsulated this view arguing that, “although the alleged aim is to combat the diffusion 
of narcotic drugs, the various countries are, in point of fact, seeking to promote their commercial 
interests and to earn business profits for themselves.”476  European colonial states that had 
established opium monopolies wanted to protect the revenue from these systems as far as they 
could477 and producer states (e.g. Greece, Turkey, Persia, Yugoslavia, India, Bolivia, and Peru) and 
manufacturing states (e.g. France, Britain, Germany, and Switzerland) all benefitted from a loosely 
controlled trade in drugs.478   
The US argued that profiting from the drugs trade was morally reprehensible.  For example, Bishop 
Brent, who had been chief commissioner of the US delegation at the Shanghai Opium Commission 
stated that  
Money is indeed the root of all evil.  As with individuals, so with Governments.  The crux is that 
narcotics are wealth as well as vice-producing. Eliminate revenue and what Government would 
have further interest in the cultivation of the poppy?479      
During the Shanghai Opium Commission, British representative Sir Cecil Clementi Smith defended 
opium regulation and the revenue derived from it by arguing that “it is the most efficient systems 
of regulating the use of opium which yield the highest return of revenue.”480  This defence was 
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maintained during The Hague Opium conference.  Indian OAC representative Sir John Campbell481 
argued that Bishop Brent was being unfair when he suggested that governments were reticent to 
prohibit opium due to the financial benefits of the trade, noting that “The Government of India have 
formally declared that their opium policy is not actuated by financial and economic motives.”482  The 
Indian representative was not the only one to challenge this criticism: producer states such as 
Turkey, Greece, Persia and Yugoslavia raised the objection that their peasant farmers would be left 
financially destitute unless production of opium was allowed or alternative source of income were 
provided.483  However, by the time of the Geneva conferences, the British government had 
recognised that relying on the revenue from of the opium trade was becoming harder to defend, 
noting that “For the time being we can defend ourselves at Geneva, but I do not pretend to think 
that if we are successful we shall be immune from further attacks next year and the year after.”484  
The British Home Secretary proposed that one option might be to  
dissociate the profits of the opium monopolies from the revenues of the Colonies and to use 
them for humanitarian and social purposes outside the ordinary sphere of Government 
activities, e.g. medical provision, improvement of housing, higher education, and the like.  This 
would at any rate relieve us from the reproach of living on the profits of vice.485  
The European colonial powers gradually changed their stance as the century progressed.  The British 
government ended exports of opium from India in the late 1920s486 and Dutch production of coca in 
the Dutch East Indies died out in the early 1930s due to a vast over supply.487  Furthermore, from the 
late 1940s onwards as decolonisation began,488 Britain, France and the Netherlands no longer had to 
defend their opium monopolies or opium and coca trade, and therefore they became more open to 
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US arguments in favour of a stricter system of control.  However, they still wanted to protect their 
pharmaceutical industries489 and therefore tensions between international controls and national 
sovereignty remained.  These arguments centred around protecting national interests and continued 
to be evident during the drafting of the Single Convention, as we shall see later in this thesis (Chapter 
Four).      
3.3. What is the threat?: defining ‘legitimate’ use  
The issue of ‘legitimate’, or ‘licit’,490 use is crucial to understanding how the drug control dispositif 
evolved in the form that it did, as well as how ‘the drugs and a threat’ discourse gradually took 
precedence within it.  If the nineteenth century drug laws were concerned largely with questions of 
the quality of substances and licensing distributers, so twentieth century drug policy has been 
shaped predominantly by questions surrounding what forms of drug use were legitimate and how 
the trade should be regulated.  The establishment of a dichotomy between legitimate and 
illegitimate use formalised the “ambivalent materiality” of drugs whereby these substances were 
seen as being both beneficial and dangerous.491  The issue of ‘legitimate’ use is also intimately 
connected to the development of the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.  The identification of some forms 
of drug use as licit and other forms as illicit established the idea that non-medical/non-scientific drug 
use and, by extension, the people that participated in this trade were threatening.   
At Shanghai the US argued that “the world knows that opium and morphia constitute a danger that 
threatens the welfare of China, and no less than of other nations”. 492   The Chinese representative 
went even further, arguing that opium threatened the “very existence of the Chinese nation.”493  
Here we see the first international examples of drugs being identified as threatening to society and 
the nation state.  From the outset of the Shanghai Opium Commission, the US identified non-medical 
production and use of opium as a major concern and therefore called for a total prohibition on 
opium use apart from for “legitimate medical practice”.494  This led the US to press their European 
counterparts to limit opium production to scientific and medical need only and therefore end opium 
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smoking and eating, practices which the colonial governments considered ‘quasi-medical’ and 
therefore legitimate.495  At Shanghai Sir Cecil Clementi Smith argued that  
Even if we adopted the [US] resolution in principle we should still, and for a long time to come, 
be compelled to put a most liberal construction on the term ‘medical purposes’; this further 
opportunity for irregularity would go far to complete the undermining of a scheme of nominal 
prohibition.496   
The Shanghai Opium Commission, which was not legally binding, agreed “that the use of opium in 
any form otherwise than for medical purposes is held by almost any participating country to be a 
matter of prohibition or for careful regulation.”497  However whilst they recognised that 
uncontrolled use of morphine and other opiates constituted a “grave danger”,498 they could only 
agree “to take measures for the gradual suppression of the practice of Opium smoking”.499  Though 
the 1912 Hague Convention was initially aimed solely at regulating the opium trade, cocaine was 
eventually included at the behest of the British who were increasingly alarmed about the burgeoning 
trade in Asia.500  The Hague Convention called for the limitation of the manufacture, sale and use of 
“manufactured narcotic drugs to medical and legitimate needs” and the gradual suppression of 
opium smoking .501   
During the 1923 Opium Advisory Commission (OAC) meetings, the US representatives maintained 
an uncompromising stance in regard to their interpretation of the term ‘legitimate’ use.  As US 
representative Porter argued, “The United States is of the opinion that there should be complete 
acceptance of, and compliance with, the terms and spirit of The Hague Opium Convention in dealing 
with the traffic in narcotic drugs”502 and that The Hague Convention recognised that any form of 
non-medical use was not legitimate,503 but this was disputed by other members of the committee.  
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The claim by the US that non-medical/non-scientific use was not legitimate was disputed by 
delegates at the Geneva Opium conference, not least by the representative for India, Sir John 
Campbell, who argued that if the US interpretation of ‘legitimate’ use was accepted it would mean 
that smoking and eating opium would have to end in India, something that the British did not believe 
was necessary.504   
At the Geneva conferences, the representative for India approached the US delegation in a bid to 
discuss the matter of what constituted ‘legitimate’ use but they refused noting that “the American 
delegation was not disposed to enter into any discussion.”505  The British government supported 
Indian opposition to the US demands even though they broadly accepted the US position, claiming 
the importance of national sovereignty over such decisions.  A Cabinet Office secretary noted that 
If Mr. Porter really insists on the proposal to limit the production of opium…. The right of any 
state to do what it likes within its own borders is so fundamental and so completely separate 
from the question of international trade in opium or manufactured drugs that I feel we ought 
to give full support to India in this matter.506 
The Home Secretary made the discomfort of the British position even clearer, noting that they were 
“strongly in favour of the latter course [prohibition of opium], if it is at all practicable.  Our position 
at the present time is an equivocal and an embarrassing one.”507  Delevingne believed that the 
British government should aim for the eventual end to the opium trade and ‘quasi-medical’ use of 
opium, however, colonial government representatives were strongly opposed to these objectives 
for economic and cultural reasons as well as fearing that smuggling would increase.508  Therefore 
the British representative attempted to produce a compromise by suggesting that each country 
should decide what constituted “as medicinal or scientific use of the drugs within its own 
territories”,509 but this was rejected by other states.  The Indian representative noted that opium in 
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India was legitimately used for non-medical purposes and so eventually it was agreed that the term 
‘legitimate’ would replace reference to ‘medical and scientific’ uses,510 thus merging the different 
terms.  The US was deeply unhappy that participants at the Geneva conferences refused to accept 
their demands for drug use to be limited solely to medical and scientific purposes and so they walked 
out of the conference.  As the US withdrew from the conference, one of the US delegates stated 
that “according to the spirit of the Hague Convention, the use of opium products for other than 
medicinal or scientific purposes is an abuse and not legitimate”.511   
The 1931 Convention created two groups of substances, which would, in the Single Convention, 
become the drug schedules that delineated how a substance should be controlled.512  It was also 
the first convention to call upon states to “suppress the illicit traffic”,513  therefore establishing the 
distinction between licit and illicit trafficking.  However, these terms were not clearly defined; 
instead, it was left to be understood that illicit trafficking was that which supplied illicit use, for 
which there was no agreed definition.  An example of this lack of clarity can be found in an article in 
1934, where Delevingne noted that “By illicit traffic I mean the supply of drugs for purposes of abuse, 
though at this time the traffic was in most countries not actually illegal.”514  What was considered 
‘legitimate’ use continued to be questioned throughout the League of Nations period and indeed 
was not completely settled even by the time that the Single Convention came to be completed.  
However, the League of Nations treaties did establish a dichotomy between licit and illicit use that 
had not existed in the early years of the drug control dispositif.  This dichotomy between ‘good’ 
(licit) and ‘bad’ (illicit) drug use bolstered the US argument that certain forms of drug use, and by 
extension drug users, were threatening, thus contributing to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.   
3.4. The international drug control system: expert bodies and the creation of a monitoring system  
The League of Nations treaties created a system of monitoring for the import, export and 
manufacturing of controlled substances that continues to this day.  Gradually, as this system of control 
of licit manufacturing and trade was tightened up, it exacerbated a distinction between licit and illicit 
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drug manufacturing and distribution.  However, until the Single Convention was brought into 
international law, most illicit drug use was supplied through leakages from the licit market.515  The 
League of Nations treaties also created bodies of ‘experts’ who were involved in not only monitoring 
the system, but who also, played a vital role in drafting the treaties and shaping domestic discourses 
on drugs.  Whilst in the UK and the Netherlands, the medical professions maintained dominance over 
the prescription and distribution of controlled substances and played an important part in shaping 
domestic policy and discourses on drugs, at the international level, medical professionals played a 
lesser role.  Few of the international drug control bureaucrats of the twentieth century were members 
of the medical professions; rather, they were often law enforcement officers (Harry Anslinger and 
Charles Sharman of the US and Canada respectively), lawyers (Herbert May and Leon Steinig from the 
US and Adolf Lande from Switzerland), civil servants (Malcolm Delevingne and Harry Greenfield from 
Britain, Edwin Neville from the US and John Campbell of India), religious leaders (Bishop Charles Brent 
from the US), or politicians (Stephen Porter from the US).  As such, these “professional managers of 
unease”516 saw international drug control in terms of foreign policy and enforcement rather than as a 
public health issue.        
After World War I the League of Nations was created and under its auspices several bodies were 
established to look at the issue of drugs:  the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other 
Dangerous Drugs (the Opium Advisory Committee or OAC) had overall responsibility for the issue and 
the Opium and Social Questions Section (the Opium Section), based within the League secretariat, 
provided administrative support.517  Through the collection of data and the examination of issues 
relating to drugs, members of these bodies came to be seen as experts on drug matters and therefore 
gained a great deal of political and social capital to influence the drug control dispositif.   
Under the terms of the 1925 Convention, the Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB, or ‘the Board’) 
was established as “an impartial body whose members should not be Government representatives 
but should serve in a personal capacity”.518  PCOB members, the convention decreed, must also be 
“persons possessing a knowledge of the drug situation, both in the producing and manufacturing 
countries on the one hand and in the consuming countries on the other hand, and connected with 
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such countries.”519  Though the idea of ‘the Board’ was agreed upon, manufacturing states – e.g. 
Switzerland, France and the Netherlands – would only accept a weak body with no compulsory 
powers.520  The creation of the OAC - under the 1912 Hague Convention - and the PCOB established 
bodies of ‘experts’ who, along with members of the Drug Supervisory Board (DSB) - created under the 
1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs - 
came to shape the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.521  The PCOB was to oversee compliance of a non-
binding import/export system that aimed to restrict the movement of drugs from one country to 
another.522   
Throughout this period, the US continued to see the prohibition of production of raw materials for 
anything other than medical and scientific purposes as their long-term goal but in the short term they 
were willing to focus on encouraging other states to imitate their stringent enforcement controls.523  
The US delegation gained some notable successes in the negotiations for the 1931 Convention.  The 
1931 Convention further strengthened the international control machinery by making manufacturing 
estimates and import and export restrictions mandatory for contracting parties; these controls were 
monitored by the newly created DSB.524  The US succeeded in getting some reference to limits on the 
production of raw materials in that governments had to restrict the amount of stocks that 
pharmaceutical companies held to six months’ supply only, and through the creation of the DSB and 
recognition of the PCOB, the US were able to engage legitimately with the international drug control 
system without having to support the League of Nations or ratify the 1925 Convention.525  Another US 
success was Article 15 of the 1931 Convention which committed signatory states to establish a “special 
administration”526 to regulate the licit trade and limit the illicit trade, effectively meaning that states 
had to imitate US domestic control measures. 527  The introduction, under the 1931 Convention, of 
obligatory manufacturing estimates and the need for signatory states to create a domestic 
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bureaucracy to monitor the drug trade were important within the drug control dispositif because they 
represent the first real restrictions on the international trade and manufacture of drugs. 
The 1936 Convention was the last to be signed under the auspices of the League of Nations.  World 
War II prevented further international cooperation, however, during the war the drug control bodies 
(such as the DSB) moved to New York and therefore came under even more influence from the 
prohibition-orientated head of the US Federal Bureau of Narcotic Drugs, Harry Anslinger and his 
allies.528 Furthermore, members of the League of Nations bodies formed what McAllister called the 
‘inner circle’529 around Anslinger; they included Charles Sharman (head of the Canadian Narcotics 
Service and member of the DSB), Herbert May (US member of the PCOB and later president), Helen 
Moorhead (member of the US Foreign Policy Association), Elliot Felkin (British member of the 
League of Nations secretariat and then PCOB Secretary) and Leon Steinig (member of the DSB 
secretariat).  The ‘inner circle’ were keen proponents of strict control. They aimed to end the non-
medical use of drugs530 and used their influence to shape the international drug control system, 
particularly the 1953 Opium Protocol and the Single Convention, as will be explored further in 
Chapter Four. 
3.5. Forms of control: prohibition or regulation 
The issue of what forms of control should be applied to drugs is another crucial aspect of the 
evolution of the drug control dispositif and its relationship with the development of the ‘drugs as a 
threat’ discourse.  As the licit market became subject to tighter controls, so the production, trade 
and use of drugs outside the licit market began to be seen as threatening.  At the Shanghai 
conference, the US argued that “the total prohibition of the manufacture, distribution and use of 
smoking opium is the right principle to be applied to all people”.531  Throughout the League of 
Nations period, the US held steadfastly to their argument that prohibition of all but ‘legitimate’ use 
was the best way to deal with the threat posed by non-medical drug use.  US objectives focussed 
largely on supply-control, believing that use was merely a by-product of supply and that by 
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prohibiting supply all illicit drug use could be ended.532  By contrast, the European colonial powers 
saw less need to eliminate certain forms of use, instead being concerned with controlling them: in 
their overseas territories, they tended towards using government-controlled monopolies to 
regulate opium use, and at home they preferred medical supervision rather than prohibition.  These 
approaches to reducing opium use were summarised by the British Home Secretary in a report of 
the 1924 Geneva Opium Conference  
There seem to be only two possible methods by which the suppression of the practice of opium 
smoking may be brought about.  One is to limit the use of opium smoking to existing smokers 
by the introduction of registration or licensing.   No licenses are issued to new smokers, and as 
the existing smokers die off, the practice disappears…  The other method is to prohibit 
absolutely all smoking after a fixed date.  This is the policy adopted by the United States 
Government in the Philippines.533   
At Shanghai Clementi Smith argued that, particularly in India and Burma where regulation was a 
well-established policy, prohibition would not work.  He noted that “the system of regulation built 
up in India is in fact in a large measure, an efficient instrument in the prevention of abuse”.534  He 
also stated that Britain was willing to aim for an end to opium smoking in the future but that this 
could be done in a number of ways other than through prohibition and each country should be able 
to adopt whichever measures are most applicable.535  Whilst the Shanghai Opium Commission 
established a broad agreement that opium use should be controlled, it was recognised that “the 
wide variations between the conditions prevailing in the different countries” allowed for a range of 
different systems.536  As mentioned earlier, some states, such as Britain and the Netherlands, 
considered that addiction was a health issue rather than a criminal one and so preferred alternative 
forms of drug control such as opium monopolies and maintenance for addicts;537 they were also 
concerned that increased restrictions would bring about a rise in illicit trade.538  By the 1920s, 
however, for the British there was a divergence between managing drug use in the British Isles and 
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the colonial territories: opium smoking had been outlawed at home under the 1920 Dangerous 
Drugs Act but in many overseas territories it remained legitimate, and this was becoming a source 
of embarrassment for the British government.539 
The US delegates who attended the 1924/25 League of Nations conference went armed with a 
Congressional resolution stating that they could not sign anything that did not prohibit non-medical 
use.540  On the surface this could be seen as government limiting the scope for representatives to 
negotiate; however, it was US Congressman Stephen Porter who had sponsored the bill,541 which 
illustrates that he was in a position to shape domestic government views rather than merely 
representing them on the international stage.  Porter brought new proposals to the 1924/25 Geneva 
conferences that had not been included in the OAC draft agenda: firstly, he called for a global 
expansion of the 1907 British-Chinese 10-year agreement to end opium smoking; secondly, he called 
for restriction of opium and coca production to medical and scientific needs only.542  As these 
proposals were not included in the draft treaty drawn up by the OAC, most states refused to discuss 
them.  During the second Geneva conference Delevingne proposed that the manufacturing states 
commit to limiting output in order to reduce excess supplies.  This, he hoped, would meet the crucial 
US objective of restricting the flow of illicit drugs into America whilst not bowing down to US 
demands for the complete prohibition of non-medical use.543   Despite numerous attempts at 
                                                          
539 Memorandum from the British Home Secretary, Arthur Henderson, to the Cabinet Office on the 
International Opium Conference, November 1924, p. 6.  British National Archives, CAB 24/168. 
540 The resolution stipulated that, “that representatives of the United States shall sign no agreement which 
does not fulfil the conditions necessary for the suppression of the habit-forming narcotic drug traffic as set 
forth in the preamble”.  The preamble stated that ““it is necessary to exercise control of the production of 
raw opium in such a manner that there will be no surplus available for non-medical and non-scientific 
purposes.”  The resolution is quoted in a British Cabinet Office memorandum dated, 3rd December 1924.  
British National Archives FO371/10329. 
541 McAllister, p. 65. 
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1924 summarises the two proposals: “(a) that the contracting parties should control the production and 
distribution of raw opium and coca leaves so that there would be no reserves available for purposes not 
strictly medical or scientific. (b) That the countries in whose territories the use of opium for smoking is now 
temporarily permitted shall bring it to an end in ten years by a ten per cent reduction each year in their 
imports of opium for the purpose.” pp. 5-6. British National Archives CAB 27/256. 
543 British Cabinet Office memorandum dated 3rd December 1924. British National Archives FO371/10329. 
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negotiation, this proved to be an obstacle and in early February 1925 the Americans and Chinese 
walked out of the conference.544   
American participation in the 1931 conference was in doubt as Porter claimed that it would mean 
the US had abandoned its aim of limits on the production of raw materials in favour of the more 
generally accepted desire to limit the manufacture of drugs, but eventually the US State Department 
overruled this objection.545 At the 1936 conference the US representatives proposed including limits 
to raw materials and opium smoking in the treaty; it was their aim to prohibit all non-medical/non-
scientific production and distribution as well as use if possible, but most other delegates rejected 
this proposal.546  After this rejection, US representatives wanted to withdraw from the conference 
but the US State Department overruled them, fearing a repeat of the 1924/25 conference 
embarrassment.  As a result, the US delegation barely engaged with further proceedings and refused 
to sign the treaty.547   
During World War II the European-Allied powers came to rely increasingly on American military 
support in the Far East, which made them vulnerable to US pressure to end their opium monopolies.  
In September 1943 the US State Department produced an aide-memoire calling for a common policy 
to end all non-medical opium use.548  On the 10th November 1943 the British and Dutch governments 
announced that they would prohibit opium smoking and end government opium monopolies upon 
re-occupation of their territories.549  The decision to end opium monopolies in British colonial 
territories gave rise to great consternation in the British Colonial Office and particularly in the Burma 
Office where staff were concerned that the prohibition of opium production and smoking would 
cause an increase in illicit trafficking, alienate the local tribes and impoverish rural tribes dependent 
upon the crop for their livelihoods.550  The British Embassy in Washington clearly stated, however, 
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549 In November 1943 the US State Department called on their European allies to end the opium monopolies in 
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Civil Affairs Authorities and the Foreign Office, November 1943-April 1944. British National Archives, FO-
371/39366. 
550 Report from the Burma Office into the feasibility of prohibiting opium in Burma, 29-30th November, 1943 in 
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that the Americans would not be satisfied with anything short of complete prohibition and so 
pressure was put upon the Civil Affairs Authorities in Burma to commit to this despite their 
reservations.551  Britain, along with the Netherlands and France, were forced to commit to ending 
their opium monopolies in Asia, thus ending their paradoxical position whereby they had placed 
‘medico-penal’ controls on access to drugs for their domestic populations but imposed regulatory 
controls on the use of these substances by their colonial subjects.  Once decolonisation began, they 
had even less reason to maintain their support for regulatory systems of control because they no 
longer governed territories where opium use was common.  By the end of the 1940s, the prohibition 
of non-medical and non-scientific use was becoming accepted across the industrialised world and a 
shift had occurred as drugs increasingly came to be represented as a threat to society and 
individuals.   
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the drug control dispositif came into being first in individual states and 
then through the international system.  The evolution of a control orientated dispositif went through 
a number of phases: firstly, it was instituted through domestic pharmaceutical and medical regulations 
with a focus on quality controls and licensed distributors; the second phase, with which this chapter 
was predominantly concerned, involved the development international trade controls and criminal 
laws in the domestic sphere.  Moral and social norms have also played an important part in the way 
drugs and drug users were perceived, particularly in the US.     
The US instigated the need for international cooperation in order to deal with the problem of, initially, 
opium but later cannabis and cocaine and their derivatives, but other states had a range of reasons to 
engage with this, from trade interests to domestic and colonial systems of drug control.  From the 
outset, the US argued that drugs were dangerous and potentially threatening and that the only way 
to deal with these issues was to prohibit all but medical and scientific use, and thus the ‘drugs as a 
threat’ discourse was born.  However, this perspective was contested by other states, particularly the 
European colonial powers, who believed their opium monopolies were an effective way of reducing 
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use without instituting prohibition and that medical prescriptions for dependent users were legitimate 
forms medicine.  This was disputed by the US and domestically, the Harrison Act limited the rights of 
doctors to prescribe maintenance doses to their patients in sharp contrast to practices in Britain.        
By the beginning of World War II, the situation was changing as European states came to accept 
stricter forms of control for both their international trade and domestic citizens.  The international 
drug control system, though at this stage it did not comply with US aims for the prohibition of non-
medical/non-scientific production and use of drugs, had come a long way in a relatively short space of 
time.  In 1909 there was little or no consensus on drug control and yet less than thirty years later there 
were four international drug conventions signed by a considerable proportion of the world.  
Intertwined with the creation of an international system for drug control was the establishment of 
bodies of experts who monitored and reported on the drug situation and through this, gained a 
political and social capital which allowed them to shape discourses and practices on drugs.  As the 
system for the licit manufacture, trade and use of drug became tighter, so illicit drug production and 
use came to be seen as threatening which further reinforced calls for the prohibition of all but medical 
and scientific use.  As will be seen in the next two chapters, as the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse became 
more widely accepted, drugs and drug trafficking became securitized.  This chapter has explored some 
of the ways in which drugs have been controlled outside of the prohibition framework, and the next 
two chapters will explore how the securitization(s) of drugs limits the options available to states in 
their attempts to deal with the issue of drugs.  Chapter Six will then explore recent developments 
within the drug control dispositif that may function within the prohibition paradigm, and in some cases 
outside it, but challenge the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, instead concerning themselves with other 








Chapter Four  
‘Drug Addiction as a Serious Evil’:   
The Construction of Drugs as a Threat to Humankind in the 1961 UN Single Convention 
1. Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how drugs became accepted as being threatening to 
humankind and how this threat construction re-shaped the drug control dispositif.  The Single 
Convention is crucial for understanding the development of the international drug control system 
because, whilst it did not demand that signatory states prohibit drugs, it shaped the drug control 
dispositif to such an extent that prohibition became seen as the dominant solution to the ‘drug 
problem’.  As discussed in the previous chapter, from the beginning of the twentieth century the US 
had argued that drug production, trade and use needed to be limited to legitimate medical/scientific 
purposes only, that earning revenue from the trade in opium was immoral and that the fight against 
drugs was a global issue that needed international cooperation. Whilst many states were not initially 
convinced that drugs (primarily opium but later broadened out to include cocaine and cannabis) were 
the threat that the US made them out to be, or indeed that drug production and use needed to be 
restricted to medical and scientific purposes only, they did begin to accept that this was a global issue 
that needed a coordinated approach.  Some of the key obstacles throughout the period 1909-1961 
were how much national sovereignty to relinquish in order to achieve this goal and what was 
considered ‘legitimate’ use.  By the time the Single Convention was completed, however, the 
international drug control system had established twin aims: to establish a world free from illicit drug 
use and a system of control that was universally acceptable.552 
With the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the organs of drug control were transferred to 
this new organisation under the terms of the Lake Success Protocol of 1946.  In 1945 a new body – the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) – was created to replace the Opium Advisory Committee (OAC). 
It reported to the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 553 and the secretariat was provided by 
a new body called the Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND).554  There was a growing concern that with so 
many international drug control treaties (see Chapter Three), the system had become too unwieldy 
and so the US promoted the idea of a new ‘single’ convention.  The US wrote and sponsored an 
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ECOSOC resolution requesting work to be started on a new convention in 1948.555  ECOSOC resolution 
159 authorised the creation “of a new single convention…. [that would] replace the above-mentioned 
instruments [the League of Nations conventions] relating to narcotic drugs and also include provisions 
for the limitation of the production of narcotic raw materials.”556  The resolution was approved by 
CND and adopted by ECOSOC in August 1948.557  However, the birth of the Single Convention was a 
long and contentious process.  It took 13 years and three drafts before the Single Convention could be 
agreed upon.  Even after the Single Convention had been finalised, it did not enter into international 
law until December 1964 and the US attempted to torpedo the convention by bringing the more 
stringent 1953 Opium Protocol into law.  
As has been shown in the previous chapter, whilst most states agreed that non-medical/non-scientific 
drug use needed to be controlled, there were divergent views on how this could be achieved.  The US 
believed the only way to solve the ‘drug threat’ was to prohibit recreational and ‘quasi-medical’ use, 
however, during the League of Nations period a number of other states believed that strictly 
controlled opium monopolies were also effective.  This attitude changed after the US persuaded the 
European colonial states to end their opium monopolies and decolonisation began.  However, some 
states, particularly the European states, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, still tried to fight against 
the strictest provisions in the third draft of the Single Convention.  Furthermore, there continued to 
be a long-running debate about what constituted ‘legitimate’ use and how best such use could be 
managed: through supply control or demand control.558 
The Single Convention should be seen as a securitizing move in relation to drugs.  As will be explored 
in this chapter, the Single Convention identified non-medical use and addiction to drugs as a threat to 
humankind.  The principle actor in this securitizing move was the US but once the convention was 
finalised they were so unhappy with it that they actively attempted to undermine it.  Therefore, 
another group of actors – the British and Canadians predominantly – worked to gain enough 
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556 Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC), Simplification of existing international 
instruments on narcotic drugs, ECOSOC Resolution 1948/159 (VII) IID, (New York: United Nations, 1948). 
557 ECOSOC resolution 1948/159(VII)IID, E/799. 
558 Demand control focusses on limiting use, in contrast to supply control where the emphasis is on limiting 
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ratifications to bring it into international law.  The ‘extraordinary measures’ proposed by the US aimed 
to achieve the elimination of production, trade and use of drugs except for medical and scientific 
purposes.  However, the strictest of provisions in the third draft – mandatory prohibition of certain 
substances, the ‘closed list’ of opium and coca producers, the right of the Board to make local 
enquiries and mandatory embargoes – were not accepted into the final draft.  This was because they 
were extremely contentious and therefore undermined another key facet of the convention: the need 
for the broadest levels of adherence possible.  This suggests that whilst the existential threat was 
accepted relatively early on in the development of the international drug control system, agreement 
on some of the solutions to the threat, and the powers that should be given to bodies overseeing the 
management of such a threat, were never completely accepted.  Nevertheless, as countries 
incorporated the Single Convention into their domestic laws, prohibition became the overriding 
paradigm for dealing with the ‘drug threat’.  This caused a reorientation of the drug control dispositif 
from a regulatory system of control towards a prohibitionist one. 
This chapter uses a combination of documents from the British and US National Archives and UN 
sources to examine the processes by which drugs became constructed as threatening to humankind 
internationally.  The chapter starts by analysing the Single Convention as a securitizing speech act.  It 
then identifies discursive and rhetorical strategies pursued by the participants of the Single 
Convention plenipotentiary conference that culminated in the agreement that drugs should be limited 
solely to medical and scientific purposes.  Next, the chapter examines how the convention was 
translated into domestic law to explore how the practices shaped national drug policy and illustrates 
the reorientation of the drug control dispositif.  The chapter then analyses the various agents that 
contributed to the securitization process, firstly highlighting those ‘actors’ that were supportive of the 
securitization, secondly examining those that were opposed to various practices proposed in the third 
draft of the convention, and thirdly analysing the role of the ‘audiences’ in the securitization process 
in relation to the ratification of the Single Convention.  Finally, the chapter examines the geo-political 
context of the period that shaped the securitization.  This study of the Single Convention as a 
securitizing move concludes that even after the speech act was accepted, the securitization of drugs 
only became operational once the practices had been enshrined in international and domestic law.  
Once this occurred, prohibition become the norm across much, but not all - as the Dutch example 
explored later in this chapter will show - of the world and the drug control dispositif evolved so that 
the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse became the predominant lens through which policies relating to drugs 
became viewed.  As will be seen in Chapter Six of this thesis, even where policies that were legitimate 
under the Single Convention were carried out to mitigate some of the negative health and social 
effects of illicit drug use, they were strongly criticised by the US and UN bodies if they failed to adhere 
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to the prohibitionist paradigm of the international drug control system.  The securitization of drugs 
restricted the range of policy options available to nation states.559  This led to wide-ranging negative 
impacts including the criminalisation of people involved in the drug trade,560 but also limited the access 
to drugs for licit purposes in much of the world.561      
2. The securitizing ‘acts’: speech act(s) and practices 
As outlined in Chapter Two, securitizing ‘acts’ consist of both speech acts and practices.562  Therefore 
this chapter will firstly analyse the Single Convention as a speech act, identifying its constituent 
elements – the referent object, the existential threat and the extraordinary measures – and then 
examine the discursive and rhetorical strategies used.  It will then examine the practices that 
contributed to establishing the securitizing move.    
2.1. The speech act 
The Parties,  
Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind,  
Recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for the relief 
of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of 
narcotic drugs for such purposes,  
Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is 
fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,  
Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil,  
Considering that effective measures against abuse of narcotic drugs require co-ordinated and 
universal action,  
Understanding that such universal action calls for international co-operation guided by the 
same principles and aimed at common objectives… 
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115 
 
Desiring to conclude a generally acceptable international convention replacing existing treaties 
on narcotic drugs, limiting such drugs to medical and scientific use, and providing for continuous 
international co-operation and control for the achievement of such aims and objectives.563 
The preamble to the Single Convention can be seen as a speech act because it summarises the 
objectives and purpose of the convention.  Whilst preambles carry no legal weight, they set the 
normative tone for the document,564 and this was explicitly stated by Brazilian representative A.G.R. 
Bittencourt who noted that  
A preamble was not a mere formal introduction, but rather dealt with the substance of a treaty; 
it was a statement of purposes and a justification of the aims of the negotiation; and, because 
it helped to understand the intentions of negotiators, it had a juridical force for the purposes of 
interpretation.565   
The preamble reinforced the dualistic function of drugs: being both “indispensable for the relief of 
pain”566 and causing “addiction [that] constitutes a serious evil”.567  This duality has been a crucial part 
of the international drug control system, which aims to both provide necessary access to pain relief 
and eliminate the trade and use of drugs for non-medical and non-scientific purposes.  Initially it was 
suggested that the secretariat to the conference would produce a draft preamble, but a number of 
states wanted to play a part in the drafting process.568  Two committees put forward drafts: committee 
one consisted of Brazil, Canada, France, India, Ghana and Poland, and committee two consisted of the 
Netherlands, Pakistan and the USA.  When it came to debating the two drafts, Robert Curran 
(chairman of the drafting committee and Canadian representative) suggested that the first 
committee’s draft should be used as the core document and then additions from the second version 
could be added in as appropriate.569  Analysis of the discussions during drafting process for the 
                                                          
563 United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 11.  
564 Sanford Levinson, ‘Do Constitutions Have a Point? Reflections on “Parchment Barriers” and Preambles’, 
Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 28: 1, 2011, p. 158; Mark McKenna, Amelia Simpson, and George Williams, 
‘First words: The Preamble to the Australian Constitution’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 
24: 2, 2001, pp. 382-83. 
565 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, pp. 19-20.  
566  United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 11. 
567  United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 11. 
568 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, pp. 19-20. 
569 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 187. 
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preamble are illustrative of the intersubjective relationships between elements of the securitizing 
agent.  The final version of the 1961 preamble was based predominantly on the first committee’s 
draft570 with some important additions from the second committee.  It was the second committee 
that proposed the inclusion of reference to “the grave social and economics evils produced by narcotic 
addiction and illicit traffic…”.571  Acknowledgement of illicit traffic was eventually dropped in favour 
of reference to addiction being a “serious evil” that causes “social and economic danger to 
mankind”.572  The second committee also recommended adding a clause noting the competence of 
the UN in “the field of narcotics control”, which was accepted.573  The two drafts of the preamble also 
highlighted the contrasting views of those that wanted to only emphasise the negative aspects of 
drugs and those that felt it necessary also to recognise the importance of legitimate, medical and 
scientific use.574  Whilst the Netherlands, Pakistan and the US emphasised the danger posed by illicit 
traffic and addiction, Brazil, Canada, France, India, Ghana and Poland highlighted the fact that drugs 
were essential medicines as well as being potentially addictive.  The first committee’s draft 
emphasised that the convention was concerned about the “social and moral welfare of mankind”,575 
and that drugs were “still indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering…”, but also highlighted that 
“addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil”.576  Both committees referenced the need to 
restrict drugs to medical and scientific use.  The first committee called for “provisions for the 
controlled use of drugs for medical and scientific purposes”,577  whereas the second committee’s draft 
was far more specific in its ambitions, stipulating the determination to “limit exclusively to medical 
and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and 
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possession of narcotic drugs”.578  Although this wording was dropped from the preamble, it was 
included in Article 4, the General Obligations.579  
Whilst discussing the two drafts of the preamble, a representative from the USSR noted that he 
preferred the first of the two drafts because it emphasized the “social evil of drug addiction”, but the 
Peruvian representative suggested that the reference in the first draft to "moral welfare" was 
inappropriate as he viewed the Convention as being more concerned with health.580  The 
representative from the Holy See, by contrast, said he would support the preamble only if the word 
"welfare" in the first paragraph was understood to mean both moral and social welfare.581   
The preamble was also discussed during the 1972 conference to amend the Single Convention, when 
the Afghan and Ivory Coast representatives suggested an amendment to the preamble.  This 
amendment concerned technical and financial support for developing countries and its first paragraph 
stated that “that assistance to developing countries is a concrete manifestation of the will of the 
international community to honour the commitment contained in the United Nations Charter to 
promote the social and economic progress of all peoples”.582  This amendment was eventually 
dropped, however, and instead incorporated into the convention as a separate resolution (Resolution 
II) and a new article (article 14bis), giving low income countries access to much needed financial and 
practical support for their domestic drug control policies.  Therefore, this assistance helped shape the 
direction of these states’ national drug strategies.   
As can be seen from the above analysis, there were competing views as to what aspects of the ‘drug 
problem’ should be emphasised in the preamble and these views reflect the concerns of the national 
representatives.  The members of the second committee wanted to emphasise the social and 
economic threats posed by illicit trafficking and the ‘evil’ of drug addiction, as well as the need to limit 
drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes.  Whereas those on the first committee were more 
concerned with reaffirming the need for access to pain relief whilst also acknowledging that addiction 
                                                          
578 United Nations, E/CONF. 34/L.42 in E/CONF.24/34-Add.1, p. 297. 
579 United Nations, The Single Convention, 16. 
580 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 187. 
581 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 214. 
582 United Nations, E/CONF.63/L.7, in United Nations, Official Records of the United Nations Conference to 
Consider Amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Volume I: Preparatory and 
Organizational Documents, Main Conference Documents, Final Act and Protocol Amending, the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Annexes, E/CONF.63/10-e, (United Nations: New York, 1974), p. 99.  
118 
 
caused ‘evil’ to the social and moral welfare of humankind.  Analysing the difference versions of the 
preamble therefore highlights the contestation over the nature of drugs that occurred during the 
plenipotentiary conference in a way would not be apparent if only the final draft was studied.    
2.1.1. The referent object 
The preamble of the Single Convention focused on damage done by drugs to individuals and society; 
therefore, it concerned itself with the security of humankind.583  The preamble clearly articulates the 
idea that international drug control was a “universal” goal that requires “international co-operation” 
and adherence to “common objectives”.584  This emphasis on the need for international cooperation 
has been an important element of the drug control system since the ‘foundational treaties’ (see 
Chapter Three).  During the formative years of the international drug control system, US 
representatives had compared the ‘drug threat’ to slavery585 and atomic weapons.586  They argued that 
international cooperation had ended slavery and could therefore eliminate the drug problem.  Once 
international cooperation on drug control had been established, they argued that it was so successful 
that it could be used as a model for control of atomic weapons and energy.  Furthermore, by 
comparing the nascent drug control system with the ending of slavery in the nineteenth century, the 
US portrayed their ambitions for an end to non-medical/non-scientific use of drugs as a moral good.  
These comparisons also helped create a strong idea of the referent object: humanity/the ‘global self’.  
The preamble to the Single Convention reinforced this idea of drug control being a “humanitarian 
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endeavour”587 by framing it as being concerned with the “health and welfare of mankind”.588  This also 
reflected the wishes of the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, who had asked that the convention 
reaffirm the humanitarian intentions of the League of Nations treaties.589  Reference to the 
humanitarian objectives of the Single Convention was also regularly made during the plenipotentiary 
conference.590  The preamble and the convention itself, therefore, strengthened the idea of a ‘global 
self’ by claiming to protect the welfare of humankind against the “social and economic danger” of 
addiction to, or ‘abuse’ of, drugs.591  Giving both past and future examples of successful international 
cooperation on behalf of humankind further reinforced the legitimacy of the ‘global self’ as something 
that needed to be protected.     
Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma argue that using the term “health and welfare of mankind”592 in the 
preamble also strengthened the idea of the ‘global self’ by framing the work of international drug 
control as being more important than individual state interests.593  The Single Convention required 
states to relinquish even more national control than the ‘foundational treaties’ had done and this was 
a cause for long debates during the drafting process.  Certain states – particularly those in the Soviet 
Bloc594 – established reservations with regard to articles that reinforced the power of the international 
drug control bodies over states, particularly those that gave the Permanent Central Opium Board 
(PCOB) the right to question states’ estimates (Article 12, final draft) and statistical returns (Article 13, 
final draft).  Despite these reservations and those relating to ‘traditional use’, most states were willing 
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to accede to the Single Convention in order to be seen as being part of the ‘global self’, rather than 
outside it. 595   
As discussed in Chapter Two, Buzan et al. argue that it is hard to create a global referent object because 
it is rare that actors have enough legitimacy to speak for the whole of humanity;596 however, in the 
case of the Single Convention, the ‘global self’, ‘free from drugs’597 has been exceptionally well 
established as an international consensus.  From the very beginning, the Single Convention’s 
universality was one of its key tenets and the British representative argued clearly that it was essential 
that the Single Convention was supported by the widest number of states possible, even if this meant 
“leaving out desirable provisions”.598  At the 1962 Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meeting, 
during the push for ratification of the convention, the general consensus was that the Single 
Convention’s universality was a major improvement over the 1953 Opium Protocol,599 as will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
2.1.2. The existential threat 
The existential threat as laid out in the preamble of the Single Convention was ‘addiction to drugs’, 
but in the convention itself, the threat was all non-medical/non-scientific use, as well as drug 
production and trafficking (see Table 1. the Drug Control Dispositif, p. 18).  This expansion of the threat 
is explicit in the 1972 Amending Protocol with the conflation of illicit drug use/drug abuse and 
addiction, as will be discussed below.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ‘foundational 
treaties’ created a framework of international control for the licit production and trade in drugs.  
However, there has always been a lack of agreement as to what constituted ‘legitimate’ or ‘medical 
and scientific use’ (see Chapter Three).  Even during the Single Convention plenipotentiary conference, 
some representatives were concerned that there was no universal definition about what the terms 
meant.600  However, it was argued that because these terms had been in use since the 1925 
                                                          
595 Herschinger, Constructing Global Enemies, p. 75. 
596 Buzan et al., p. 36. 
597 In 1998 the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Drugs used the slogan “A drug-free world, 
we can do it”.  See, United Nations International Drug Control Programme, General Assembly Twentieth 
Special Session: World Drug Problem, 8-10 June 1998, United Nations, 1998) [online]. Available from: 
<http://www.un.org/ga/20special/> (accessed 15/08/17).  
598 E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 4. 
599 McAllister, p. 217. 
600 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24/Add.1, p. 123. 
121 
 
Convention, they were deemed to be sufficiently recognisable to remain.601  Adolf Lande, the Deputy 
Executive Secretary for the conference, suggested that they adopt a resolution to define the term 
‘medical and scientific’, but this proposal was not followed up.602   
During the plenipotentiary conference discussions about Article 30 (third draft), which concerned 
‘medical and scientific purposes’, raised concerns for Indian and Pakistani representatives who feared 
that it would delegitimise their indigenous medical practices.603  After some debate, it was agreed that 
“indigenous medicine would be treated in exactly the same way as … other forms of medicine.”604  
Despite this agreement, the West German representative suggested that Article 56 (third draft), which 
concerned reservations for states that wished to allow ‘quasi medical’ use, might satisfy the Indians 
and Pakistanis in this context.605  The commentary to the 1972 Amending Protocol confirmed this 
understanding of the term ‘licit purposes’, which it notes “covers not only medical and scientific 
purposes, but also quasi-medical use of opium and opium smoking in cases in which by virtue of an 
appropriate reservation pursuant to article 49 opium production for such non-medical use is 
authorized.”606  However these articles only permitted ‘quasi medical’ use on a temporary basis,607 
which points to a privileging of Western medicine over other forms of medicine, reflecting the overall 
Western-centric direction of the convention.608   
In order to understand the precise nature of the existential threat as conceptualised within the Single 
Convention, it is necessary to unpack what was meant by “addiction to narcotic drugs”.609  This raises 
a number of questions: what drugs were being identified as a threat?; what was meant by ‘addiction’?; 
and, did the convention recognise that not all non-medical/non-scientific (recreational) use leads to 
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addiction?  The substances themselves are clearly set out in the schedules of the convention.  There 
are four schedules that indicate the levels of control required: drugs in Schedule IV were deemed to 
be “particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects… and that such liability is not offset by 
substantial therapeutic advantages”.610  Schedule IV drugs were considered the most dangerous and 
were subject to the strictest levels of control.  This meant that any signatory state could  
if in its opinion the prevailing conditions in its country render it the most appropriate means of 
protecting the public health and welfare, prohibit the production, manufacture, export and 
import of, trade in, possession and use of any such drug except for amounts which may be 
necessary for medical and scientific research only…611   
These drugs then, were seen as the most threatening but the General Obligations (Article 4, final draft) 
stipulated that drugs in all the schedules should be limited exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes only.612  Therefore, despite the different schedules, the importance placed on the ‘General 
Obligations’ show that it was not the drugs themselves that were a threat, indeed in certain situations 
they were “indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering”,613 but rather certain using behaviours, 
i.e. the non-medical/non-scientific use of drugs and the production and trade that supplied it, as well 
as addiction to these substances.  In 1955, Herbert May had noted that there was no universal 
definition of “addiction-producing drugs”, and that it was very difficult to settle upon a single 
definition “which is sufficiently accurate both scientifically and for legislative purposes.”614  However, 
he argued that because the drugs concerned had been listed by the drug control bodies, there was no 
need for “a scientific definition of the term “drug addiction” in the new convention”.615  This lack of 
clarity over the term ‘addiction’, ‘addiction-producing drugs’, and as mentioned earlier, ‘medical and 
scientific’ use, is particularly pertinent here because it illustrates the conflation between illicit drug 
use and addiction to drugs that is prevalent throughout the UN conventions.  The World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs, the body that made 
recommendations on drug scheduling in the conventions, attempted to create a scientific rationale 
for which drugs should be controlled in 1957 when they defined the terms ‘addiction’ and 
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‘habituation’.616  They noted that “Addiction-producing drugs need strict control, national and 
international” but “habit-forming drugs” did not need to be controlled internationally. This then 
recognises a distinction between distinct types of drugs although not different types of use.617  In 1964 
the Expert Committee found that these differentiations were no longer scientifically viable.  They 
abandoned the terms ‘addiction’ and ‘habituation’ in favour of ‘drug dependence’ which could be 
“applied to drug abuse generally”.618  However global norms surrounding the terms ‘addiction’ and 
‘dependence’ were not clearly established.  It has even been argued that the concepts of 
addiction/dependence are in fact merely the rationale for the international drug control system rather 
than being critical issues themselves619 and also that they have been shaped by specific moral and 
cultural imperatives.620     
As well as a lack of clarity around the terms ‘addiction’ and ‘medical and scientific’ use, there was little 
recognition in the Single Convention that not all non-medical use caused addiction.  This is despite the 
WHO recognising that there was a difference between habituation, dependence and addiction.  One 
of the few references to recreational drug use occurred when the Egyptian representative identified 
the three stages of hashish usage: he argued that at first the user participates in drug taking with 
friends, this then leads to the second stage where drug use becomes a habit, and finally this leads to 
addiction; he did recognise that during the first and second stages the user could give up the habit but 
in the latter stage it became much harder.621  Other than this example, all non-medical/non-scientific 
drug use was conflated with addiction and therefore threatening.  The 1972 Amending Protocol made 
this conflation explicit with the change of Article 38’s title from “treatment of drug addicts” to 
“measures to prevent drug abuse”.622   The commentary to the amended article noted that “the 
essence of the Single Convention…” is a “system of administrative controls and penal sanctions 
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established for the purpose of keeping narcotic drugs from actual or potential victims…”623 and that 
“The article under consideration deals with measures to be applied to individuals abusing narcotic 
drugs…”624  Furthermore, the article is concerned not only with those that use drugs illicitly, “but also 
to that of particular groups whose members are specially prone to abuse them.”625  This points to the 
fact that by 1972 it was not just the drugs that were a threat, but specific users, or potential users, 
that were seen as threatening, thus reinforcing both the ‘othering’ of drug users and also the 
legitimate profiling of some people or sub-cultures as likely to be potential users.  Whilst the Single 
Convention and the 1972 Amending Protocol were framed as tools to protect humankind from the 
most damaging forms of drug use, data from the UN suggests that only 10% of non-medical/non-
scientific drug users are “problem drug users”.626      
2.1.3. ‘Extraordinary measures’  
As has been discussed in Chapter Two, security politics and the management of risk do not always 
involve ‘extraordinary/emergency measures’; rather, they are moved along a continuum of 
risk/fear.627  This means that ‘emergency measures’ are more likely to result in policies of containment 
such as policing or customs controls rather than military action.628  The Single Convention proposed 
policies of containment that established the prohibition of the unauthorised production and trade in 
drugs as well as to limit specific drug using behaviours.  By encouraging states to institute prohibition, 
the Single Convention limited the range of policies allowed to deal with the ‘drug problem’ and its 
outcomes.629 
One of the Americans’ principle concerns, when drafting the convention, was the lack of controls over 
the production of raw opium, which had not been addressed in the ‘foundational treaties’.630  The US 
position was summarised by US representative to the PCOB, Herbert May, who noted that  
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The present international legislation relating to the control of narcotic drugs has left two 
important loopholes: Opium smoking was to be suppressed gradually. There was no total 
prohibition; There was no provision for the strict limitation of the production of raw opium and 
of the coca leaf to medical and scientific needs.631   
Because it was recognised that simplifying the treaty system would take some time, it was suggested 
that an interim convention should be drawn up to deal with the issue of the production of raw opium 
until the Single Convention was completed.632  This interim treaty was to become the 1953 Opium 
Protocol.  However, many of its provisions were considered so controversial that it did not enter into 
international law until after the Single Convention was signed.  The most contentious of its provisions 
were included in the third draft of the Single Convention but were largely rejected in the final draft, 
as will be discussed below.  Leon Steinig, a member of the Drug Supervisory Board (DSB), proposed 
the creation of an International Opium Monopoly, which he thought could then be used as a model 
for the control of nuclear material.633  The opium monopoly was rejected but the idea of strictly limiting 
production was incorporated into the Opium Protocol which stipulated that only seven named 
countries could produce opium – something that was included in the third draft of the Single 
Convention but jettisoned from the final draft.  Producer states would be required to submit estimates 
to the DSB of how much was planted, harvested, used domestically and exported and they would also 
have to submit annual statistics to the PCOB.  The Board would then have the power to investigate 
and take punitive action such as imposing mandatory embargoes if production exceeded world 
demand.  These proposals were also included in the third draft of the Single Convention but dropped 
in the final version.634  Harry Anslinger, US representative at the CND, made sure that the protocol 
stipulated that production and use should be limited strictly to medical and scientific purposes only.635   
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The British and the Canadians however, were not convinced that opium producing countries such as 
Iran, Turkey, India and Yugoslavia would sign up to the 1953 Opium Protocol because of its onerous 
provisions on production.636  As will be seen later in this chapter, increased powers for the drug control 
bodies, the restriction of opium and coca production and punishment for those states that 
overproduced were deemed to be crucial for the Americans and other like-minded states in order to 
mitigate the ‘drugs threat’.  Anslinger and his allies did their utmost to get the provisions from the 
1953 Opium Protocol incorporated into the Single Convention, but largely failed.  The Single 
Convention did, however, go further than previous treaties in limiting the production, trade and use 
of drugs to medical and scientific purposes only.  The convention therefore represented a shift in the 
orientation of the drug control dispositif from a regulatory framework to a prohibitionist one.637  Whilst 
prohibition of drugs was not mandatory, restricting drugs use to medical and scientific purposes 
was,638 although the term was left open to some interpretation.  Despite there being no categorical 
commitment to prohibition in the convention, over time it did become the overriding tool to deal with 
the ‘drug threat’, therefore reorienting the drug control dispositif.  As states incorporated the Single 
Convention into their domestic legal systems, the prohibition paradigm prevailed, as will be seen later 
in this chapter. 
In the case of drug policy, the ‘emergency measures’ themselves have created severe ‘unintended 
consequences’ such as a huge criminal black market, policy displacement, geographical displacement 
(the ‘balloon effect’ whereby tighter controls in one territory shift the market to another location), 
substance displacement and discrimination against users, as Antonio Maria Costa (then head of the 
UNODC) noted in 2008.639  In a successful securitization, such unintended consequences, however, are 
often ignored or dismissed as minor concerns.  As Grayson notes in relation to US foreign policy  
With all the diverse aspects of the ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘War on Drugs’, human rights abuses, 
human suffering and loss of life seem to be largely unproblematic for US policymakers as long 
                                                          
636 McAllister, p. 179. 
637 Martin Jelsma, ‘The Development of International Drug Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges 
for the Future’, working paper prepared for the first meeting of the Global Commission on Drug Policies, 
Geneva, 24-25th January 2011, (Geneva: Global Commission on Drug Policies, 2011), p. 4. 
638  United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 16. 
639  Costa, 2008, pp. 10-11.  
127 
 
as the United States, its interests and important segments of domestic population remain 
secure.640   
This perspective has often been mirrored at the UN where, until recently, the negative impacts of the 
international drug control system have been downplayed.  This situation is beginning to change 
however, as Chapter Six will discuss.   
2.2. The discursive and rhetorical strategies    
There were a number of different, but related, rhetorical strategies that were carried out throughout 
the period of the ‘foundational treaties’ and the drafting process for the Single Convention that 
contributed to the securitization process.  In the early period, some states argued that drug use was a 
moral failing.  For example at the Geneva conference one of the US representatives, Stephen Porter, 
argued that “heroin addicts spring from sin and crime”.641  However, by the Single Convention 
plenipotentiary conference, the idea that addiction was a moral failing was becoming merged with 
the disease metaphor: drug addiction was described as a “morbid habit”642 that was “contagious”643 
and addicts needed treatment in closed institutions due to their tendency to “convert” or “corrupt” 
others.644  Whilst some states645 argued that drug addiction was a disease, others646 claimed it was a 
social problem caused by poverty, lack of education and employment, poor diet or the capitalist 
system,647 and a few648 claimed that it was predominantly a criminal issue.   
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Framing drug use as an issue of “health and welfare of mankind”649 reinforced the idea that drug 
control was a “humanitarian endeavour”.650  This was a powerful rhetorical strategy to establish the 
‘global self’ as a referent object, as discussed earlier.  During the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission 
members compared the need for drug control with the ending of slavery and flattered the British by 
praising their role in eliminating it: US representative Hamilton Wright noted that  
we have concluded that the traffic in opium for other than necessary uses ought not much 
longer to continue, or, there will loom between East and West a problem that in its magnitude 
and potentialities for strife will outstrip the magnitude and forces of the long since, and happily 
settled, slavery question.  The slavery question agitated the civilised world… in spite of the great 
example set us by the British Government in voluntarily freeing the salves in her colonies…651   
US representatives used slavery as an example of global cooperation and urged the same for drug 
control.  By using pre-existing narratives of global cooperation against a trade deemed immoral they 
reinforced the idea that such cooperation was morally right.  By then arguing that international 
cooperation in the field of drugs was so successful that it could be a template for weapons and nuclear 
material, the impression was given that the drug control system was a viable working model.652  The 
Single Convention, then, was portrayed as being both essential for strengthening an already successful 
control system and an important ‘humanitarian’ act.   
Just as the referent object was powerfully constructed through rhetorical strategies linking drug 
control with international cooperation to end slavery and the proliferation of atomic materials, the 
existential threat was equally forcefully articulated.  In stating that “addiction to narcotic drugs 
constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to 
mankind”,653 the preamble of the Single Convention uses Schmittian language of enmity and exclusion 
to identify the threat - “addiction to narcotic drugs” - as being “evil”.654  By labelling something as ‘evil’, 
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actors are able to impose harsh measures to eliminate the threat;655 the term also, if accepted, helps 
legitimise ‘extraordinary measures’.656  This identification of something as ‘evil’, means that a moral 
judgement is being made about it which leads to an extreme form of ‘othering’.657  This form of moral 
framing situates the object of evil as outside of normal politics and therefore allows for measures to 
be proposed that would otherwise not have been acceptable.658  Whilst the use of the term ‘evil’ in 
the Single Convention is not totally unique, it has only been used in one other UN convention – the 
1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others659 - which also has moral overtones.  The word is not used in other conventions 
that deal with human rights abuses such as genocide, torture, slavery or apartheid.660  During the 
plenipotentiary conference great emphasis was placed in creating a treaty that could be amenable to 
as many states as possible and all decisions required a majority of two-thirds in order to pass, 
therefore, the inclusion of the word ‘evil’ becomes even more significant.661  Indeed, the use of the 
term ‘evil’ was not seen as controversial662 and was commonly used at the conference.663  As well as 
being associated with ‘evil’, it was argued by US representative Harry Anslinger that drugs  
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had taken more lives than hydrogen bombs would ever do and indeed, as had been stated in 
the early days of the League of Nations, the problem of the international control of drugs was 
comparable with and might be related to the question of disarmament.664 
The idea that drug control was a moral issue and a humanitarian objective fed into the final rhetorical 
strategy of the securitizing move: that international cooperation was imperative in order for drug 
control to succeed.  The developing international drug control system was praised for “the additional 
hope it has given to those who believe that organized international co-operation in other fields can 
best be achieved through the example of functional success such as this.”665  This idea of the 
importance of international cooperation continued throughout the development of the drug control 
system.  Indeed during the drafting of the Single Convention much emphasis was made of the need to 
secure global adherence, to the point that the British representative argued that it would be worth 
dropping controversial clauses if it meant more states signed the treaty.666  The importance of near-
universal adherence667 continues to be an achievement of the system: as the United Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) has noted, “The entire world agrees that illicit drugs are a threat to health and 
that their production, trade and use should be regulated: indeed, adherence to the conventions is 
virtually universal.  Ninety six percent of all countries” are parties to the conventions.668 
2.3. Practices that contributed to the securitization process: national and international policies  
Didier Bigo suggests that “routine practices”, for example policing, surveillance and border control 
policies, carried out by “professional managers of unease” also shape understandings of security 
themselves rather than merely being practices that are legitimised through previous speech acts (e.g. 
government policies).669  The international drug control system legitimised security practices such as 
policing and border controls by the ‘professional managers of unease’ such as the aforementioned US 
representative Harry Anslinger.  Furthermore, with the collection of data, whether statistics and 
estimates of legitimate drug stocks, or drug seizures, arrests and areas of drug crop eradication within 
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the illicit market, the dichotomy between the licit and illicit market was sharpened.  This reinforced 
the distinction between the ‘self’ (those not participating in the illicit drug trade) and the ‘other’ (drug 
users, producers, traffickers and dealers).670  These practices played a large part in creating a situation 
whereby prohibition was seen as the only option for international drug control.   
Many of the practices laid out in the Single Convention were not new; they had been set out in the 
League of Nations treaties.  However, these practices reinforced the distinction between licit and illicit 
drug use, particularly through the scheduling system.671  As the Single Convention’s articles were 
incorporated into domestic law, the drug control dispositif began to take the shape of a prohibitionist 
system of control.  This section briefly summarises when and how the Single Convention was 
integrated into the domestic laws of the US, the UK and the Netherlands in order to illustrate some of 
the differences and similarities in the ways it has been interpreted in various settings.  It should be 
noted, however, that changes in policy in these states reflected perceived changes in patterns of drug 
use as well as the need to abide by the international drug control system, therefore suggesting that 
such practices were still subject to ‘normal’ policy making procedures even after the securitizing move 
had been accepted.  After discussing changes in domestic law, this section then analyses how the 
acceptance of the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse and the practices that were implemented to address 
this threat have negatively impacted upon access to essential medicines, something enshrined in the 
Single Convention, in order to illustrate how the drug control dispositif became affected by the 
paradigm of prohibition. 
2.3.1. The integration of the Single Convention into domestic law – the US, UK and Netherlands 
US 
As has been discussed earlier in this thesis (Chapter Three), the US had instituted a strict form of 
prohibition through the Harrison Act of 1914.  After the Single Convention plenipotentiary conference, 
the US was deeply disappointed by the final draft because they considered it would weaken the 
international system and they failed to ratify it until 1967.  Richard Nixon won the presidential election 
in 1968 with a campaign that emphasised law and order.672  In 1971, he launched his ‘war on drugs’673 
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which focussed on heroin addiction because of concerns about use of the drug amongst soldiers 
returning from Vietnam.674  This ‘moral panic’ created fears that US national identity was under threat 
from those who rejected conventional values.675  Despite the ‘drug war’ rhetoric of the Nixon 
administration, they allocated the larger share of the federal drug budget to treatment and 
education,676 and expanded methadone maintenance programmes.677  However, they also created the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)678 in order to strengthen and streamline the federal agencies 
that dealt with drugs.679  The Single Convention was incorporated into US federal law through the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970.  The new law created five schedules - based on 
the Single Convention’s drug schedules -  for drugs that denoted the substances’ dangerousness and 
risk of causing dependency680 and established harsher penalties for drug users.681  Discursively, the 
Nixon administration remained committed to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Five, even though they allowed opiate maintenance therapy – something that went against 
the strict interpretation of the Harrison Act (see Chapter Three).  Despite allowing for such treatments 
for dependent users, recreational use was heavily criminalised, and the prison population began to 
rise.682  Whilst the Carter administration did not see drug use as a priority, the Reagan administration 
took a far harsher stance to drug use and trafficking – calling for a return to the abstinence-based 
policies of the pre-Nixon years (see Chapter Five).  The Reagan administration’s approaches to drugs 
re-shaped the drug control dispositif yet again.            
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The UK signed the Single Convention at the conference in 1961 and ratified it on 2nd September 1964. 
The reason there was a delay in ratification was so that British law could be brought in line with the 
convention.  In 1964 Lord Amulree brought a Private Members Bill in order to amend the Dangerous 
Drugs Act 1951 (DDA) so that the UK could ratify the Single Convention.683  In the Hansard debate in 
the House of Lords about this bill, it was explained that discussion between “the Home Office, the 
industry and the pharmaceutical organizations”684 had been necessary in order for the amendments 
to the DDA to be made.  Under previous drugs legislation, all illicit drug offences were treated with 
the same level of seriousness,685 however, when the Single Convention was integrated into British 
domestic policy through the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, it established three classes of drugs – A, B and 
C – reflecting the drug scheduling system of the convention.686  These categories claim to reflect the 
“relative harms and the maximum penalties which offences relating to their cultivation, possession 
and supply attract”687 although they have been criticised as having “evolved in an unsystematic way 
from somewhat arbitrary foundations with seemingly little scientific basis”.688  The British, who were 
among a number of countries that had argued that heroin should not be subject to a mandatory 
prohibition during the plenipotentiary conference, continued to use it for pain relief and allow it to be 
prescribed to problematic users.689  The medicalised approach that had existed since the 1920s 
functioned within a ‘medico-penal’ system690 but was centred around treating the therapeutic addict 
(who became addicted after being prescribed a substance) and the professional addict (e.g. doctor, 
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pharmacist, vet, nurse etc. who became addicted in the course of professional life).691  The ‘British 
System’ was challenged in the 1960s by the growth of recreational drug use by young people because 
they did not fit with the idea of the therapeutic or professional addict; this created a dichotomy 
between the ‘deserving addict’ and the ‘undeserving addict’.692  By the 1960s, the rise of recreational 
use led to the medicalisation approach being challenged.693  The Second Interdepartmental Committee 
on Drug Addiction (the second Brain Committee) recommended that GPs should no longer be central 
to treating addicts; instead, this role should be given to psychiatrists within fixed settings such as the 
Drug Dependency Clinic.694  Also during this period, the prescription of heroin maintenance largely 
disappeared and methadone became the preferred opiate substitution therapy (OST).695  Whilst 
dependent users were offered treatment, other recreational users were criminalised.  The UK 
prohibited non-medical drug use although it was not until the 1980s, when heroin use rose rapidly 
and the links to HIV became known, that the government began to discursively construct drugs 
(heroin) as a threat.  Even then, the government allowed for experimentation with harm reduction 
programmes as a response to the threat, as will be seen in Chapter Six.  The UK also experimented 
with the reclassification of cannabis – from a Class B drug to a Class C - between 2004 and 2008 but 
this move was criticised strongly by Philip Emafo, the head of the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) at the time.696  The Labour government reversed their decision, against the advice of their own 
advisory committee on drugs, after concerns about links between the drug and mental illness were 
revived.697              
The Netherlands  
The US, the UK and the Netherlands can be seen as pursuing different modes of control within the 
drug control dispositif.  Whilst most illicit drug use was prohibited - to some extent - in each country, 
the way drug users were perceived and treated varied.  The Dutch, though they did introduce criminal 
penalties for illicit drug use, over time took a starkly different position on cannabis.  By the 1960s, 
concern was growing about the use of drugs in the Netherlands, particularly ‘new’ drugs such as 
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hashish and LSD.698  This led to a more repressive strategy towards cannabis users because the drug 
was seen as having no medical benefits and as being used largely by the members of the counter-
culture movement.699  However, there was widespread criticism of this approach within the media, 
and various public and governmental bodies called for the decriminalisation or legalisation of drugs.700  
The Hulsman Commission, established by the National Federation of Mental Health Organizations, 
argued that cannabis should be separated from other illicit drugs,701 and the Baan Commission, set up 
by the government, called for a distinction to be made between ‘soft’ drugs such as cannabis and 
‘hard’ drugs (e.g. heroin and cocaine) that caused unacceptable risks.702  In 1976 the Dutch amended 
their Opium Law making drug trafficking and production illegal in order to comply with the Single 
Convention.703  However, on the recommendation of the Hulsman and Baan Commissions, the 1976 
Opium Act formally divided drugs into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ drugs.  ‘Hard’ drugs continued to be 
criminalised and trafficking was vigorously prosecuted; however, ‘soft’ drugs were dealt with 
differently.  This distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ drugs paved the way for the sale of cannabis in 
so-called ‘coffee shops’.704  The ‘coffee shops’ are tolerated but not enshrined into domestic law; the 
Dutch argue that they are merely not enforcing all aspects of the Single Convention rather than being 
in contravention of it.705  The Dutch approach to cannabis enforcement has been criticised by the INCB 
as being in contravention of the UN conventions706 as will be discussed in more details in Chapter Six. 
These three examples illustrate how the Single Convention shaped domestic drug policy in the UK, US 
and Netherlands but they also highlight how changing patterns of drug use in each country also had 
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an impact.  As levels of drug use increased, politicians and professionals felt the need to respond to 
growing public concern with changes to the laws.  This largely led to criminal penalties being 
introduced.  However, the approach each country took to illicit drug use and the negative 
consequences – whether social and physical – associated with it are illustrative of the variation that 
exists within the drug control dispositif.  While in all three examples the increase in recreational drug 
use was associated with counter-cultural movements, the way this was portrayed was very different.  
In the US, these developments were represented as threatening US national identity; in the UK, there 
was a shift towards seeing ‘addicts’ as being mentally rather than physically ill; and in the Netherlands 
the discussion focussed on preventing further marginalisation of drug users.  These examples also 
illustrate that the practices within the securitizing moves were as important as the speech acts in 
establishing a successful securitization.     
2.3.2. Access to essential medicines  
Although access to essential medicines707 is enshrined in the Single Convention, the way the UN 
convention has been instituted both domestically and internationally has resulted in a situation 
whereby availability to pain relieving and palliative medicine is highly restricted for 75% of the world’s 
population.708  Acceptance of the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse has prioritised prohibition and a 
criminalised approach to drug misuse over medical care.709  The huge bureaucratic burdens placed on 
a state by the Single Convention’s requirement to submit ‘statistical returns’710 in order to be eligible 
for an annual quota of controlled substances has also meant that many low and middle income 
countries either ban essential medicines completely711 or restrict them severely.712  Where such 
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countries do submit ‘statistical returns’ in order to access controlled substances, lack of infrastructure 
and training, and onerous prescribing and dispensing procedures limit availability.713  The tension 
between access to pain relief and prevention of drug misuse can be seen in the 2007 ‘Framework for 
the Access to Controlled Medications Programme’ produced by the WHO and the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB).  The abstract recognised the “differences in their mandate”714 and 
noted that the INCB was restricted by the international drug control conventions to simply complying 
with the resolutions of the World Health Assembly and the Economic and Social Council of the UN 
(ECOSOC)715 who called for increased access to pain relieving and palliative drugs.  In contrast, the 
WHO’s remit was “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. Therefore, 
WHO finds itself obliged to widen the scope of the activities to be undertaken with regard to 
availability of controlled medicines”.716  These divergent goals meant that the WHO and INCB wrote 
separate parts of the framework.  The WHO has long been critical of the way the “greatly exaggerated 
fears of addiction [and] overly restrictive national drug control policies” have limited access to pain 
relieving drugs.717 It has been argued that although the Single Convention states clearly that access to 
pain relief is “indispensable”718 there are no articles concerning how access should be provided apart 
from those regarding ‘estimates’ and ‘statistical returns’, but a number stipulating that parties should 
criminalise or suppress various forms of drug use not considered legitimate under the convention.719  
Thus the Single Convention privileges criminalisation over health.  This example illustrates how the 
practices within the drug control dispositif became prohibitionist in character as the ‘drugs as a threat’ 
discourse became paramount and how the way these practices were carried out undermined the 
stated aims of the Single Convention.   
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3. The agent: actor(s) and audiences   
As has been discussed earlier in this thesis (Chapter Two), a sociological interpretation of securitization 
theory, as proposed by Balzacq, is being used in this thesis rather than the Copenhagen School variant.  
Therefore, this section will analyse what Balzacq has described as the ‘agents’ of securitization: ‘actors’ 
and ‘audiences’.720  What follows is an examination of intersubjective negotiation between the 
securitizing actor(s), opponents of the designation of ‘security’ or proposed measures to counteract 
the threat and the audience(s) that resulted in the securitization of drugs at the international level. 
3.1. Those who support the designation of ‘security’  
Knowledge (cultural capital), power and trust (social and political capital) are closely connected and 
highly relevant when exploring the agency of actors.721  Throughout the twentieth century one can 
identify a range of securitizing actors at different political levels that helped shape the development 
of the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, the securitization of drugs and consequently the drug control 
dispositif.  Initially the actors were ‘moral and political entrepreneurs’,722 such as US Bishop Brent, Dr 
Hamilton Wright and US Congressman Stephen Porter, working to convince their governments of the 
need to prohibit drugs in order to deal with the threat they posed (see Chapter Three).  Later, the 
actor(s) became governments, principally the US, and supportive members of the international drug 
control bureaucracy, such as the OAC (e.g. Delevingne), the PCOB (e.g. May), the DND (e.g. Steinig) 
and the DSB (e.g. Sharman of Canada and Vaille of France).  Finally, the actor(s) became an 
international coalition of governments, particularly Britain and Canada, and their representatives at 
the CND who were keen to get the Single Convention ratified in the face of US opposition to the 
completed convention.  The role that these various actors played, and the agency that allowed them 
to do so, will be explored further below. 
Whilst exploring the roles the various actors played, and their political agency, it is important here to 
highlight a number of issues that should be taken into consideration.  Firstly, even where a state is 
referred to as the actor, it should be recognised that they did not hold monolithic views on how to 
deal with the ‘drug threat’.  Within one state there were often a range of views and competing 
concerns and these did not always coincide.  For example, in the US there were a range of divergent 
views within drug policy-making circles that often came into conflict, particularly between the US State 
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Department and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN).  These divisions were particularly evident 
when it came to the 1953 Opium Protocol and the ratification of the Single Convention.  Anslinger and 
the Treasury were opposed to the Single Convention once it had been finalised, but the State 
Department felt “it had some good points”.723  One British civil servant recognised this lack of unity 
when reporting on the likelihood of speedy ratification of the Single Convention by the Americans, 
noting that  
it looks as if the whole matter is still being thrashed out interdepartmentally although the 
Narcotics Bureau [FBN] may still be trying to steal a march on the State Department by 
approaches to Turkey and Greece.  I think that the State Department were left in no doubt about 
our anxiety and I got the impression that the State Department agree with us but that, as you 
say, the policy is really in the hands of the Narcotics Bureau of the Treasury.724 
Within US government circles, there was also a recognition that there was a  
division of opinion on the merits of the Convention between the Department of State and the 
Bureau of Narcotics.  Both representative from State and the representative from the Bureau 
of Narcotics agree that there is little likelihood the Convention will be submitted as long as they 
disagree on the merits.725 
Secondly, the positional power of the actor is also relevant and therefore some actors maybe in a 
better position to influence and shape their governments policy.726  Stritzel notes that Harry Anslinger 
and the FBN were in a privileged position of power in that they were able to shape public and 
administrative perceptions of organised crime through influencing information flows and public 
hearings, as well as having the largest organised crime database upon which the government was 
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forced to rely.727  A third important point to note when considering the power and agency of the 
actor(s) is that some national representatives at the international conferences worked for their own 
ends as well as representing their own governments’ views.  Anslinger for example often acted to 
defend the power of the FBN.  In the 1930s, he took up the anti- marijuana cause believing that tackling 
the issue could safeguard the organisation’s funding during the Depression, co-authoring an article 
titled ‘Marijuana assassin of youth’ and arguing that the drug was as dangerous as heroin.728  In 1967 
Anslinger gave up his opposition to the Single Convention partly because he felt that ratifying the 
treaty would undermine domestic moves to liberalise cannabis in some US states.729   
At the plenipotentiary conference, there were a range of views held by the participating members.  
McAllister has identified four distinct interest groups at the 1961 Conference: the producer states, e.g. 
Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and the coca-producing nations of Latin America who took an active role 
in revising the third draft; the manufacturing nations, e.g. UK, Switzerland, West Germany, 
Netherlands, Italy and Japan, who tried to limit calls by producer nations for controls on manufactured 
psychotropics; the Soviet Bloc, who wanted to limit internal interference by the monitoring bodies 
and also pushed for an ‘open’ list of producers rather than the ‘closed’ list of the 1953 Opium Protocol; 
and finally, the US and France, who were the cheerleaders of the harshest provisions from the Opium 
Protocol to be included in the Single Convention. 730   
3.1.1. The US and their allies 
As has been argued in Chapter Three, the US was the principal actor in shaping the international 
securitization of drugs and calling for the prohibition of non-medical/non-scientific use as a solution 
to the threat, and whilst the international drug control system had evolved a great deal since the 
Shanghai Opium Commission, US objectives had not been achieved.  This chapter shows that although 
the US continued with their push to design a prohibitionist system of drug control, the outcomes were, 
initially, not much more successful than they had been in the ‘foundational treaties’.  The US did have 
some allies in their push for a strict prohibition-orientated approach to drug control: the Canadians, 
led by Anslinger’s close associate Charles Sharman, were supportive of the US approach until Sharman 
retired, they then shifted their stance somewhat; the French, led by another Anslinger ally, Charles 
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Vaille; and the Chinese, who had been strong proponents of highly restrictive opium control measures 
since the 19th century.731     
Just as the US had been one of the main drivers for the creation of the Single Convention, they were 
also the ones to push for amendments to the convention.  This resulted in another conference in 1972 
to discuss tightening up the drug control system further.  The US was particularly concerned that the 
drug control bodies were not able to fully monitor areas of poppy and coca under cultivation and so 
hoped the amendments would give the INCB strengthened powers.732  However, other states were 
less concerned with the need for amending the convention and felt that it was called in part for US 
domestic political reasons.  According to a British Home Office representative, “there was a prevailing 
attitude of cynicism in most delegations about the real American objectives behind the Conference.  
These were widely taken to be a ploy to promote domestic support for the re-election of President 
Nixon.”733  The Home Office report also states that 
The sponsors [of the amendments] tended to be of two kinds: last minute allies enlisted by US 
diplomatic pressure who had no knowledge of drug problems or the meagre value of US 
amendments, and reluctant associates, like the UK and France, who on balancing the political 
risks of non-alignment and the general innocuousness of US proposals, were ready to support 
but not to lead.734      
As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, growing US hegemony gave them the political 
agency to shape the international drug control system, and by extension, the drug control dispositif, 
as the century progressed. 
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3.1.2. The drug control bodies 
As well as state actors and individual actors, there were also bureaucratic actors, for example those 
charged with monitoring and defending the system.  As was discussed in Chapter Three, three drug 
control bodies had been created under the auspices of the League of Nations: the OAC, the DSB and 
the PCOB.  In 1946, within the newly formed United Nations, the OAC was replaced by the CND and 
the Single Convention established that the PCOB (1928-1967) and DSB (1937-1967) be merged into 
one secretariat which eventually became the INCB in 1968.  Leon Steinig, under the auspices of the 
DND, wrote the first draft of the Single Convention.735  Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’ made sure that 
the first draft contained strict clauses concerning production736 including many of the features of 
Steinig’s proposed International Opium Monopoly.737  This first draft was discussed at the CND 
meetings from 1950-1955.738  The second draft, rewritten by the secretariat as a result of previous 
discussions at CND,739 was debated during the 11th and 12th CND meetings (1956-1957).740  The first 
two drafts were rejected by the majority of members as being too restrictive.741 The third draft was 
drawn up in 1957-58 under the guidance of Canadian CND representative Robert Curran who had 
recently taken over from Sharman and became less prohibition-orientated than his predecessor.742   
These so-called ‘experts’ can be seen as what Bigo refers to as “professional managers of unease”.743  
The members of the drug control bodies were meant to be impartial experts, however, they frequently 
acted in a less than passive manner.  The secretariat members wrote the early drafts of the Single 
Convention and were often closely allied with their governments so were able to influence their views; 
a prime example of this would be Anslinger who, as mentioned earlier, shaped both public and US 
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government perceptions of drugs and organised crime.  Furthermore, through the collection of data, 
and sharing of knowledge, language and resources, the drug control bodies created a “means of 
inscribing reality”744 and therefore a ‘local regime of truth’ that constituted the illicit use of drugs as a 
threat.  In the third draft of the Single Convention the drug control bodies were to be given the right 
to institute local inquires and impose mandatory embargoes if countries were deemed to be over-
producing raw materials; the final draft however, made these embargoes recommendatory only.   
However, in the years after the Single Convention came into international law, the INCB used its 
position to criticise countries that it believed were not acting in the ‘spirit’ of the convention745 (i.e. 
prohibiting non-medical/non-scientific use of drugs) as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.  
3.2. Oppositional voices at the plenipotentiary conference  
During the League of Nations period, the principal areas of contention were around the level of 
international cooperation needed, what forms of drug use were ‘legitimate’, what shape the controls 
should take, i.e. regulatory or prohibitive, and whether states should be allowed to benefit financially 
from the drug trade.  By the time the UN had taken on the role of international drug control, a general 
consensus had formed around the idea that uncontrolled drug production, sale and use was a problem 
that constituted a threat of some kind.  Whilst some of the tensions that had been highlighted in the 
‘foundational treaties’ were still in existence during the plenipotentiary conference, the predominant 
issue was how much national sovereignty each nation would have to give up in order to achieve the 
level of international control required to eliminate the ‘drug threat’.  The unpopular 1953 Opium 
Protocol had stated that “restrictions on the freedom of activity of States are necessary in the 
international trade in opium in order to combat the illicit traffic and to protect humanity against the 
danger of addiction…”746 but it was clear that in 1961 these restrictions had not been completely 
agreed upon as will be discussed in relation to the ‘closed list’ of opium and coca producers, later in 
this chapter. 
The opening statements at the plenipotentiary conference give a good indication of some of most 
problematic articles of the Single Convention.  The articles of the third draft highlighted in the opening 
statements as being contentious were: Article 2 – substances under control; Article 3 – changes to the 
scope of control; Article 22 - measures to ensure execution of provisions of the convention; Articles 
                                                          
744 Bull, p. 88. 
745 Buxton, The Political Economy of Narcotic Drugs, pp. 161-162. 
746 United Nations, Final Act of the United Nations Opium Conference Held at United Nations Head Quarters, 
New York, From 11 May To 18 June 1953, (New York: United Nations, 1963) p. 38. 
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32 and 37 – restrictions on the international trade in opium and poppy straw and restrictions on the 
international trade in coca and crude cocaine, respectively; Article 47 – treatment of drug addicts; 
and, Article 48 – languages and procedures for acceptance.  Discounting Article 48 - which relates to 
geo-political issues regarding states that were not members of the UN - North Vietnam, East Germany, 
North Korea and the People’s Republic of China747 - the above-mentioned articles were some of the 
most proscriptive and therefore controversial at the conference.  Analysis of each one is useful in 
order to understand some of the keys tensions and main actors during the plenipotentiary conference. 
3.2.1. Substances under control and changes to the scope of control 
Articles 2 and 3 (third draft) dealt with the drug schedules: what forms of control should be applied 
and who should be allowed to place drugs in different schedules.  One of the most problematic areas 
concerned drugs in Schedule IV: Article 2 paragraph 1(e) of the third draft stipulated that the most 
extreme control measures should be applied to these drugs whereby “the Parties shall prohibit the 
production, manufacture of, trade in, possession and use of such drugs except for small amounts for 
medical and scientific research”.748  Article 3 paragraph 3 (third draft) allowed the CND to move drugs 
into different schedules after consultation with the World Health Organisation (WHO), effectively 
giving CND the right to prohibit certain drugs by placing them in schedule IV even if they were routinely 
used for medical purposes in some countries.   
                                                          
747 Some countries such as the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (North Vietnam) and the Mongolian People’s 
Republic were not invited to the conference because they were not members of the UN and their 
governments were not formally recognised.  Furthermore due to lack of formal recognition by many nations 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese representative came from Taiwan.  Neither the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) or the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 
were invited to the conference for similar reasons as the PRC, the representatives from the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) therefore claimed to speak for the 
entire Korean and German peoples.   This caused some countries – particularly Eastern Bloc countries – to 
object to this situation frequently. 
748  United Nations, ‘Third Draft of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs’, E/CN.7/AC.3/9, in E/CONF.34/24-
Add. 1, p. 3.  
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A number of countries749 objected to Articles 2 and 3  on the ground that these drugs, especially heroin, 
were used for medicinal purposes in some countries.750  The British and Canadian governments also 
argued in their comments on the third draft that “States should not be asked to bind themselves in 
advance to prohibit any drugs which the Commission [CND] might choose to add to Schedule IV”.751  
Some countries that had already prohibited heroin – such as Greece, India, Turkey and the US – though 
in favour of keeping Article 2 paragraph 1(e), were willing, in the spirit of compromise to allow this 
provision to be recommendatory rather than mandatory.752  In the final draft of the Single Convention 
the clause stated that prohibition was only to be instituted if a party considered that “the prevailing 
conditions in its country render it [prohibition] the most appropriate means of protecting the public 
health”.753  Article 3 of the final draft still allowed the CND, on advice from the WHO, to place a drug 
in Schedule IV,754 however once the clause instituting a mandatory prohibition has been rejected, this 
article became less problematic.  
The next article that was the subject of much discussion was Article 22 (third draft) concerning 
measures to ensure the execution of the convention.  There were two key objections: the Board's 
powers to institute local inquiries into overproduction (paragraph 1(e) of the third draft) which many 
countries felt undermined national sovereignty; and the mandatory embargo on countries that over-
produced drugs (paragraph 4 of the third draft).755  These were two crucial areas for the US who, in 
internal governmental discussions, noted that “the international supervisory organs retain essentially 
the same functions as under existing agreements, except that… the authority of those organs to 
recommend local enquiry and impose an embargo (never invoked), has been dropped...”756  They 
believed that the threat of a mandatory embargo and the Board’s ability to carry out independent 
                                                          
749 The countries that objected to article 2 were Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, West Germany, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Israel, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Countries that objected to article 3 were Britain, 
the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Australia and Canada. See General Statements, E/CONF.34/24-e, pp. 4-16  
750 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 4. 
751 United Nations, Article 56, Footnote 6, E/CN.7/AC.3/9, p. 3. 
752 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 20-21. 
753 United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 13. 
754 United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 14. 
755  United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 140. 
756 US State Department, Report on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 and Comparative Analysis of 
the Single Convention, 1961 and the Protocol of 1953 produced at the request of William J, Fulbright 
(chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs) in 1961, p. 2. US National Archives (Washington 
D.C.) SFo-T.5 (Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, 90th Congress), Box labelled ‘Single Convention’. 
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inquiries on the ground were crucial to eliminating the drug threat and establishing a punitive 
international system.   
Article 22 paragraph 1(e) of the third draft allowed the Board to institute local inquiries if they felt this 
would “contribute to the elucidation of the drug situation in a country or territory” and therefore 
raised concerns.757  Indeed the Mexican representative argued that this paragraph was “even more 
controversial than that for the mandatory embargo, in that it was a challenge to the internal 
jurisdiction of States.”758  The British representative suggested that this provision be deleted and this 
was supported by the French representative.  When the vote was taken, it was agreed by 27 votes to 
10 with 14 abstentions to delete paragraph 1(e).759  A number of countries760 argued that the 
provisions for a mandatory embargo (paragraph 4) extended the powers of the drug control bodies 
too greatly and therefore this could discourage states from signing the convention and “might unduly 
hamper medicine and science”.761  A vote was taken and it was agreed by 41-3 with 3 abstentions to 
delete paragraph 4 concerning the mandatory embargo.762  As can be seen here, the issue of how 
much national sovereignty states were willing to relinquish in order to establish a robust system of 
international control was highly contentious.             
3.2.2. Production controls 
The demand for strict controls on the production of raw materials can be seen as one of the key 
policies demanded by the US in their securitizing move and one that they had been working to achieve 
since the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission.  Therefore, a key objective for the US was the 
introduction of the ‘closed list’ of opium producers763 (Article 32, third draft) and by extension a ‘closed 
list’ for coca producers764 (Article 37, third draft).  In the plenary session US representative Anslinger 
outlined the importance of strict production controls stating that  
                                                          
757 United Nations, E/CN.7/AC.3/9, p. 8. 
758 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 85. 
759 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 86. 
760 The Dutch, the Soviet states, the Danish, the Australians, Bulgarians, Israelis and the Polish. 
761 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, pp. 7-16. 
762 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 87. 
763 The closed list allowed for only named opium producers (initially Bulgaria, Greece, India, Turkey, the USSR 
and Yugoslavia but later Afghanistan and Iran were also added) to grow opium for export.  
764 As with the opium closed list, only named producers of coca (Bolivia, Peru and Indonesia) were allowed to 
grow coca for export. 
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It was somewhat discouraging to hear delegations calling for the deletion of articles 32 and 34 
[confiscation of opium stocks].  If those provisions were deleted from the Single Convention, 
narcotics control would be put back fifty years and international measures would comprise 
nothing more than a general agreement to limit the need for narcotic drugs, as decided at the 
Shanghai Conference in 1909, and a set of general principles included in The Hague 
Convention.765   
However, the British representative argued that the dangers of deleting Article 32 had been 
exaggerated.766  The Soviet representative went further, noting that the supporters of Article 32  
dealt in generalities and had not demonstrated how that provision would ensure uninterrupted 
supply of opium to countries for their lawful needs or would combat illicit traffic... the principle 
advocates of article 32 were the representatives of countries listed [those named in the ‘closed 
list’ of opium producers] in paragraph 1(a). 767  
Certainly, most of the countries that were listed as opium producer states argued keenly in favour of 
the closed list.  Of the named states, only Bulgaria and the USSR were in favour of eliminating the 
closed list as they believed limiting the rights of countries to produce opium/coca was an infringement 
of national sovereignty.  Yugoslavia noted that they would not make a recommendation either in 
support of, or against, the idea of a ‘closed list’ for either opium or coca.768  Those non-opium 
producing states that supported the closed lists were ones that supported the strictest control 
provisions: China, the USA and Canada.769  Similar countries supported the closed list for coca 
production as well, with the obvious inclusion of those countries named on the list (Bolivia and 
Indonesia).  The other named country – Peru - did not make a statement on closed lists.   
A far greater number of states opposed the idea of ‘closed lists’ both for opium and coca.  Two main 
reasons were put forward for this opposition: some countries claimed that closed lists undermined 
the sovereignty of states;770 others771 argued that ‘closed lists’ could result in certain countries gaining 
                                                          
765 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 52. 
766 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 50. 
767 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 50. 
768 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 44. 
769 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 41 (USA), p. 42 (Canada), p. 52 (China).  
770 These were largely Eastern bloc countries including USSR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. 
771 Ghana, the Netherlands, Britain, Pakistan, Australia and France. 
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a monopoly on production and that this was very unsatisfactory.772  In the ad hoc committee US 
representative Anslinger argued that  
since article 32 was the most important part of the Convention, it was essential to reach 
agreement on it… Unless agreement was reached on the limitation of opium production, 
addiction would double where it had already existed and also spread to new countries.773   
An amendment was proposed by a group of states774 that abandoned the idea of closed lists, instead 
calling upon parties which wished to produce opium to “take account of the prevailing world need for 
opium… so that the production of opium by such Party does not result in the over-production of opium 
in the world.”775  When the ad hoc committee met again to discuss the amendment it was adopted 
unanimously776 although the US would later use the rejection of the ‘closed lists’ as one of the reasons 
not to ratify the convention.  One US government official noted that 
 The Convention was not signed by the United States for several reasons.  The principal reason 
was a concern that omission from the Convention of the “closed list” provision… would result 
in many additional countries engaging in such production and a consequent spiralling of the 
amount of opium that would be diverted into illicit traffic.777   
As mentioned earlier, the positions taken by the national delegations regarding Article 37 (third draft) 
– the closed list for coca producing countries – mirrored the stances taken on Article 32.  Discussion 
was more limited in part because many of the issues had been aired during discussions on opium 
production but also because the coca issue was seen as less pressing than that of opium as so few 
countries felt that they had a problem with coca-based products.778  Just as those states that had a 
well-developed pharmaceutical industry lobbied hard to protect the sector, the US also lobbied to 
make sure that drinks manufacturers, such as Coca Cola - which used a form of coca leaf that had had 
                                                          
772 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, pp. 39-41. 
773 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24/Add.11 p. 161-162. 
774 Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Netherlands and the Philippines. 
775 United Nations, E/CONF.34/C.5/L.6 in E/CONF.34.24/Add.1 p. 42. 
776 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24/Add.1 p. 166. 
777 A letter from Nicholas de Belleville Katzenbach, Acting US Secretary of State, to US President Lyndon B. 
Johnson dated 15th February 1967.  US National Archives (Washington D.C.) box SFo.T5. 
778 For example Canada, France, Britain all noted that they had very few problems with illicit traffic in 
coca/cocaine.  United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 54. 
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the active elements removed as a flavouring agent - continued to have access to a supply of the 
substance.779  
After Article 37 (third draft) was deleted, a new article (article 26) was drafted in relation to coca which 
noted that “If a Party permits the cultivation of the coca bush, it shall apply thereto and to coca leaves 
the system of controls provided in article 23 respecting the control of the opium poppy...”780  Because 
of the changes to Article 32 of the third draft and the deletion of Article 37, the final draft of the 1961 
Single Convention included a new article that dealt with ‘special provisions for cultivation’ (Article 22) 
that gave countries the right to prohibit cultivation if the felt it necessary.781  The 1972 Amending 
Protocol added some further responsibilities on signatory states regarding the control of cultivation.  
The new article on the limitation of production of opium, stipulated that “the production of opium by 
any country or territory shall be organized and controlled in such manner” that it does not exceed the 
estimates given.782  A new paragraph was also added to Article 22 which stated that a party that 
prohibited the cultivation of opium, cannabis or coca, “shall take appropriate measures to seize any 
plants illicitly cultivated and destroy them, except for small quantities required by the Party for 
scientific and research purposes.”783   
3.2.3. Treatment for problematic drug users 
The next article to be analysed here is Article 47 (third draft, which became Article 38 in the final draft) 
concerning the treatment of problematic drug users.  This article is of importance because it reflected 
how countries perceived of, and treated, ‘addicts’, the very people that were most affected by the 
‘evil’ of drug addiction.  In the third draft, this article stated that all parties should “give special 
attention to the provision of facilities for the medical treatment, care and rehabilitation of drug 
addicts.”784  This provision was widely supported in the plenary sessions.  It was the second paragraph 
that gave rise to more serious debate: this paragraph called on signatory states to “establish facilities 
for the compulsory treatment of drug addicts in closed institutions.”785  It was the call for compulsory 
treatment in closed institutions that caused the most intense discussion.  The US opened discussions 
                                                          
779 Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2011, p. 11; United Nations, E/CONF.34.24-e, p. 54. 
780 United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 26. 
781 United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 23. 
782 United Nations, Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention, p. 58. 
783 United Nations, Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention, p. 69. 
784 United Nations, Third Draft of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, E/CN.7/AC.3/9, p. 18. 
785 United Nations, Third Draft of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, E/CN.7/AC.3/9, p. 18. 
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in the plenary session by clearly identifying themselves as an authority on the subject of drug addiction 
treatment and emphasising their social and political capital in this arena.  The US delegate noted that 
many American specialists had shown that confining addicts in closed institutions was the most 
successful approach, though he claimed that this was not a punitive approach.786  A number of other 
countries, including Canada, the United Arab Republic (UAR), China, India and Iran, supported this 
provision.787  However a greater number of countries were either actively opposed to the idea of 
compulsory treatment and closed institutions or favoured this provision being a recommendation 
only.788  Some countries789 were concerned about the cost of establishing closed institutions or 
providing compulsory treatment; other states felt that closed institutions and compulsory treatment 
may not always be the best way to deal with addiction because it reflected a punitive approach which 
they did not believe was appropriate for people who were sick.790  Indeed, the New Zealand 
representative argued that his delegation “doubted whether direct reference to details of medical 
treatment should be made in the Convention.”791  In the end it was agreed that making paragraph 2 
recommendatory would not undermine the objectives. 792  In relation to how to treat drug addicts, 
there was a discussion around the causes of drug addiction.  The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(BSSR), Czechoslovakia and Indonesia proposed an amendment to Article 47 (third draft) stating that  
The Parties consider that the most important prerequisite for the prevention and eradication 
of drug addiction is the consistent application by States of measures aimed at improving the 
economic and social well-being of the people, raising its cultural level and providing medical 
services that are available to all segments of the population.793   
This amendment was discussed in the plenary sessions.  However, the American representative argued 
that the amendment advocated “socialized medicine” and therefore his delegation would be unable 
                                                          
786 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 103. 
787 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, pp. 103-113. 
788 Burma, New Zealand, Liberia, Brazil, the Philippines, Pakistan, the Netherlands, Cambodia, Japan, Sweden, 
Britain, Yugoslavia, and more all objected to paragraph 2 as it was drafted. E/CONF.34/24-e, pp. 103-113. 
789 Greece, Brazil, Ghana, India and Pakistan all stated that their national economic situation may not allow for 
such a proposal. United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 103-113. 
790 Burma, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, Sweden and Britain, E/CONF.34.24 p. 103-113. 
791 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 107. 
792 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 114. 
793 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-Add.1, p. 49. 
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to ratify the convention if it included such a provision.794  The UK representative suggested that this 
amendment was “incomplete” because it only noted one caused of addiction but at the same time it 
was “too wide” and was therefore it was “out of place in the Convention.”795  Therefore the 
amendment was dropped.796             
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 1972 Amending Protocol added changes to Article 38 (final 
draft).  These developments explicitly broadened the scope of the article so that it was concerned with 
all illicit drug use, rather than just addiction.  It also went into more detail about the forms of support 
that should be available to drug users.  The commentary noted that “Treatment, after-care, 
rehabilitation and social reintegration present four stages of remedial measures which are widely held 
to be necessary to restore the well-being and social usefulness of abusers of narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances.”797  It stated that rehabilitation should provide “such measures as may be 
required to make the former abuser of narcotic drugs physically, morally and otherwise fit for living a 
normal life as a useful member of society…”798  This quote shows how users of illicit drugs were framed 
as existing outside of ‘normal’ society and therefore reinforced the ‘othering’ of drug users.  Paragraph 
2 of the amended Article 38 refers to the “social reintegration of abusers of drugs”799 and the 
commentary explains that “the term “social reintegration” may thus cover such measures as provision 
of a suitable job and appropriate housing, and perhaps also enabling the former abuser of narcotic 
drugs to leave his former environment and to move to a social atmosphere less likely to produce such 
social evils as drug addiction.”800  These aspects of drug treatment and rehabilitation were often 
overlooked in favour of criminalisation, especially in states that emphasised strict prohibition, such as 
the United States under President Reagan, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.  
However, at the same time in European states, recognition of the spread of HIV amongst injecting 
drug users was beginning to bring about a re-assessment of the importance of treatment, 
rehabilitation and social integration, as will be discussed in Chapter Six.  
  
                                                          
794 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 111. 
795 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 111. 
796 United Nations, E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 113. 
797 United Nations, Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention, p. 84. 
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799 United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as Amended by the 1972 Protocol, (New York: United 
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3.3. The ‘audience(s)’: ratification and US-led opposition to the Single Convention 
As discussed in Chapter Two, one of the critiques of the Copenhagen School variant of securitization 
theory is the lack of conceptualisation around who the ‘audience’ is and what role they play in 
facilitating the securitization move.801  Indeed, it is often hard to identify separate ‘actors’ and 
‘audiences’ and their roles become indistinct.  This blurring of the roles between the actor and 
audience is another reason why this thesis choses to see both ‘actor’ and ‘audience’ as crucial 
elements of the securitizing agent.   
Participants at the plenipotentiary conference functioned as ‘actors’ during the conference, however, 
on their return home, they became ‘audiences’ because they had to choose whether to ratify it or not.  
In order for the Single Convention to come into international law, it needed 40-member states to ratify 
it802 this total was reached on 13 December 1964.  Some countries did not sign the Single Convention 
in 1961 or ratify it until much later.803  McAllister argues that this was out of deference to the US but 
once the treaty had come into force in December 1964, they ratified it.804  Furthermore, the US, initially 
the lead actor in the securitizing move, later took a less than constructive role in the ratification 
process.  They were extremely disappointed by the final draft of the Single Convention and therefore 
tried to undermine the ratification process.  There was not much sympathy from the British, and one 
official argued that  
The US attitude to the Single Convention is unrealistic… They were also upset because the strict 
control of the production of opium which is provided for in the 1953 Protocol, and which 
Anslinger seems to have promised Congress would be included in the Single Convention, was 
watered down because it was unacceptable to many countries, including some of the major 
producers...805 
                                                          
801 For example, Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization’, p. 1-30; Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’, p. 
357-383; Taureck, p. 1-31; Salter, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, p. 321-349; Watson, p. 279-301. 
802 United Nations, The Single Convention, p. 34.  
803 For example, India ratified it on 13th December 1964, Turkey ratified it on 23rd May 1967, the US ratified it 
on 25th May 1967 and France ratified it on 19th February 1969. 
804 McAllister, p. 218. 
805 Letter from Tom Green (UK Home Office) to E.E. Key (UK Foreign Office), dated 6th September 1961. British 
National Archives, FCO-371/161050. 
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Anslinger however, blamed the failure of the Single Convention on other countries.  In a report to the 
Department of State on the Single Convention plenipotentiary conference he claimed that the Soviet 
Bloc, supported by the British Commonwealth and African countries  
attained a measure of success in its efforts to weaken the Convention when… the article in the 
third draft “Limitation of Production of Opium”, which would have strictly limited production, 
was amended to permit any country to produce and export opium.806   
The US viewed the stricter production controls of the Opium Protocol as being more effective in 
managing the ‘drugs threat’ and argued that   
The most important provisions of the 1953 Protocol that were omitted from the Single 
Convention are the provisions establishing a “closed list” of countries permitted to produce 
opium for export.  Other provisions of the Protocol omitted from the Convention relate to 
limitation of stocks, estimates and statistics on areas cultivated for opium, local inquiry, and a 
mandatory embargo.807   
The Opium Protocol needed three of the seven named producer states to ratify it for it to come 
into international law.  India was the first producer state to ratify it in 1954, and Iran ratified the 
Opium Protocol in 1959.  One more ratification was needed in order for the Protocol to come into 
international law, which would, it was hoped, supersede the need for the Single Convention.  A 
State Department report comparing the Single Convention and the Opium Protocol noted that   
It has been suggested that if the 1953 Protocol were brought into force by the one additional 
ratification or adherence required, that the Protocol together with the provisions of agreements 
                                                          
806 H.J. Anslinger, Classified Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference for the 
Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, New York, N.Y., January 24 through March 25, 1961, 19th 
April 1961, US National Archives (Maryland), Box labelled ‘Narcotic Drugs, ECOSOC – Plenipotentiary 
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807 US State Department, Report on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961. US National Archives 
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now in force would furnish a more effective international control of narcotic drugs than would 
exist under the Single Convention.808 
This led the Americans to turn their attention to persuading the Greeks or Turks to ratify the Protocol 
because they were concerned that “Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R will certainly never ratify, and Yugoslavia 
is most unlikely to do so”.809   
As mentioned earlier in this chapter there were tensions between the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(FBN) and the US State Department over whether to ratify the Single Convention or not.  According to 
the British, “pressure which is being put on Turkey is applied rather through the United States Treasury 
enforcement agencies [the FBN] than through the State Department”.810  This was because the FBN 
were concerned “that the Department of State had not done as much as it could have to get one more 
country (Greece or Turkey) to sign the 1953 Protocol and thereby bring it into effect.”811  The British 
approached the State Department with their concerns about the need for the US to ratify the Single 
Convention and were given the impression that “the State Department agreed with us but that, as you 
say, the policy is really in the hands of the Narcotics Bureau of the Treasury.”  The US persuaded the 
Greek government to sign the Opium Protocol in 1963, bringing it into international law and the Turks 
ratified it shortly after,812 however the Single Convention came into international law the year after 
effectively supplanting the Protocol.      
In order to counteract US pressure to support the Opium Protocol, British DND Director Gilbert Yates, 
with support from Canadian CND representative Robert Curran, made concerted efforts to promote 
the Single Convention at the ECOSOC meeting in 1962.813  They managed to convince 81 countries to 
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(Washington D.C.) SFo-T.5 (Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, 90th Congress), Box labelled ‘Single 
Convention’. p. 17. 
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Archives (Washington D.C.) SFo-T.5 (Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, 90th Congress), Box labelled 
‘Single Convention’.  
812 McAllister, p. 217. 
813 McAllister, p. 217. 
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support the motion in favour of the Single Convention, with only the US voting against it.814  After 
Yates’ big push for ratification of the Single Convention in 1962/3, the Opium Protocol gained few new 
supporters.815  Here we can see an example of what Grayson and Collins have described as 
“Frankenstein's Monster”816 whereby the US lost control of the securitizing move and the end result 
was very different from that which they had demanded.      
In 1967 the US eventually ratified the Single Convention and testimony to Congress in support of 
ratification acknowledged that  
Whatever the imperfections of the Single Convention with respect to the control of opium 
production, the Treasury is now persuaded that they are far outweighed by the broad coverage 
of the treaty… Moreover the imperfections of the Convention do not appear as real or as 
significant as they did a few years ago.817   
The US had not been alone in their resistance to the Single Convention.  In his testimony to Congress, 
Anslinger emphasised the continuing close relationship with France, noting that both France and the 
US “struggled hand in hand at the conference to improve the convention” and that both countries 
eventually agreed to ratify the Single Convention in concert with one another.818  Though the aim was 
for the Single Convention to be the “convention to end all drug conventions”,819 this was not to be.  In 
1972, the US called for the Single Convention to be amended in order to tighten up the drug control 
system further.  The drug control system was also expanded by the 1971 UN Convention on 
                                                          
814 McAllister p. 217. 
815 McAllister, p. 218. 
816 Grayson, 'Securitization and the Boomerang Debate’, pp. 337-343; Collins, ‘Frankenstein’s Monster’, pp. 
567-588. 
817 Statement of James Pomeroy Hendrick (special assistant to the Treasury) before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations in connection with the ratification of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 27th April 
1967, pp. 13-14. US National Archives (Washington D.C.) SFo-T.5 (Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, 
90th Congress), Box labelled ‘Single Convention’, pp. 13-14.  
818 Statement of Harry J. Anslinger before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in connection with the 
ratification of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 27th April 1967, p. 14.  US National Archives 
(Washington D.C.) SFo-T.5 (Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, 90th Congress), Box labelled ‘Single 
Convention’, p. 14. 
819 May, Comments and Possibilities’ [online]. 
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Psychotropic Substances which brought synthetic drugs820 under international control, and later by 
the 1988 UN Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances that 
demanded states apply criminal penalties to all aspects of illicit trafficking, production and use of 
drugs.821   
During the ratification process the main actor in the securitizing move changed.  Initially the US had 
been the predominant actor but once they withdrew their support for the convention, the British, 
Canadians and supporting CND members took responsibility for gaining enough ratifications to bring 
it into international law.  As mentioned above, many of the demands made by the control-orientated 
states were dropped in order to achieve broad international acceptance.  Here we see the inter-
subjective nature of the securitizing move, as well as one of its key goals: universality. 
4. Context: US hegemonic power and the international system 
As was shown in Chapter Three, the US had been consistently calling for the prohibition of drugs for 
non-medical and scientific purposes since the beginning of the twentieth century, but this demand 
had been met with resistance.  This began to change during World War II for a number of inter-related 
reasons.  Firstly, the US used its growing status as a military power to persuade the European colonial 
states to end their opium monopolies in Asia.  Secondly, decolonisation in Asia meant that the 
European powers no longer had to take uncomfortable, paradoxical, positions towards drugs in their 
colonial territories and at home.  Finally, the birth of the UN created powerful motives for states to be 
seen to be participating in the international system rather than outside it.  These contextual factors 
all contributed to the establishment of a legitimate referent object (humankind), the political capital 
of the ‘actor(s)’ (the US and the UN), the discursive and non-discursive practices that constructed 
drugs to be threatening, and the willingness of the ‘audience(s) to accept this threat.     
During World War II, Anslinger and other members of the ‘inner circle’822 proposed that once the US 
forces had helped liberate the European Asian territories from the Japanese, the governments should 
commit to ending their opium monopolies and prohibit opium smoking.823  The ‘inner circle’ framed 
                                                          
820 The term ‘synthetic drugs’ refers to “a psychotropic substance manufactured by a process of full chemical 
synthesis.” As opposed to one that has natural plant origins.  See, United Nations, Commentary on the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, E/CN.7/598, (New York: United Nations, 1976), p. 12. 
821 Jelsma, p. 5. 
822 McAllister, pg. 149. 
823 Bewley-Taylor, United States and International Drug Control, p. 45; McAllister, p. 150. 
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the ending of the opium monopolies as a military matter rather than a civilian one in order to limit 
debate on the issue.824  Anslinger hinted to the British and Dutch governments that ending the opium 
monopolies was official US government policy even though it had not, at the time, been formally 
agreed upon.825  The State Department were alarmed by Anslinger’s unilateral action but after 
consulting with the Treasury, War and Navy Departments – all of whom favoured the policy – they 
reluctantly supported the moves.826  Shortly after Anslinger’s diplomatic approaches, a similar 
argument was put forward by Congressman Walter Judd827 who argued that  
an additional reason for our making representations [on opium prohibition] at this time is that 
some of these countries [Britain, France, and the Netherlands] are dependent upon us today as 
they have not been before.  They need our money, our materials, our men.  We therefore have 
position of special influence.828    
Judd also argued that US influence over non-Allied powers had also increased, noting that “most of 
the producer countries are in considerable degree dependent upon us, and we need only to urge that 
they put into effect promises they made 30 years ago at The Hague.”829    The Congressman put forward 
the Judd Resolution which stipulated that the US government should put pressure on opium producing 
countries to control the amounts of opium grown and see World War II as a chance to end illicit poppy 
production and trade; the resolution passed in the House and the Senate unanimously and was 
accepted as US government policy.830  The acceptance of the Judd Resolution as US government policy 
created a clear strategy and encapsulated Anslinger’s objectives despite it having been developed 
independently from him.831  Here we see an example of the US using the political capital gained 
through their role in World War II as a lever to gain concessions for the European powers.  This said, 
and even considering Buzan et al.’s assertion that the securitization process can rest on “coercion as 
                                                          
824 Collins, ‘Breaking the Monopoly System’, p. 9. 
825 Collins, ‘Breaking the Monopoly System’, p. 11; McAllister, p. 151. 
826 McAllister, p. 151. 
827 Dr Walter Judd had previously been a missionary doctor in China from 1925-1931 and 1935-1938.  He went 
on to become Republican Congressman for Minnesota from 1943-1963.  See, Biographical Directory of the 
United States Congress, Congressional Biography of Walter Judd [online]. Available from: < 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=J000278> (accessed 12/04/13). 
828 Dr Judd’s speech to the US Congress, US Congressional record 21st February 1944, in FO-371/39366. 
829 Dr Judd’s speech to the US Congress, US Congressional record 21st February 1944, in FO-371/39366. 
830 Collins, Regulations and Prohibitions, p. 87.  
831 Collins, Regulations and Prohibitions, p. 88 
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well as on consent”,832 the process of securitizing the non-medical/non-scientific production and use 
of drugs was clearly an intersubjective process as has been illustrated in this chapter.  By the end of 
World War II there was a growing community of states who had come to accept that the prohibition 
of non-medical/non-scientific production and use of drugs would help reduce the ‘drug threat’.  The 
US used a combination of political coercion - through the need for US military support during World 
War II to liberate European Asian colonies - and rhetorical coercion - by accusing producer states of 
benefiting from an immoral trade, a critique that tied in with domestic discourses in countries such as 
Britain - to make it harder to justify maintaining opium monopolies.833  Furthermore, the US 
constructed the narrative that it had ‘won’ World War II, which in its view made it the leader of the 
free world and gave it the power and responsibility to restructure the international system.834  This 
belief reinforced their view that international drug control was their responsibility. After the end of 
World War II and the formation of the UN, there was a powerful imperative for states to participate 
in the international system.  The birth of the UN, and particularly the creation of the UN Charter, 
established international norms and moral authority.835  As has already been discussed in Chapter 
Three, since the ‘foundational treaties’ were drafted, international cooperation had been the 
cornerstone of the drug control system.  The creation of the UN, then formalised this international 
system as well as reinforcing the ‘global self’ as a legitimate referent object.   
Whilst the US failed to get all of their objectives incorporated into the Single Convention, their role in 
influencing the drug control dispositif cannot be underestimated.  As countries integrated the Single 
Convention into their domestic legal codes, US-style prohibition became the predominant mode of 
drug control.  As will be shown in Chapter Five, a new securitization of drugs by the Reagan 
administration reoriented the drug control dispositif once again, so that increased criminalisation and 
militarised drug law enforcement became accepted as tools of the drug control system.    
  
                                                          
832 Buzan et al., p. 25. 
833 The anti-opium movement had been influencing public discourse on the drug trade since the late 19th 
century.  See, Bull, p. 37; Berridge, Opium and the People, p. 173. 
834 Jutta Weldes, ‘The Cultural Productions of Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles in Cuba’, in Cultures of 
Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, ed. by Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh 
Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 4. 
835 Michael Barnett, ‘Peacekeeping, Indifference and Genocide in Rwanda’ in Cultures of Insecurity: States, 
Communities, and the Production of Danger, ed. by Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond 




This chapter has analysed the language used in the securitizing move, the political capital of, and 
relationships between the ‘actor(s)’ and ‘audiences’, the context in which the speech acts were made 
and practices that influenced the securitization of drugs.  By the end of World War II, the US (the actor) 
was able to use its growing political capital in order to persuade the audience (the European colonial 
powers and the producer states) that its objective – the prohibition of non-medical/non-scientific 
production and use of drugs – was the most effective way of dealing with the ‘drugs threat’.  Here we 
see an example of how an actor’s power and capability can make it easier to persuade an audience: 
the US had both military and diplomatic power over the European colonial states because they needed 
US help to liberate their territories and therefore the US used this power to gain support for their 
objectives.  This reinforces the proposal in this thesis that when it comes to the speech act of a 
securitizing move, it is not just what is said, as much as when it is said and by whom, that is crucial to 
understanding how such a move became accepted.  Furthermore, non-discursive practices (including 
policy implementation or non-implementation) play a significant role in established the securitization 
as well.       
The Single Convention can be seen as meeting Salter’s securitization threshold,836 as discussed in 
Chapter Two, because the issue of drugs was debated in detail at the plenipotentiary conference and 
preceding League of Nations and CND meetings.  By the time the 1972 Amending Protocol was ratified, 
the non-medical use of drugs was accepted as being a threat to humankind, even by states that 
claimed to have no illicit production or use.837  Through the near-universal adherence to the Single 
Convention, the solutions proposed to counteract the threat - prohibition of non-medical/non-
scientific use of drugs – were largely accepted at least for a time.  Whilst few new powers were given 
to the agent - the UN bodies – at the international level, prohibition at the domestic level gave new 
tools to the state to deal with the issue.  The Single Convention did not demand that countries institute 
the prohibition of drugs for non-medical purposes, but the commitment to limit drugs only to medical 
and scientific use (Article 4) along with the onerous regulations surrounding statistics (Article 13) and 
estimates (Article 12) created the situation whereby prohibition became the most common form of 
drug control.  This led to the drug control dispositif becoming prohibitionist in character and limited 
                                                          
836 Salter, ‘When securitization fails’, p. 120. 
837 For example, Dahomey, argued that it “was not a producer of narcotic drugs and had no illicit traffic [but] it 
wished to co-operate with other countries… [to protect] from such evils.” See, United Nations, 
E/CONF.34/24-e, p. 10. 
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the range of options available to nation states when considering the ‘drug problem’.  As will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, even when countries instituted policies that were allowed 
under the Single Convention, such as decriminalisation of possession or harm reduction programmes, 
they were harshly criticised by the drug control bodies and the US for not abiding by the ‘spirit’ of the 
conventions.  This shows that even though the Single Convention was not explicitly prohibitionist in 
outlook, the international drug control system, and the drug control dispositif had taken on the form 



















The Drug Trade as a Threat to ‘The Integrity of Democratic Governments’: 
The Construction of Drugs as a Threat to the Nation State in US National Security Decision 
Directive 221 (1986) 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold: to map the processes through which drug use and drug trafficking 
became securitized under US President Reagan and to analyse how this securitization impacted upon 
the drug control dispositif.  The critical year under analysis is 1986, when Reagan made a concerted 
effort to underline the threat posed by drugs to the security of the US state, but also to the security 
of the American people and the wider international order.  1986 was the year when National Security 
Decision Directive-221 (NSDD-221) was produced and also when public concern about the threat 
posed by drugs hit a peak that had not been seen since the Nixon era.838  However, in order to fully 
understand how drugs came to be securitized by the Reagan administration, NSDD-221 should be 
considered as an important nodal point in a series of securitizing speech acts that began in 1981 with 
Reagan’s proposed amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act.  Furthermore, Reagan’s securitization of 
drugs was built upon foundations laid by President Nixon and the launch of his ‘war on drugs’ in 1971839 
as well as previous examples of discourses linking drugs, drug users and drug trafficking to threatening 
‘others’ stretching back to the nineteenth century840 (see Chapters One and Three).    
From the perspective of the development of US drug policy, analysis of NSDD-221 is useful because 
although its major focus is on the threat caused by drug trafficking to national security, from the very 
beginning, the document recognised the perceived threats caused by domestic use of drugs as well.841  
NSDD-221, therefore, expressed a concern with both national and societal security.  It also situated 
the ‘drug threat’ in its geo-political context of the Cold War by naming three Soviet-allies (Bulgaria, 
Cuba and Nicaragua) as countries that were using drug trafficking for financial and political reasons.  
                                                          
838 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, p. 213; Eric L. Jensen, Jung Gerber and Ginna M. Babcock, ‘The New War on Drugs: 
Grass Roots Movement or Political Construction?’, The Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1991, p. 656. 
839 Richard Nixon launched his so-called ‘War on Drugs’ with a speech designating drug abuse as “public enemy 
number one”.  See, Richard Nixon, ‘Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control’, 17th June 1971, The American Presidency Project, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley [online].  
Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3047 > (accessed 25/03/13). 
840 For example, the 1875 San Francisco Opium Ordinance specifically targetted Chinese immigrants.  See, 
Musto, pp. 3-5.  
841 The White House, National Security Decision Directive 221, p. 1. 
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Furthermore, as will be discussed below, the US concern about the threats posed by drug use and 
drug trafficking shaped international discourses on the drug trade and this was reflected in the 1988 
UN Convention Against Illicit Trafficking Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. NSDD-221 and 
the new UN convention represented a reorientation in the drug control dispositif through an emphasis 
on increased concern about international drug trafficking as a threat to national security and the 
militarisation of the ‘war on drugs’. 
Further to this, the chapter argues that the Reagan administration identified a new referent object, 
one that included both US society and values and the (US) state.  Reagan, from the very beginning of 
his administration, saw the military as key to aiding drug law enforcement.  The 1981 Posse Comitatus 
amendment should be seen as the beginning of the securitizing move relating to drugs under Reagan.  
Although, at this point the amendment merely legislated for the military to provide technical – or 
‘passive’ - support for the Coast Guards and Customs officials; the military were still prohibited from 
‘actively’842 participating in counter-narcotics operations.  This prohibition was lifted in 1986 when 
Reagan signed NSDD-221 which set out how the military and intelligence agencies should play an 
active part in counter-narcotics operations overseas.     
NSDD-221 was only one aspect of the securitization of drugs under the Reagan administration 
however.  It dealt predominantly with the international production and trafficking of the illicit drugs, 
in other words supply-control.  The domestic focus of the Reagan administration’s drug policy 
concentrated largely on demand-control - reducing drug use - in the United States although it also 
increased criminal sanctions on drug dealers and traffickers as well.  In the early years of Reagan’s 
presidency, Nancy Reagan began to take an interest in reducing drug use domestically and she coined 
the phrase ‘Just Say No’.843  The ‘Just Say No’ campaign should be seen as part of the domestic 
dimension of the Reagan administration’s securitizing move against all aspects of the drug trade.  Both 
                                                          
842 I am using the term ‘active’ here to denote a situation in which US military service personnel participated in 
the operations on contrast to situations where they gave ‘passive’ support through lending technology or 
expertise. The terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’ are commonly used when determining whether the PCA has been 
violated.  See, Mark P. Nevitt, ‘Unintended Consequences: The Posse Comitatus Act in the Modern Era’, 
Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 36, October 2014, p. 150; Charles Doyle and Jennifer K. Elsea, The Posse Comitatus 
Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) Report for Congress, (Washington D.C.: CRS, August 2012), p. 56. 
843 Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, pp. 199-200. 
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Ronald and Nancy Reagan regularly used their speeches to emphasise the dangers that drug use and 
trafficking could pose to the national security of the US and to the American people.      
During the Reagan administration, the international and domestic aspects of drugs were frequently 
linked together but different solutions were proposed.  Within the US, the blame was put squarely on 
those who used and sold drugs and the solutions ranged from increasing the mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug offences to random drug testing in federal workplaces and the ‘Just Say No’ 
campaign.  Externally, however, solutions were even more stringent.   They included using the military 
to carry out operations against drug producers and traffickers and cutting off US aid to countries that 
were deemed to be not fully committed to US counter-narcotics policies and the 1988 UN Convention 
Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.844      
This chapter provides new insights into the Reagan administration’s drug policy agenda.  This includes 
analysis of archival documents that have not been scrutinised in detail before.  None of the scholars 
looking at the Reagan’s administration’s drug policy referenced documents in the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library and Museum in California, which form the basis of my archival research for this 
chapter.  William L. Marcy845 has done detailed archival research into the Reagan era (amongst others) 
but used the US National Security Archives rather than the Reagan archives.  Ted Galen Carpenter846 
did not use archival documents and instead used media sources and academic publications to 
complete his research.  Furthermore, there is little detailed analysis of NSDD-221 in the scholarly work 
on this subject.  Part of this lacunae may be because the document was only partially declassified in 
2005 and only fully declassified in 2011, meaning that those writing before this time were unable to 
read it and had to rely on secondary analysis of it.  Because many documents in the archives were still 
classified when I undertook this research, I have analysed newspaper articles from the Washington 
Post and New York Times in the year 1986.  This has provided alternative voices to the official 
narratives found in the archives.  I also reviewed biographies and memoirs by key players in the Reagan 
                                                          
844 United States Committee on International Relations, Committee on Foreign Relations Legislation, 
Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002, Volume I–A, Current Legislation and Related Executive 
Orders, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2003), pp. 185-189 & pp. 189-194. 
845 William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in 
Central and South America, (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2010). 
846 Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
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administration and journalistic histories of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),847 although these 
books brought little additional information to light.  In fact, there are very few references to drug 
policy in the memoirs and autobiographies which suggests that the ‘drug problem’ was not in itself an 
important policy issue for the authors.  In Ronald Reagan’s memoirs and diaries, the only references 
to drug policy relate to Nancy’s concern about the issue.  George Shultz is the exception here and 
when he did discuss drug policy, he challenged the status quo848 as will be discussed later in this 
chapter.       
In order to investigate the securitization process under Reagan, this chapter will firstly analyse the 
speech acts carried out by the Reagan administration and other actors.  It will then identify various 
practices that support or sediment the securitizing process.  Next the chapter will deconstruct the key 
actors and audiences participating in the securitizing moves, and finally it will explore the context in 
which these securitizing acts and agents were situated.  The aim is to fully deconstruct the process of 
securitizing drug use and drug trafficking by the Reagan administration, and to analyse how this 
securitization affected the drug control dispositif.  This chapter concludes that although the Reagan 
administration’s securitization of drugs followed the pattern of using pre-existing narratives 
surrounding the threats posed by drugs, drug users and drug traffickers, it put forward a new, 
militarised, approach to dealing with the ‘drug problem’ overseas.  The administration also increased 
criminal sanctions and emphasised demand control at home.  There were a range of elite agents that 
contributed to this process including the executive branch, the legislative branch, several federal 
organisations and the US First Lady Nancy Reagan.  The securitization of drugs was not simply a ‘top 
down’ process however. Congress, the media and the ‘Parent Power’ movement who had campaigned 
for a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to drug use849 all played a role in demanding harsher policies and 
creating an environment that was supportive of such practices.  The geo-political context in which the 
speech acts were made, one of the Cold War and political destabilisation in Central America, also 
contributed to laying the groundwork for the successful securitization of drugs.  Nancy Reagan’s ‘Just 
Say No’ campaign, as well as the highly emotive language used by both of the Reagans’, and wide-
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CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 2013). 
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spread media hysteria over crack cocaine, reflected the administration’s emphasis on ‘family values’ 
and created a situation whereby a significant proportion of the general public were willing to accept, 
and indeed sometimes call for, harsh policies against drug users and drug traffickers.    
2. The securitizing ‘acts’: speech act(s) and practices  
This section will firstly analyse NSDD-221 as securitizing speech act.  It will then analyse the discursive 
and rhetorical strategies used by the agent, before finally exploring some of the practices that 
contributed to supporting and sedimenting the securitization process.  
2.1. National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-221) as a speech act   
As suggested above, NSDD-221 can be considered the primary securitizing speech act in this case study 
but before examining the detail of this speech act in itself it is worth contextualising its significance 
against the wider backdrop of what National Security Decision Directives are and how they have 
tended to be used historically.  Most National Security Directives (NSDs)850 are classified and they are 
often not even announced to Congress.851  NSDD-221 however was publicly announced by Vice 
President George Bush852 and a fact sheet was produced summarising its content,853 which makes it 
quite unusual in this respect, although not wholly exceptional.  Reagan also issued a fact sheet about 
NSDD-207 concerning terrorism shortly after signing it into law.854  NSDD-207 and NSDD-221 were 
issued within three months of each other and reflected the Reagan administration’s growing concern 
                                                          
850 Since Eisenhower US presidents have issued national security directives under a variety of different names 
including National Security Decision Memoranda, National Security Directives, National Security Decision 
Directives, Presidential Decision Directives and National Security Presidential Directive.  Despite, the 
different names they all had the same function and power.  See, Vikki Gordon, ‘The Law: Unilaterally Shaping 
U.S. National Security Policy: The Role of National Security Directives’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37: 
2, June 2007, p. 350. 
851 Vikki Gordon, ‘National Security Directive Classification’, Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 27, 2010, 
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852 Times Wire Services, ‘Bush discloses Directive Tying Drugs to Terror’, Los Angeles Times, 8th June 1986 
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853 NSDD-221 fact sheet for release, in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Collections, Turner, Carlton, E., 
Files, Series I, Chron File August 1986 – September 1986, Box 3. 
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about the threats posed by non-state actors such as terrorists and drug traffickers.855  In analysis of 
which presidents issued the most NSDs, it was found that Reagan issued the most, with Kennedy and 
Nixon coming second and third.  It should be noted, however, that Reagan served two full terms unlike 
Kennedy or Nixon.856  Reagan was not the only US president to issue a National Security Directive 
concerning drugs, in fact there have been seven NSDs concerning drugs.857  The first was issued under 
the Nixon/Ford administration and concerned Turkish opium production;858 then came NSDD-221; 
President George H.W. Bush issued two, one concerning cocaine trafficking,859 and the other regarding 
overseas counter-narcotics operations;860 Clinton also produced two, one relating to counter-narcotics 
operations in the Western hemisphere,861 and another on heroin control;862 the final one was 
produced under George W. Bush regarding drug trafficking.863 
The president of the US has a range of tools that allow him to unilaterally change policy; one of these 
is the National Security (Decision) Directive (NSD).864  NSDs have a number of functions: firstly, to help 
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inform the president’s decisions about national security, secondly, to communicate and record their 
decisions,865 and thirdly, to coordinate policy cooperation across different departments and 
agencies.866  On occasion NSDs have also been used as instruments of ‘public diplomacy’ (or, some 
would argue, as a component part of propaganda strategies) and as such they can be used to shape 
either foreign or domestic public opinion as well as Congressional opinion.867  NSDD-221 provided all 
these functions and because it was communicated to both Congress and the general public, I argue 
that it particularly functioned as ‘public diplomacy’.  Vice-President Bush stated that the reason he 
was announcing NSDD-221 was so that “every American will understand [that there is] a very real link 
between drugs and terrorism”868 and that “we must convey that when you buy drugs you can also very 
well be subsidizing terrorist activities overseas".869  Whilst he emphasised the links between drug 
trafficking and terrorist groups, he also stated that the ‘drug problem’ was an issue of demand as well 
as supply, arguing that in the long-term, the solution lies at home where “there must be a dramatic 
reduction in the demand for drugs”.870  Accompanying the predominant speech act were a multitude 
of subsidiary speech acts carried out by Reagan himself, Reagan administration officials and Nancy 
Reagan that were directed at different audiences as will be discussed on more detail below.  These 
speech acts used “heuristic cues”871 and rhetorical strategies to emphasise the threats to US national 
and societal security posed by drugs and the trade that supplied them, but also explicitly laid the blame 
on Americans who used drugs.  For example, Reagan argued that “Your government will continue to 
act aggressively, but nothing would be more effective than for Americans simply to quit using illegal 
drugs.”872      
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2.1.1. Referent object 
Whereas Anslinger and Nixon’s campaigns against drug use had focussed on US society and values as 
the object that needed to be protected (see Chapters One and Four), NSDD-221 established a new 
referent object in relation to the drug threat: the US state.  NSDD-221’s primary focus was on the way 
the illicit drugs trade “has created a situation which today adds another significant dimension to the 
law enforcement and public health aspects of this international problem and threatens the national 
security of the United States.”873  Whilst it recognised that “the domestic effects of drugs are a serious 
societal problem for the United States”,874 it made clear that the major concern was the national 
security of the US.  Though the first page refers to the threats posed to the security of “democratic 
states of the Western Hemisphere”,875 the directive stated that this was an issue predominantly 
because “the international drug trade threatens the national security of the United States by 
potentially destabilizing democratic allies”876.  It can therefore be concluded that in this speech act, 
the primary referent object was US national security although it was recognised that US societal 
security was also threatened by drugs.  NSDD-221 contributed to the reorientation of the drug control 
dispositif at the international level through its identification of drugs trafficking as a threat to the state.  
This new referent object was reflected in the 1988 UN Convention which stated that signatory states 
recognise “the links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal activities which 
undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States”.877  
The accompanying subsidiary speech acts often concerned themselves both with the national security 
and societal security of the US, sometimes blurring these together into an overarching referent object 
of the United States which incorporated both ‘the state’ and ‘the citizens’ of the US.  This will be 
explored in more detail below.         
2.1.2. The existential threat(s)  
As illustrated in Table 1 (the Drug Control Dispositif, p. 18), NSDD-221 and its accompanying speech 
acts identified drugs, drug use, drug trafficking and drug production as threats.  The stated aim of 
NSDD-221 was to “identify the impact of the international narcotics trade upon U.S. national 
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security”.878  NSDD-221 clearly identified the existential threat as the global illicit drugs trade and 
argued that these threats were “particularly serious outside U.S. borders.”  NSDD-221 then expanded 
the threat beyond simply the trade itself to include “those nations with a flourishing narcotics industry, 
where a combination of international criminal trafficking organizations, rural insurgents, and urban 
terrorists can undermine the stability of the local government; corrupt efforts to curb drug crop 
production, processing, and distribution”.879   
NSDD-221 identified three countries - Bulgaria, Cuba and Nicaragua880 - that it claimed had “supported 
or condoned international drug trafficking for financial or political reasons.”881  The fact that these 
countries are specifically named seems likely to have more to do with Cold War politics than their 
actual level of involvement in the illicit drug trade because they were not seen as the biggest drug 
producer or trafficking states.882  Indeed, a letter from a New York Congressman stated that “There 
are six foreign states that produce the bulk of the illegal drugs used in the United States – Thailand, 
Burma, Pakistan, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.”883   However, identifying specific Soviet Bloc states as 
using the illicit drug trade for political reasons played into concerns about ‘narco-terrorists’.  The 
political resonance of the ‘narco-terror’ discourse was useful for a number of reasons, as David 
Campbell has argued: 
The conflation of narcotics production and trafficking with insurgent and revolutionary 
movements in central and southern America has been an attempt, largely without foundation, 
to both inflate the dimensions of the danger associated with drugs, and render it more 
intelligible on a traditional national security register….  The power of 'narco-terrorism' as a 
concept is that it subsumes under one banner a number of ideas, including the assertion that 
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guerrilla movements finance their operations largely through drug trafficking, and the more 
believable argument that the principals in the drug industry employ extreme violence.884 
During the 1980s Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry first articulated the ‘narco-terror’ 
threat in response to the rise of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).885  NSDD-221 echoed this 
discourse by emphasising the links between drug trafficking organisations and terrorists.  Both Reagan 
and Vice-President Bush repeated this narco-terror discourse.  Bush noted in his public announcement 
of NSDD-221 that “when you buy drugs you can also very well be subsidizing terrorist activities.”886  
Reagan often claimed that the Sandinistas were involved in drug trafficking,887 even when the DEA 
disputed this.888  The concept of the ‘narco-terror’ threat was used by Reagan and later George H.W. 
Bush (as president) as cover for anti-Sandinista policies in Central America.889   
NSDD-221, and its accompanying fact sheet for general release, went into detail about some of the 
ways in which the ‘narco-terror’ groups threatened US national security.  Together these documents 
argued that the illicit drugs trade threatened the security of the US by destabilizing allied countries.890  
This destabilisation caused the corruption of “political and judicial institutions”,891 which created a 
situation whereby “a government … is unable to control key areas of its territory and elements of its 
own judiciary, military, or economy”.892  This therefore allowed “trafficking organizations … [to] 
control… [the] local media to influence public attitudes”893 and  distort “public perception of the 
narcotics issue in such a way that it becomes part of an anti-U.S. or anti-Western debate”.894    The 
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growing illicit drug trade increased levels of violence and weapons as well as provided funding for 
insurgents groups.895  The CIA’s classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) from 1985, on which 
NSDD-221 is based,896 however, is more circumspect about the links between terrorist/insurgent 
groups and the drugs trade than NSDD-221.  The NIE notes that “we judge that insurgent involvement 
in the drug trade has a relatively small impact on the overall narcotics situation, but access to drug 
money and narcotics smuggling could have a major impact on the capability of insurgent forces.”897  
However, this argument was not made public and, therefore, the discourse of the ‘narco-terror’ threat 
was not seriously challenged.  This merging of counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency strategies 
has perpetuated to this day through operations such as ‘Plan Colombia’898 and the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.899  The ‘war on drugs’ also allowed the US to set up air 
bases in various countries - particularly in Latin America - which raised concerns that they are using 
these ‘Forward Operating Locations’ in order to further wider foreign policy objectives.900           
2.1.3. ‘Extraordinary measures’  
NSDD-221 outlined a range of policy measures that needed to be enacted in order to counter the 
threats identified.  The accompanying fact sheet set out six actions to be taken:  
Full consideration of drug control activities in our foreign assistance planning.  An expanded role 
for U.S. military forces in supporting counter-narcotics efforts.  Additional emphasis on 
narcotics as a national security issue in discussions with other nations.  Greater participation by 
the U.S. intelligence community in supporting efforts to counter drug trafficking.  Improvements 
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in counter-narcotics telecommunications capability.  More assistance to other nations in 
establishing and implementing their own drug abuse and education.901   
The NSDD-221 itself goes into considerably more detail about the tasks that needed to be carried out 
and established lines of responsibility: for example, the Secretaries of Defense and State, along with 
the Attorney General, “should develop and implement any necessary modifications to applicable 
statutes, regulations, procedures, and guidelines to enable U.S. military forces to support counter-
narcotics efforts more actively, consistent with the maintenance of force readiness and training…”902  
The Director of the CIA in conjunction with the Attorney General and relevant agencies  
should enhance, where appropriate, support of the drug enforcement effort targetted against 
international drug traffickers, particularly those with known or suspected ties to terrorist or 
insurgent groups. Such enhanced effort shall be in accordance with applicable Presidential 
Findings and the National Security Act of 1947.903   
These two stipulations potentially allowed the administration and federal organisations to give 
financial, military and intelligence support to the Nicaraguan Contras since the country was named in 
NSDD-221, something that had been prevented under the Boland Amendments of 1982, 1983 and 
1984.904 Regardless of the Boland Amendment, however, National Security Council members such as 
Oliver North and John Poindexter continued to fund the Contras throughout this period because they 
claimed that they thought “that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the N.S.C. staff”.905  By 
October of 1986 however, Congress lifted the ban on funding for the Contras and agreed to Reagan’s 
request for $100 million in aid.906  
The directive also went into detail about the various roles and responsibilities for members of the 
administration with regards to dissemination and coordination strategies.  It stated that the Director 
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of the CIA, along with the Attorney General and Secretaries of State and Treasury, should share and 
disseminate intelligence with the relevant law enforcement agencies;907 the CIA should give special 
emphasis to collecting data on drug production and trafficking with a particular focus on the links 
between drug trafficking and insurgent/terrorist groups;908 and finally that the Secretary of Defense 
should set up and oversee a robust inter-agency communications system for drug-related 
operations.909  NSDD-221 created the conditions for a new form of military involvement than had 
previously been allowed.  For example, Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), started in 
1982, was an example of military cooperation within the realm of drug law enforcement that was 
instigated after the Posse Comitatus Act had been amended.910  US OPBAT military personnel were 
not allowed to fire their weapons even if they sustained enemy fire.  After NSDD-221 was created, 
however, the rules of engagement were changed to allow American military personnel to fire their 
weapons if they came under fire.911  The ‘extraordinary measures’ proposed in this securitizing move 
created a militarised response to the threat as was exemplified by Operation Blast Furnace in July 
1986.      
1986 Operation Blast Furnace   
Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia was the first operation to be legitimated by NSDD-221.912  The 
operation involved six US military Black Hawk helicopters, 160 support personnel and 15 Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents working with the Bolivian police in order to disrupt the 
production and supply of cocaine from the Chapare region.913  Though the operation succeeded in 
reducing the supply of cocaine into the US, it was recognised even at the time that this was a short 
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term fix only.914  Initially at least, the operation was portrayed as a huge success, with Carlton Turner 
noting, “The mood in Bolivia, even among those opposed to U.S. troops and BLAST FURNACE [capitals 
in original text], has changed from one of quasi-support of narco-traffickers to public repudiation of 
narcotics and traffickers”.915  However, media sources suggested that it was strongly resented by many 
locals in Bolivia who saw it as an attack on the peasants and, towards the end of the operation, 150 
US military personnel and Bolivian police were attacked by local residents.916  The unpopularity of Blast 
Furnace was such that one Bolivian newspaper published a headline stating “U.S. invades Bolivia”.917  
A Congressional Review Service report on Operation Blast Furnace noted that similar short-term 
operations were less likely to succeed than longer term ones.  However, the report also raised 
concerns about the impact that such operations might have on both other foreign policy objectives 
and military preparedness.918 Regardless of the outcomes of Operation Blast Furnace, other states that 
were struggling with drug trafficking organisations saw it as a template for future military 
interventions and shortly after it was ended Colombia, Peru and the Bahamas all approached the US 
for help.919  After Blast Furnace, using the military for counter-narcotics operations became 
commonplace across much of the world and should be seen as one example of the newly reoriented 
drug control dispositif.          
2.2. Discursive and rhetorical strategies   
In the subsidiary speech acts that accompanied NSDD-221, it is possible to see the discursive and 
rhetorical strategies used by the Reagan administration to link the international aspects of the drugs 
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trade to the security of the United States and the security of the American people (i.e. national and 
societal security).   It is important to note that there were no references to the legitimate uses of drugs 
and therefore these speech acts were only concerned with illicit drug use.  Furthermore, in line with 
the language from the amended Single Convention, the term ‘drug abuse’ should be seen in this 
context to mean all illicit drug use.  There was no distinction made between dependent and 
recreational use. 
In May 1986 President Reagan argued that before he came to power “our country was threatened by 
an epidemic of drug abuse that's been growing in intensity since the 1960's. By 1980 illegal drugs were 
every bit as much a threat to the United States as enemy planes and missiles”.920  This provided 
powerful imagery of a threat on two fronts, firstly, identifying drug use as an ‘epidemic’ raised fears 
of contagion, and secondly, by equating drug use with war, it conjured up fears of invasion.  Later that 
year, in September 1986, in a speech made with Nancy Reagan from the White House, he linked the 
dangers of the drugs trade to the protection of the American way of life and the family, arguing that 
“Drugs are menacing our society. They're threatening our values and undercutting our institutions. 
They're killing our children.”921  In the same televised address, Nancy Reagan further emphasised the 
dangers to the family by saying  
Today there's a drug and alcohol abuse epidemic in this country, and no one is safe from it - not 
you, not me, and certainly not our children, because this epidemic has their names written on 
it. Many of you may be thinking: ‘Well, drugs do not concern me.’ But it does concern you. It 
concerns us all because of the way it tears at our lives and because it's aimed at destroying the 
brightness and life of the sons and daughters of the United States.922   
By continuously emphasising the damage being done to children and families as well as ‘our country’ 
and ‘our society’, the Reagans made a powerful plea to the American people to support the 
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securitization of drugs both domestically and internationally.  Furthermore, they connected wider 
with Reagan’s ‘New Conservatism’ and emphasis on ‘family values’ as will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter.  These speech acts made the foreign threat explicit but also laid the blame on US 
citizens by calling “for Americans simply to quit using illegal drugs”.923  It also merged a number of 
existential threats and referent object(s) together so that it was less than clear whether it was drugs 
themselves, drug use/abuse, the drugs trade or those who participated in the drugs trade at home 
and abroad that were threatening US national and societal security.  The themes of family, children 
and the epic struggles of the US against a wide range of evil enemies had been common in Reagan’s 
speeches since he began his political career in California and are illustrative of the symbolic language 
and stories that he told in order to get his point across to the American public.924  Some have argued 
that his voice and his ability to create an emotional connection with the audience were what made 
him such a “Great Communicator”.925  Reagan’s use of these rhetorical strategies sought to establish 
drugs as a clear threat in the minds of the American people.      
As well as creating a powerful referent object by linking the US state, society and the family together, 
Reagan laid the blame for these threats at the door of well-established external enemies.  In March 
1986 Reagan claimed that the Sandinista regime was involved in drug trafficking, and that he was sure 
that “every American parent concerned about the drug trade will be outraged”926 by this fact.  Vice 
President Bush also followed a similar path when he announced NSDD-221 by accusing Nicaragua and 
Cuba of being involved with drug trafficking.927  This follows a long-established American tradition of 
pointing the finger of responsibility for the drug problem at foreigners and ethnic/racial groups as has 
been discussed in Chapters One and Three.  Harry Anslinger had linked foreigners with drug trafficking 
in the 1940s, 50s and 60s when he accused first the Japanese, and then the Chinese and later the 
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Soviets of trying to smuggle drugs into the US.928  Nixon targeted ethnic groups and those living 
alternative life styles.  As a member of Nixon’s administration recently noted:  
We knew we could not make it illegal to be either against the [Vietnam] war or black, but by 
getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then 
criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities.929   
The Nixon Tapes reinforce the idea that members of the administration - and Nixon especially – 
commonly associated illicit drug use with racial, social and political groups.930  By the time Reagan 
came to power, the association between drugs and race had become so inextricably entwined that, 
although his language was “race neutral”, it made “implicit racial appeals” against people of colour.931  
Reagan, it would seem, was replicating pre-existing narratives in order to strengthen his claims that 
external forces were to blame.  The Reagan administration also had another, more recent, discursive 
construct to fall back on: that of Nixon’s ‘war on drugs’.  Nixon announced that “drug abuse” was 
“public enemy number one” in June 1971932 - even if that was largely a rhetorical ‘war on drugs’ 
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because the vast percentage of federal money spent was on drug treatment and education933 - and 
the idea of a ‘war on drugs’ had become commonplace since then.   
Whilst Reagan used his speeches, and NSDD-221 itself, to highlight the roles played in the illicit drug 
trade by those already portrayed as the ‘enemy’ or ‘other’, he downplayed, or ignored, the 
participation by American allies in the Cold War, such as Panamanian President General Noriega (who 
was seen, at that point at least, as an ally to the US), despite evidence of complicity in drug smuggling 
being widely discussed at the time.  As Charles B. Rangel (chairman of the Select Committee on 
Narcotics Abuse and Control) noted in 1988:  
Less than two years ago, the New York Times detailed extensive allegations that General 
Noriega was deeply involved in drug trafficking to the United States and other illegal activities.  
At that time, State, DEA and Customs representatives testified before the Select Committee 
that there was no evidence substantiating Noriega’s involvement.934   
Reagan also compared the Contras with the US ‘Founding Fathers’ despite rumours of their 
involvement in drug trafficking.935  In a 1985 speech he argued that 
I've spoken recently of the freedom fighters of Nicaragua. They are the moral equal of our 
Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French Resistance. We cannot turn 
away from them, for the struggle here is not right versus left; it is right versus wrong.936 
The ‘Founding Fathers’ and their descendants were often portrayed as semi-divine figures who were 
used as common rhetorical devices in US presidential discourse to communicate with, and connect to, 
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the general public.937  As Paul Erickson notes, “this fictive deification has a constant subliminal effect 
on how we perceive the nation and its presidency.”938  By relating the Contras to the ‘Founding 
Fathers’, Reagan was attempting to legitimise both their struggle and US support for them.  George 
Shultz, in a 1984 speech about drugs, also referred to the “Founding Fathers”.939  He argued that “the 
Founders also believed that upholding this morality was not primarily the role of government but of 
our educational, religious, and social institutions, our families and communities”.940  He then noted 
that recently, “Parents, community organizations, educational and religious institutions are heeding 
President Reagan's call ‘to join the battle against drug abuse’”,941 reinforcing the role of civil society in 
protecting the nation against the ‘drugs threat’.  Reagan and other members of his administration 
used narratives that were already in existence in order to create powerful referent object(s) and 
aggressive existential threats in order to convince Congress, the media, the general public, and also 
other states, that it was necessary to act immediately to mitigate such threats.     
2.3. Practices that contributed to the securitization of drugs 
Security practices, as well as speech acts, can play a significant role in the securitization process.942  
The Reagan administration developed a wide range of security practices, from military operations to 
tightening up federal drug laws and changing treatment funding priorities, that all contributed to the 
securitization process.  This section analyses the key practices that in various ways shaped the 
securitization process.    
2.3.1. The Posse Comitatus Act   
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was drawn to prevent abuses of power by the military and create a 
separation between domestic law enforcement and the protection of national security.943  It expressly 
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forbade all branches of the military, apart from the Coast Guards and National Guard, from 
participating in civil law enforcement unless specifically directed by the president.944  In a 1981 speech 
to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Reagan announced that he would “support 
an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act which will allow the military to assist in identifying and 
thwarting drug traffickers”.945  The PCA was amended by Congress in the Defense Authorization  Act 
of 1982.946  Although the Reagan administration amended the PCA early on in the presidency, the 
military only had a very limited role in counter-narcotics operations overseas before 1986: this was 
largely limited to loaning equipment.947       
The amendment of the PCA was the start of the militarisation of US drug control, but initially it only 
allowed for ‘passive’ participation.  This changed after NSDD-221 legislated for the military to become 
‘actively’ involved.948  The ‘passive’ participation of the military had caused financial issues for the 
Coast Guards and US Customs, and potentially undermined the effectiveness of the policy, because 
they had to pay the costs of using the military equipment.949  After NSDD-221 allowed for ‘active’ 
participation of the military, the costs and responsibilities became shared between the agencies.950  As 
will be analysed in more detail later in this chapter, during the PCA amendment process members of 
Congress called for the military to be given powers of arrest. The first time this was proposed Reagan 
and his aides supported Weinberger and the Pentagon’s objections, although they recognised that 
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they might need to review this stance at a later date.951  When Congress suggested giving the military 
these powers again in 1985 and 1988, the Reagan administration continued to block the proposals.  
However, by 1989 when the new President George H.W. Bush sent the marines into Panama to arrest 
General Noriega for drug trafficking offences, it was concluded that PCA only applied in domestic 
territories rather than overseas.952  The amendment of the PCA should be seen as the first concrete 
step in the process of securitizing drugs under Reagan. 
2.3.2. Legal reforms   
During the Reagan administration, a number of law reforms were carried out that dramatically 
tightened up domestic drug law enforcement.  In 1984 the Sentencing Reform Act eliminated parole 
for most federal prisoners.953  Also in the same year the Comprehensive Crime Control Act enshrined 
‘civil forfeiture’ into law.  This act allowed assets to be confiscated even before charges had been 
brought; it also allowed for enforcement agencies, both federal and local, to share the proceeds of 
such raids.954  The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 introduced mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
offences955 and disproportionately longer sentences for crack, which was largely associated with 
African-Americans.956  In 1988 the act was amended to introduce the death penalty for ‘drug king 
pins’.957  These changes in sentencing caused the prison population to almost double under Reagan 
from 369,930 in 1981 to 627,402 in 1988.958   Drug arrests also rose from 569,000 in 1977 during the 
Carter administration to 1,155,000 in 1988 under Reagan.959  The emphasis on criminalisation had 
hugely negative impacts on society, breaking families apart, exacerbating joblessness and limiting 
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educational prospects, as well as amplifying racial divisions.960  In 1986 Reagan also signed Executive 
Order 12564 that instituted random drug testing for Federal employees.961 These policies were 
criticised by some sections of the media on the grounds that they undermined civil liberties.962  Despite 
these criticisms, they were hardly challenged by the public and contributed to a hardening of attitudes 
against drug users and drug dealers, thereby supporting the securitization process.  
2.3.3. The decline in federal drug treatment programmes   
At the same time as increasing criminal penalties for drug users and dealers, the Reagan 
administration also reduced their financial commitment to drug treatment and education.  Under 
Richard Nixon, despite his harsh drug war rhetoric, the vast majority of his federal drug budget was 
spent on treatment and education, which included prescribing methadone to dependent users.963  The 
emphasis at this time was on ‘managing’ addiction and substance maintenance rather than 
overwhelmingly on criminalisation.   This changed markedly under the Reagan administration as the 
focus shifted to an emphasis on abstinence rather than maintenance, and the federal drug treatment 
funding system was wound down with whatever money was left being handed back to states to spend 
as they thought necessary.964  This shift towards abstinence rather than maintenance reflected the 
Reagan administration’s desire to return to ‘family values’ of the past.  Also under Reagan, needle 
exchanges programmes and other harm reduction methods were blocked at the federal level which 
exacerbated the growing HIV/AIDS crisis.965  Despite the discursive emphasis on demand-control and 
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education, the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act only allocated 12% of the total funds to drug education, 
something that was criticised at the time.966  The President’s Commission on Organized Crime noted 
that from 1981 to 1986 when the report was published, funding for demand-control programmes 
including drug education had been cut drastically.967  The reduction of federal funding for drug 
treatment and education, and the reliance on the ‘Just Say No’ narrative, made it harder for 
problematic users to get help and further hardened the views of non-drug using Americans against 
those that did take drugs, therefore reinforcing the ‘othering’ of illicit drug users.    
2.3.4. ‘Certification’  
The practice of ‘certification’ was another crucial element of the securitization process.  It allowed the 
US to put pressure on drug producer and transit countries to commit their, often limited, resources to 
counter-narcotics programmes that the US found acceptable.968  This policy was one outcome of 
NSDD-221969 which stated that, “the Secretary of State and Administrator of AID should ensure that 
narcotics control objectives are fully integrated into foreign assistance planning efforts”.970  The policy 
was signed into law through an amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1986.971  It stipulated that 
each year the president must determine whether drug producer or drug transit country972 should be 
‘certified’ as being fully committed to US counter-narcotics policies.973   If any country was identified 
as not doing enough to eliminate drug production and trafficking it could be ‘decertified’, meaning 
that any promised US aid would be cut by 50%; if a country was ‘decertified’ for a second year in a 
row, they would receive no funding from the US in that year.974  The US could also actively oppose 
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applications for multilateral loans made by the country975 and could end security assistance.976  
However, the president could ‘certify’ a country even if it was not considered to have met the US 
objectives, if he considered it was important to US national interests – this was known as the ‘national 
interest waiver’.977  This illustrates how drug control was often subordinate to other national security 
interests, but could also be used as a way to reward or punish other states.      
The ‘national interest waiver’ created a situation whereby the president could ‘certify’ or ‘decertify’ 
countries more according to their strategic importance than commitment to US drug policies.978   This 
antagonised states that were regularly ‘decertified’.979  ‘Certification’ strengthened the links between 
US national security and US-influenced international counter-narcotics control policies and allowed 
the US to play the role of ‘global drug law enforcer’.980 After the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit 
Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was ratified, a clause was added into the 
Foreign Assistance Act stating that countries must meet “the goals and objectives” of the 1988 UN 
Convention.981 This further strengthened the international legitimacy of the US policy of ‘certification’ 
by tying it closely to the UN drug conventions and therefore it became a key element that reinforced 
the prohibitionist aspects of the drug control dispositif.      
3. The agents: actor(s) and audiences   
There are a wide range of ‘agents’ that play a part in the securitization process.  These include actors 
that actively support the securitizing moves, those that oppose or restrict the designation of security 
or the policies proposed to mitigate the threat, and the ‘audiences’ that contribute to the acceptance 
of the securitizing move.982  As discussed in Chapter Two, these roles often become blurred and groups 
can move from being an ‘actor’ to an ‘audience’, or be both ‘actor’ and ‘audience’ at the same time.  
Furthermore, in the cases of the general public and the Reagan administration, they were both 
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securitizing agent and part of the referent object (US society and the state respectively) at the same 
time.  
3.1. Those who supported the designation of ‘security’ 
As with most securitizing moves, there were a number of actors who played various roles in the 
securitizing process at different times.  As with the case study analysed in Chapter Four (the Single 
Convention), sometimes the securitizing actor(s) had shared goals, and at other times, they were quite 
divided.  This is especially true with securitizing moves issuing from the US state because of the way it 
is structured with three distinct branches of government: the executive branch, the legislature and 
the judiciary.  However, in the case of NSDD-221, the designation of drug trafficking as a threat to 
national security was accepted by the Congress, the intelligence agencies and the military even though 
some of the policies proposed to counteract the threat were contested.  For example, there was a 
deep division between Congress, on the one hand, and Pentagon and Secretary of Defense, on the 
other, about how much of a role the military should have in drug law enforcement.  The military chiefs 
were reticent to allow their soldiers to have power of seizure and arrest because they did not want 
them to be seen brandishing handcuffs.983  Members of Congress proposed giving the military just 
such powers in 1981, 1985 and 1988 but each time they were unsuccessful.  The president and his 
aides supported the Pentagon point of view and noted that “the military commanders… [fear there 
could be a] risk to the integrity of the military chain of command.”984  The intelligence community, in 
contrast, was eager to recognise the utility of the ‘drugs as an existential threat’ discourse.  Indeed, 
the Reagan administration noted that “the Intelligence Community drafted an important new NIE 
[National Intelligence Estimate] on the implications of the drug trade for U.S. security.  [It] provided 
the basis for describing the threat in the NSDD.”985 The CIA’s NIE stated that “we recognize that 
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important dimensions of US security are threatened by the effects of drug trafficking… [and] this 
Estimate does underscore the manner and degree to which drug trafficking can undermine countries 
important to the United States…”986     
3.1.1. The Reagan administration   
Whilst there were often tensions between the legislature and the executive branch, it should be noted 
that the executive branch itself was not a monolith either.  It was made up of various competing 
groups including the president and his closest officials as well as bureaucratic actors, such as members 
of the executive branch and other interest groups,987 and played various roles in the securitizing 
process, whether in support or opposition.  It is usual for US presidents to rely on a number of 
simultaneous networks to advise them, especially when it comes to making national security 
decisions. These structures include formal ones such as inter-agency networks, informal networks, 
such as important advisors meeting outside of the inter-agency process, and a “confidence structure” 
of one or two favoured advisors.988  Reagan’s informal network included the Vice President, Secretary 
of Defense, Director of the CIA, his National Security Advisor (NSA) and a few others.989  The National 
Security Council (NSC) is very much a creature of the president and NSA is one of the few key members 
of president’s administrative team that does not have to be approved by Congress.990  However, during 
the Reagan administration, the role of NSA was not a stable one and Reagan had six NSA’s: Richard 
Allen (1981-1982), William Clark (1982-1983), Robert McFarlane (1983-1985), John Poindexter (1985-
1986), Frank Carlucci (1986-1987), Colin Powell (1987-1989).  This was more than any other US 
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president.991  The administration was also hampered to some extent by tensions within the 
administration.992  Reagan’s first Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigned because of these 
tensions,993 as did NSA Robert Macfarlane.994  George Shultz, who took over from Haig, and Caspar 
Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, had a strong personal antipathy towards one another which at 
times hindered the smooth running of the administration.995        
The idea of involving the military in drug law enforcement overseas was an ongoing theme from early 
on in the Reagan administration.  In a wide-ranging speech about rising crime levels to the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conference in 1981, Reagan announced that he 
intended to amend the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) in order to allow the military to participate in 
counter-narcotics programmes.996  Also in this speech he noted that he had been concerned about 
drugs and crime for a long time, claiming that in a 1967 speech in Las Vegas  
I noted the fear and the anger of the citizenry as they locked themselves in their homes or 
refused to walk the streets at night.  I spoke, too, about a phenomenon known as the ’youthful 
offender’, the astonishing percentage of crimes that they were estimated to be responsible for.  
Then there was a speech in Dallas [in 1974] where I mentioned the effect of narcotics on the 
crime rate and the appalling estimates that drug addicts were responsible for the economic 
increase of certain crimes997   
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It was agreed in 1981 that the PCA would be amended,998 but this was only the beginning of the 
debates about whether the military should play an ‘active’ or ‘passive’ role in overseas counter-
narcotics programmes between the Reagan administration and Congress.  Even after NSDD-221 was 
signed, expanding the role of the military in drug law enforcement from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ participant 
was contentious, and Weinberger spoke out against an expanded role for the military, as will be 
discussed further below.      
As Vice President, George H. W. Bush would have been expected to support the president’s proposals 
for increasing the military’s role in counter-narcotics, but on this topic, Bush seemed to take a 
particular interest.  Before becoming Reagan’s Vice President, Bush had been a House Representative 
for Texas from 1966-1970, where he and his family based themselves; he was US Ambassador to the 
UN from 1971-1973 and he also spent a year as Director of the CIA from 1976-1977.  It is possible that 
his time at the UN under Nixon, when the amendment to the UN Single Convention was drafted,999 
and his experience at the CIA played a role in shaping his concern about drug trafficking.1000  It is also 
likely that his relationship with Texas - a border state that experienced increasing levels of drug 
trafficking and related violence1001 - influenced his awareness of the international dimensions of the 
‘drug problem’.  Certainly, Bush had responsibility for the South Florida Task Force and National 
Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), both of which involved strengthening border controls 
and interdiction systems as well as providing military support for the Coast Guards and Border Guards 
to prevent drugs getting into the US.  When Caspar Weinberger expressed doubts about NSDD-221, it 
was Bush who apparently intervened to persuade Weinberger to support it1002 and it was even 
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reported in the media that Bush had instigated NSDD-221.1003  Furthermore, Bush was given the task 
of publicly announcing NSDD-221 in June 1986,1004 which also suggests that this topic was one that he 
wanted to be associated with.    
Another member of the Reagan administration who played a key role in the securitization process was 
Carlton Turner, who became Reagan’s ‘drug czar’.  The role of ‘drug czar’ was a hugely important one 
and they had a vast amount of influence in shaping the direction of drug policy.  Harry Anslinger, the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) director, is often considered the first US ‘drug czar’.1005  Turner was 
a pharmacologist whose work focussed on cannabis, but he had no experience of drug treatment 
programmes, working with drug users or policy development, unlike previous ‘drug czars’ such as 
Robert DuPont and Jerome Jaffe, who both held the role under Nixon and Peter Bourne who was 
Carter’s ‘drug czar’.1006  Turner refused to accept the ‘drug addiction as a disease’ discourse that 
previous ‘drug czars’ had promoted and did not support treatment programmes including methadone 
because he believed the aim should be for a ‘drug free America’.1007  He worked closely with both 
Ronald and Nancy Reagan to shape the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse throughout his time at the White 
House.1008  Turner’s papers in the Reagan archives form a large part of the archival research in this 
chapter.  
As mentioned above, US presidents have external groups that they can rely on and direct to consider 
various issues.  One such body was the President’s Commission on Organized Crime that Reagan 
established in 1983 in order to look into the growth of organised criminal groups in the US.  Included 
in the mandate was analysis of how the drug trade intersected with organised crime.  When the 
                                                          
1003 George C. Wilson and Marty Thornton, ‘Broader Military Role Is Considered for Raids on Drug Sources 
Abroad’, Washington Post, 17th July 1986. 
1004 Times Wire Services, ‘Bush discloses Directive Tying Drugs to Terror’, Los Angeles Times, 8th June 1986 
[online].  Available from: <http://articles.latimes.com/1986-06-08/news/mn-9648_1_drug-traffic > (accessed 
26/10/15). 
1005 Clayton Mosher, ‘Anslinger, Harry’, in Encyclopedia of Drug Policy, Volume 1, ed. by Mark A. R. Kleiman and 
James E. Hawdon, (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2011), p. 26.   
1006 Jerome Jaffe had been director of the Illinois methadone programme and Robert DuPont was a psychiatrist 
who established the Washington D.C. narcotics treatment programme, Peter Bourne was also a psychiatrist.  
These three ‘drug czars’ had a wide range of experience working with dependent drug users.  See, Baum, 
Smoke and Mirrors, pp. xi-xii.     
1007 Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 152. 
1008 Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, pp. 146-147. 
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Commission released its report in March 1986, it stated that “Beyond threats to friendly democracies, 
international drug traffickers should be considered a threat to our national security because they 
comprise a direct attack on the physical and social well-being of our country.”1009  As with NSDD-221 
and Ronald and Nancy Reagans’ speeches, this report links the external and internal threats together 
so that they are seen as two sides of the same coin.  However, this commission also argued that 
enforcement was not the only solution and that more emphasis needed to be put into education.1010 
3.1.2. Nancy Reagan   
From the early years of Reagan’s presidency, First Lady Nancy Reagan took a keen interest in reducing 
drug use domestically.    In 1982 the Reagans made a joint radio address to the nation about the 
dangers of drugs1011 and Nancy coined the phrase ‘Just Say No’ in response to a school child’s question 
about what to do if offered drugs.1012  However, Nancy had reportedly been concerned about drugs 
since bringing up her children in California in the 1960s.1013  The ‘Just Say No’ campaign became hugely 
popular in the US,1014 and was exported to the UK as well.1015 This campaign should be seen as part of 
                                                          
1009 President’s Commission on Organized Crime, America’s Drug Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking and 
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Available from: <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112104104994;view=1up;seq=3> (accessed 
05/07/16).  
1010 Joel Brinkley, ‘Fighting Narcotics is Everyone’s Issue Now’, New York Times, 10th August 1986.     
1011 Bernard Weinraub, ‘First Lady Asked for Talk on Drugs’, New York Times, 13th September 1986; Gerald M. 
Boyd, ‘Reagans Advocate ‘Crusade’ on Drugs’, New York Times, 14th September 1986. 
1012 ---, Nancy Reagan – her causes, Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, 2017 [online].  
Available from: <https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/nancy-reagan/her-causes/> (accessed 
24/10/17). 
1013 Gerald M. Boyd, ‘Reagans Advocate ‘Crusade’ on Drugs’, New York Times, 14th September 1986; Aljean 
Harmetz, ‘Nancy Reagan urges TV Roles That Rejects Drugs’, New York Times, 31st October 1986. 
1014 By 1988 there were 12,000 ‘Just Say No’ clubs in the US according to the Reagan Foundation [online].  
Available from: 
<http://www.reaganfoundation.org/details_t.aspx?p=RR1005NRL&lm=reagan&args_a=cms&args_b=10&arg
sb=N&tx=1203> (accessed 24/10/170. 
1015 The cast of British TV programme Grange Hill were flown out to the US to meet with the Reagans.  Members 
of the cast claimed, at the time, that they smoked cannabis in the White House.  See, ‘We Were Stoned When 
We Went to the White House for Say No to Drugs Day’, The Sunday Mirror, 22nd November 1998 [online].  




the domestic dimension of the Reagan administration’s securitizing move against all aspects of the 
drug trade but particularly against drug use.  In the 1970s, the ‘Parent Power’ movement was 
established in Georgia in response to parental concern about youth drug use; their message was one 
of zero-tolerance and abstinence.1016  However it was not until the 1980s that their success was really 
felt as their message dovetailed with Nancy Reagan’s ‘Just Say No’ campaign.1017    
Nancy appeared in an episode of US sitcom ‘Diff’rent Strokes’ in 1983 and the US soap opera ‘Dynasty’ 
to share her message.1018 She attended schools and conferences and in 1985 she called together the 
wives of the major world leaders for a First Ladies’ anti-drug abuse conference in order to share the 
message globally.1019  She was also the first US First Lady to speak at the UN General Assembly in 
1988,1020 where she spoke about the need to reduce demand for drugs as much as supply.  In her 
speech, she argued that  
If we cannot stem the American demand for drugs, then there will be little hope of preventing 
foreign drug producers from fulfilling that demand.  We will not get anywhere if we place a 
heavier burden of action on foreign governments than on America’s own mayors, judges, and 
legislators.  You see, the cocaine cartel does not begin in Medellin.  It begins in the streets of 
New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and every American city where crack is bought and sold.1021   
Nancy placed her emphasis on demand-control in contrast to the administration’s preference for 
supply-control.  George Shultz noted that administration officials tried to talk her out of giving the 
speech and also tried to persuade her to change the message: they wanted her to focus more on the 
supply-side policies rather than decreasing demand in the US.1022 Nancy Reagan can clearly be seen as 
                                                          
rugs...-a060651619> (accessed 15/07/15).  More recently, the actors have retracted this claim.  See, Emine 
Saner, ‘Just say no! What really happened when Grange Hill met Nancy Reagan at the White House’, The 
Guardian, 7th March 2016 [online].  Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-
radio/shortcuts/2016/mar/07/grange-hill-nancy-reagan-white-house-just-say-no> (accessed 05/01/18). 
1016 Beck, pp. 24-25. 
1017 Beck, pp. 24-25.  
1018 Jacob Sullum, ‘Just Say No to Nancy Reagan's 'Outspoken Intolerance'’, Forbes Magazine, 10th March 2016 
[online]. Available from: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2016/03/10/just-say-no-to-nancy-
reagans-outspoken-intolerance/#4ca0ed4f20c8> (accessed 14/06/16). 
1019 Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 192. 
1020 Shultz, ‘Drugs: The War with No Winner’, p. 54.  
1021 Quoted in Shultz, ‘Drugs: The War with No Winner’, p. 54. 
1022 Shultz, ‘Drugs: The War with No Winner’, p. 54. 
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engaging in explicit attempts to bolster the securitization of drugs as a societal threat and indeed on 
occasion as an actor in her own right, although the role of the ‘Parent Power’ movement in giving her 
legitimacy to speak should not be underestimated.   
3.1.3. Federal bodies 
Various federal agencies also played a key role in promoting the securitization of drugs such as the 
CIA, the Coast Guards and the Customs and Border Protection Agency.  President Nixon had mandated 
for the CIA to become involved in the ‘war on drugs’ and they enthusiastically participated.1023  There 
have long been allegations of CIA complicity in drug trafficking in South East Asia1024 and later the CIA 
was accused of supporting and condoning, if not actually participating in, drug trafficking from Latin 
America.1025  It would be fair to say that regardless of the true level of involvement of the CIA in drug 
trafficking, they would have had a detailed awareness of how the illicit drugs trade could be used to 
provide funding for non-state actors.  Their long-time involvement in counter-narcotics operations 
may well have informed the 1985 National Intelligence Estimate looking at the threat drug trafficking 
posed to national security. 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was created by president Nixon in 19731026 through the 
merger of the Bureau of Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs and the Office of Drug Abuse Law 
Enforcement.1027  This new agency’s primary task was to “interdict the highest levels of the illicit drug 
traffic.”1028  However there were tensions between the DEA and CIA, who it is alleged undermined DEA 
operations when they conflicted with CIA objectives.1029  The DEA also disputed president Reagan’s 
assertion that the Sandinistas were involved in drug trafficking.1030  Despite the tensions between the 
                                                          
1023 Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 72; Epstein, pp. 52-53.   
1024 See, McCoy. 
1025 In 1986 Senator John Kerry led a Senate Foreign Affairs Committee investigation into allegations of Contra 
involvement in drug trafficking which concluded that the CIA, and other government bodies, had at the very 
least failed to address these concerns due to other foreign policy considerations.  See, ---, Drugs, Law 
Enforcement and Foreign Policy, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, December 1988 [online].  Available from: 
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/north06.pdf> (accessed 17/07/14).   
1026 Epstein, p. 251. 
1027 Epstein, pp. 239-241. 
1028 Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 84. 
1029 Valentine, pp. 174-203.  
1030 Joel Brinkley, ‘Drug Agency Rebuts Reagan Charge’, New York Times, 18th March 1986. 
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Reagan administration, CIA and the DEA, they were active participants in the securitization process 
and joined the military in Operation Blast Furnace.1031       
The Coast Guards1032 and Customs Agency were the lead agencies for the interdiction of drugs into the 
United States, and since the amendment of the PCA, they had been able to rely on loans of equipment 
from the military to aid their operations.  However, the loan of such equipment had cost the Coast 
Guards and Custom Agency greatly, as they had to pay the military for its use and this became a source 
of concern for Congress, the administration and the agencies themselves.  Turner argued that “If the 
military insists on total reimbursement from civilian law enforcement agencies for the use of their 
facilities, the effectiveness of the Posse Comitatus exception will be cancelled.”1033  When NSDD-221 
was being drafted, Turner suggested that “we strongly recommend that the cost of military vessels, 
aircraft and other equipment utilized in drug enforcement operations be absorbed in part by the 
military.”1034           
3.1.4. Congress  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there were often structural tensions between executive and 
legislative branches of government; there were also tensions between the two main parties in 
Congress and between the House of Representatives and the Senate.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that on the drugs issue, there was considerable agreement between Democrats and 
                                                          
1031 Joel Brinkley, ‘U.S. to Avoid Clashes in Bolivia Raid’, New York Times, 16th July 1986; George C. Wilson and 
Marty Thornton, ‘Broader Military Role Is Considered for Raids on Drug Sources Abroad’, Washington Post, 
17th July 1986. 
1032 Originally the Coast Guards sat under Treasury Dept., moved to Dept. of Transportation in 1967, even 
though Coast Guards counts as one of the branches of the US military.  The Coast Guards now sit under Dept. 
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arrest. 
1033 Memo to Martin Anderson from Carlton Turner dated 17th December 1981, Subject ‘Briefing projects for 
the President and Edwin Meese [Attorney General] – Monday Briefings’.  Ronald Reagan Presidential Library 
Collections, Turner, Carlton, E., Files, Drug Policy Documents (1 of 8), Box 23. 
1034 Memo to Edwin Gray from Carlton Turner, dated 27th October 1981, Subject ‘Posse Comitatus Exception’.  




Republicans.  This suggests that the ‘drugs as an existential threat’ discourse was overwhelming 
accepted in Congress.  In fact, both parties vied with each other to be seen as the toughest on drugs.1035    
This competition became particularly acute during the 1986 mid-term elections when both parties, 
and both arms of Congress, proposed stringent amendments to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of that year 
in order to show the public that they were more serious than their opponents in tackling the ‘drug 
issue’.1036  The Republican administration felt their emphasis on targeting users would be more 
effective and popular than the Democrats’ approach towards increasing funding for law enforcement 
and treatment.  Turner argued that the idea of  
having some Republicans introduce very tough legislation on the Hill designed to solve the 
problem and hold the user responsible, as Mrs. Reagan said in her op-ed piece, is good.  DOJ 
has drafted an excellent legislative proposal… to … hold users accountable [underlining in 
original text].  Since the Democrats are afraid of offending “recreational users”, they will 
probably throw money into law enforcement and supporting urban treatment facilities.  Thus 
their approach will miss the mark.  Our approach of motivating users to stop using drugs and 
developing a national atmosphere of intolerance to illegal drugs is truly Presidential and the 
Congress cannot match it.1037   
The battle to appear tough on drugs in the run-up to the elections highlights how elected officials 
appeal to “moral audiences”1038 for legitimacy in the securitization process but it also shows the 
difficulties in separating the ‘actor’ from the ‘audiences’ within the Copenhagen School’s 
conceptualisation of securitization.  As will be discussed in more detail below, the general public was 
not simply an ‘audience’ but also an ‘actor’ in the securitizing process.     
                                                          
1035 Washington Times article ‘House Republicans, Democrats Squabble for Credit on Drug Bill’, dated 25th July 
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1038 Roe, ‘Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures’, p. 613. 
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As well as the two main political parties, some individual members of Congress also played an active 
role in the securitization process.  Senators and Representatives from states that bordered Mexico, 
such as Florida (Paula Hawkins, Clay Shaw and Charles Bennett) and Texas (Lloyd Bentsen), but also 
those that represented large cities such as Charles B. Rangel from New York, took a keen interest in 
the role of the military in drug law enforcement.  It was Shaw who, in 1981, first proposed that the 
military be given the power of arrest and seizure1039 and in 1985 another congressman from Florida - 
Charles Bennett - sponsored another amendment of the PCA that would have allowed the military to 
directly enforce drug laws outside of US borders.1040  Paula Hawkins regularly spoke out about drug 
issues,1041 particularly the alleged role of the Cubans in drug trafficking.1042  As can be seen by the range 
of different actors involved, the Reagan era securitization of drugs was not simply a ‘top down’ 
process, led by the executive branch, but involved actors at all levels of society from elites to parents’ 
groups, as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.      
3.2. Oppositional voices  
As well as groups that supported the designation of ‘security’ and the practices that were proposed 
to deal with the threat posed by drugs, there were also groups that opposed either the designation of 
drugs as a security threat, or the solutions proposed.  The US Department of Defense was against 
expanding the military’s role in the ‘war on drugs’ initially, particularly giving soldiers the power of 
arrest.  Outside of the Reagan administration and federal bodies, there was also a movement that 
called for the legalisation of cannabis, therefore challenging the idea that this drug was a threat at all.  
                                                          
1039 Shaw proposed an amendment, known as the ‘Shaw Amendment’, to the Posse Comitatus Act in order to 
allow the military to have the power of arrest.  There a number of documents in the Reagan archives that 
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3.2.1. The Department of Defense  
As mentioned above, there were sections of the Reagan administration that, though they accepted 
the threat posed by drugs, challenged the proposed solution.  The Secretary of Defense, Caspar 
Weinberger and the Pentagon were staunchly against increasing the role of the military in counter-
narcotics operations for wide ranging reasons: they were worried it would reduce military 
preparedness,1043 they were opposed to the idea of military having powers of arrest,1044 and they were 
alarmed at the thought of the military being subordinate to civilian law enforcement.1045  The 
separation of the military and civilian law enforcement had long been an important issue for the US; 
indeed, the PCA was drafted in order to formalise this division.1046  From the beginning, Weinberger 
was opposed to military involvement in drug law enforcement, which he described as “very dangerous 
and undesirable”.1047   In June 1985, Weinberger summed up his objections in a letter to Les Aspin, 
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in response to the proposed amendment of the 
PCA by Representative Charles Bennett of Florida.  Weinberger argued that “reliance on military forces 
to accomplish civilian tasks is detrimental to both military readiness and the democratic process… we 
strongly oppose the extension of civilian police powers to our military forces.”1048  For Weinberger, the 
most useful role that the military could play in counter-narcotics was “to provide support so that the 
civilian law enforcement agencies can make necessary arrests, searches and seizures.”1049      
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In 1988 when Congress again tried to push through giving the military the power of arrest,1050 
Weinberger, by that time no longer Secretary of Defense, again made another intervention in an 
article for the Washington Post where he stated:  
Calling for the use of the government’s full military resources to put a stop to the drug trade 
makes for hot exciting rhetoric.  But responding to those calls would make for terrible national 
security policy, poor politics and guaranteed failure in the campaign against drugs.1051   
What this article shows is that whilst he accepted that drugs were a threat to US society and also to 
democracy in other countries, he argued that the using the military was not the right solution.  He 
stated that “the drug crisis… [is one amongst a number of] …national security threats that may not be 
military threats”.1052  Weinberger did acknowledge that there were times when military involvement 
could be beneficial, such as Operation Blast Furnace, which he argued was effective because the 
Bolivian government asked for help and there was a clear and achievable objective.1053  This article 
reflects the so-called Weinberger Doctrine that stated that the military should only be committed 
overseas when there was a “clear intention of winning… [and that there should be] clearly defined 
political and military objectives”.1054  Weinberger himself, and the Pentagon in general, should have 
been in a privileged position to speak about national security because of their role in protecting the 
US from threats.  However, it is clear that Weinberger’s views held little sway over the president in 
this area, even though the military was never given the power of arrest during Reagan’s time in power. 
3.2.2. The cannabis decriminalisation and legalisation movements  
While the military resisted the proposed solution to the ‘drugs threat’, there was a small section of US 
society who not only challenged the solution, but also contested whether drugs were a threat at all. 
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In the 1970s there had been a growing cannabis legalisation and decriminalisation movement.  Nixon, 
as part of his ‘war on drugs’ set up the Shafer Commission to examine levels of cannabis use. When it 
reported in 1972, the Commission concluded that cannabis prohibition had failed to reduce use and 
that alternative policies should be explored.1055  Nixon ignored the report as it did not fit with his ‘war 
on drugs’ rhetoric.1056  However, this did not stop the debate or a number of states voting on reforming 
the cannabis laws.  In 1972 California held an unsuccessful vote to legalise cannabis; a year later 
Oregon became the first state to decriminalise possession of the drug, and California followed shortly 
after in 1975.1057  Between 1973 and 1978 twelve other US states decriminalised or depenalised the 
possession of cannabis.1058  This development was challenged during the Reagan era and in 1986, a 
White House panel threatened to withdraw federal funding for states that had decriminalised 
possession of drugs.1059  
During the Reagan administration, these debates on cannabis law reform were far more limited, but 
they did still exist.  In 1986, Oregon held ballot initiative to legalise the possession and growing of 
cannabis for personal use, though this measure failed.1060  It is interesting to note that despite the 
rhetoric of the time, and in contrast to the ballot initiatives to legalise cannabis since 2012, there was 
no mention of how the illegal cannabis trade threatens national security, although the support notes 
did mention the role of organised crime.1061  Also in 1986 the Department of Justice (DoJ) produced a 
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report discussing domestic cannabis eradication that mentioned the option to legalise the drug.1062  
Carlton Turner opposed that idea strongly, noting that “the very existence of the option is a significant 
policy liability….  This could set us back 50 years, particularly in the international area.”1063   He noted 
that legalization “would cause many problems internationally” as it would be in contravention of US 
commitments to the UN Single Convention. 1064  Turner confirmed that “it has been our policy to 
declare that legalization is not [underlined in original text] an option”.1065  The debate around 
legalisation continued, and in 1988 the mayors of Baltimore and Washington, cities troubled by drug 
crime and violence, went further and mooted the possibility of legalisation of all drugs.1066  However, 
these discussions were rejected out of hand by the administration.    
3.3. The ‘audience(s)’  
The audience has a crucial role in the securitizing process but sometimes it can be difficult to pinpoint 
exactly who the audience is.  As discussed in Chapter Two, Paul Roe has identified two audiences: the 
moral one, which usually constitutes the general public, and the formal one such as the legislature.1067  
With the case of NSDD-221, the Reagan administration did not need acceptance from either the formal 
or moral audiences because it was an executive decree.  Despite this, the administration did publicly 
announce NSDD-221 after it had been signed, which suggests that they did want acceptance from 
their moral audience even if they did not need it.  The subsidiary speech acts carried out by the Reagan 
administration were largely aimed at the media, and through them, the general public.  The media, by 
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acting as a channel through which the Reagan administration could broadcast their messages,1068 but 
also by holding politicians up to scrutiny and running their own campaigns, can be seen as both 
audience and actor.  There is a blurring of the role of the general public too, as they were the target 
audience for the Reagan administration, but also as public concern grew during 1986, this drove the 
executive and legislative branches to put forward increasingly stringent proposals for dealing with the 
threats.    
3.3.1. The media  
Drug use was actually in decline in the 1980s,1069 although problematic drug use and overdoses were 
on the increase.1070  Between 1979 and 1984 drugs did not appear in polling that regularly measured 
public perception of threats facing the US, but this started to change in the mid-1980s.1071  Though 
cocaine had been growing in popularity in the United States since the 1970s, a new cocaine-based 
drug - crack - had started to be seen, particularly in large US cities and the media hyped the idea of a 
‘crack epidemic’.1072 In the summer of 1986 two young black sportsmen, basketballer Len Bias and 
footballer Don Rogers, died after using cocaine or crack1073 and both deaths were widely reported in 
the media.  This contributed to growing public concern surrounding drug use in general and the ‘crack 
epidemic’ in particular.1074  Media hysteria focussed especially on the plight of ‘crack babies’, although 
the evidence of children being born addicted to the drug were later found to have been massively 
over-stated.1075  Jensen, Gerber and Babcock analysed media reporting of drug issues from 1975 until 
1986 and found that the highest number of articles were produced in 1986.1076  They then analysed 
reporting in that year only and found that media coverage of drugs hit the peak in August as the new 
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anti-drug bill was being debated in Congress.1077  The same study also found that whilst in April 1986 
only 2% of the population considered drugs were the most important issue facing the US, by August 
this had risen to 13%, making it the most cited threat.1078  This indicates the power that media coverage 
had in shaping public opinion, which clearly makes them an ‘agent’ of the securitizing process.  It also 
highlights the intersubjective nature of the securitizing move.  However, to see the media as the 
predominant actor would be to downplay the role of the Reagan administration in encouraging and 
cultivating anti-drug rhetoric within the media and the general public.   
3.3.2. The general public   
The language through which the agents of securitization communicated the drug threat to the general 
public tended towards hyperbole and was overladen with emotive images.  Prime examples of this are 
Reagan’s speeches when he argued that drugs were as much of a threat to the United States as 
“enemy planes and missiles”1079 and that they were “killing our children”.1080  As discussed above, there 
was a close relationship between the media and Reagan administration discourses on drugs and this 
shaped how the general public perceived the ‘drug issue’.   Because in democratic societies, the 
electorate has the power to vote in or out governments, they do have a considerable amount of power 
in the eyes of politicians and therefore are often appealed to for moral support.1081  In 1986 there were 
mid-term elections in the US and this coincided with the rise in importance of the ‘drug issue’ for 
politicians, the media and the general public and so Congress competed with the Reagan 
administration, and the Democrats competed with the Republicans, to be seen as the ‘toughest’ on 
drugs in this year.1082  All parties appealed to the general public to gain legitimacy for their stances.1083 
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Parents’ and community groups that campaigned for ‘zero-tolerance’ on drugs use also played a role 
in the securitization process and again they can be seen as part actor and part audience.  They worked 
together with Reagan administration officials and treatment professionals to shape government policy 
around drug use and treatment, but they were also influenced by the ‘war on drugs’ rhetoric that had 
been promoted by Reagan administrations officials and Nancy Reagan’s ‘Just Say No’ campaign.1084  In 
1986, community and church groups began to hold ‘anti-crack’ rallies to highlight the damage done to 
their communities by the drug, and a group of 60 churches went as far as to call crack use a “new form 
of genocide”.1085  The ‘Parent Power’ movement that had begun in the 1970s gained support from the 
‘Just Say No’ campaign and worked to promote a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach.1086  As well as Nancy 
Reagan’s high profile ‘Just Say No’ campaign, in 1987 the Partnership for a Drug Free America was 
established to further promote abstinence-based policies.  It became the third largest advertising 
campaign in the US, after telecoms giant AT&T and fast food chain McDonalds.1087  These campaigns 
were far reaching in their influence but did not take into account the myriad reasons why people take 
drugs and created a powerful and simple narrative against drug use that placed the blame on the drug 
user for not saying ‘no’.1088  This shows not only the intersubjective nature of the securitizing process, 
but also that this securitizing move was not solely a ‘top down’ process.  This relationship is also an 
example of the co-constitution between ‘actor’ and ‘audience’.  By using the narratives of the ‘Parent 
Power’ movement, Nancy Reagan reinforced their position as legitimate actors but also confirmed her 
own role as a voice for parents in America.        
3.3.3. International audiences  
The Reagan administration’s securitization of drugs was directed not only at the domestic audiences 
but also international ones.  In November 1986 Reagan summoned 21 US ambassadors from 
important drug production and transit states as well as US allies in drug control1089 to a meeting in 
Washington D.C. to inform them that they must stress upon their hosts the importance of 
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international drug control to the US.  In a telegram sent to the embassies before the conference began 
the objectives for the conference were clearly outlined:  
First, to convey to the ambassadors the sense of urgency with which the U.S. government is 
approaching the issue of drug demand reduction; second to create opportunity for 
ambassadors to discuss increased regional cooperation which could lead to a more effective 
international narcotics strategy; and third, to signal to host countries involved in narcotics 
production and trafficking that the U.S. public and government officials attach great importance 
to international narcotics control.1090   
At the conference the proposed UN convention on drug trafficking (what would become the 1998 UN 
Convention) was discussed and the ambassadors were told to impress upon their host countries the 
“importance the U.S. attaches to the Conference and the draft Convention.”1091  A US State 
Department briefing paper also praised the planned convention, noting that “the convention will 
provide methods for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in several specific areas including asset 
seizure and forfeiture, extradition, mutual legal and judicial assistance, controlled delivery and training 
of law enforcement officers.”1092  Nancy Reagan also contributed to the internationalisation of the 
securitization of drugs.  She held a First Ladies Conference on Drug Abuse in April 1985 to which she 
invited first ladies of other states to come together to discuss drug use1093 and she spoke at the UN 
General Assembly about the need for more emphasis on demand-reduction.1094 
In the early 1980s, two declarations (the Quito Declaration signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua and Panama and the New York Declaration signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela) came out of Latin America that called for international action on drug trafficking 
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and argued that drugs trafficking should be seen as a crime against humanity.1095  These declarations 
can be seen as the precursors to the 1988 UN Convention; however, when the treaty was drafted, the 
claim that drug trafficking was a crime against humanity was dropped.  Instead, when the 1988 UN 
Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was finalised, it 
mirrored NSDD-221 in that it identified ‘the state’ as the referent object, rather than ‘humanity’ that 
was threatened by drug trafficking organisations.1096  The convention also recommended using US-
style law enforcement methods such as asset seizures as well as reinforcing drug prohibition as the 
predominant paradigm through which international drug control should be enacted.1097  As mentioned 
above, the US also incorporated reference to the 1988 UN Convention into its ‘certification’ policy 
which strengthened their influence over international drug control.  Here we see how the Reagan 
administrations’ securitization of drugs altered the drug control dispositif from a concern about drug 
use (the Single Convention) to identifying drug trafficking as a threat (1988 UN Convention).  
Furthermore, as has already been discussed in this chapter, the ‘certification’ policy allowed the US to 
portray themselves as the enforcer of the UN conventions.   
4. The context for the securitizing speech act(s)  
The securitization move carried out by the Reagan administration did not occur in a vacuum.  The 
social and political context at the international and domestic levels influenced both the discursive 
strategies used by the actor(s) and the willingness of the audience(s) to accept the threats. 
4.1. The Cold War and the Reagan Doctrine   
It is necessary to place the Reagan era ‘drugs as an existential threat’ discourse within its geo-political 
context of the Cold War and the Reagan Doctrine that called for support for anti-communist resistance 
movements across the world but particularly in Central America.  This is important because, as Buzan 
and Wæver argue, the Cold War was a “macrosecuritisation” that incorporates and stratifies other 
securitizations within it.1098  When Reagan came to power in January 1981 one of his key objectives 
was to halt what he saw as Soviet expansion; this objective came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine 
and involved supporting anti-communist resistance movements in the developing world to promote 
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democracy and freedom.1099  Reagan had been speaking out against the communist threat since the 
1960s.1100  However, despite this long-running theme, the Reagan Doctrine did not become fully 
articulated until Reagan’s second term1101 when he announced that “we must not break faith with 
those who are risking their lives – on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua – to defy Soviet-
supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth”1102 in his 1985 State of Union 
address.  For many in the Reagan administration, fighting communism was seen as more important 
than spreading democracy.1103  However Secretary of State George Shultz gave a speech shortly after 
the president’s 1985 State of Union address in which he claimed the US wanted to support other 
human rights and democracy movements, for example in South Korea and the Philippines, as well as 
anti-communist movements.1104       
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the identification of Bulgaria, Cuba and Nicaragua as regimes that 
participated in drug trafficking is clearly driven by Cold War ideology,1105 especially considering the 
lack of reference to Noriega in Panama, who was seen as an ally, and any recognition that the Contras 
were also involved in drug smuggling.1106 Furthermore, a memo from August 1986 lists the countries 
that are involved in the production, trafficking and the transhipment of illicit drugs but does not 
mention Bulgaria, Cuba or Nicaragua.1107  Reagan had long-blamed the “Moscow-Havana axis” for 
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sparking and supporting civil war in Central America,1108 and as a presidential candidate in 1980 he 
called for the end to all support for the Sandinista government and the re-establishment of a “free 
and independent government”.1109  In what can be seen as a forerunner of the Reagan Doctrine,1110 
soon after reaching the White House, the Reagan administration focussed on the situation in 
Nicaragua.  The National Security Planning Group (NSPG), made up of the director of the CIA, the 
Secretary of State, the NSA, the Secretary of Defense and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who was US Ambassador 
to the UN, started reviewing their options in early 1981.1111 The NSPG established a $19.5 million 
covert plan to support anti-Sandinista groups in Nicaragua and Honduras, which was authorised by 
Reagan in March 1981.  William Casey, director of the CIA, described the plan to the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committee as a political and propaganda programme in Nicaragua and a regional attempt 
to halt weapons heading to El Salvador.1112  The plan was linked to a State Department diplomatic 
initiative and the aim was to use US aid to pressure the Sandinistas to reform, though hardliners in 
the administration such as Weinberger, Casey, Kirkpatrick and Clark considered that the aim was to 
prevent Nicaragua becoming a communist state.1113  The Reagan Doctrine, therefore, influenced 
NSDD-221 and the public announcements that accompanied it because they focussed on states that 
either were under Soviet influence (Cuba and Bulgaria) or were at risk of becoming so (Nicaragua).  
Naming Bulgaria in the NSDD-221 was partly influenced by the fact that they were part of the Soviet 
Bloc and the claim that they were helping to arm the Sandinistas, rather than because of any recent 
links to the drugs trade.  It was claimed that “During 1980 Nicaragua also reportedly signed a secret 
defense agreement with Cuba.  It also sent about 100 personnel for MiG pilot and mechanic training 
in Bulgaria”.1114  Commissioner of Customs, William von Raab noted that  
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As you are aware, over the past several years there has been numerous and serious charges 
that Bulgaria was clandestinely involved in illicit narcotic and terrorist activity and that Bulgarian 
customs officials, including its management, were engaged in these activities.1115   
However, whilst it had already been recognised that the Bulgarian state had been involved in drug 
trafficking in the past,1116 by the mid-1980s it was agreed that they were no longer involved and instead 
they were cooperating with the DEA.1117  Including Bulgaria in NSDD-221 also seems to be related to 
accusations that the Bulgarian Secret Service was involved in the attempted assassination of Pope 
John Paul II.  Indeed, it was argued that “any legislation declaring or implying U.S. belief in Bulgarian 
wrongdoing should await the outcome of the Italian judicial proceedings concerning the attempted 
assassination of the Pope.”1118  Despite this proposal, Bulgaria was named in NSDD-221 before the 
outcome of the investigation was concluded.  This further reinforces the argument that identifying 
these specific countries as drug trafficking states was more to do with wider geo-political concerns 
than realities on the ground.    
4.2. ‘Family Values’   
The Reagan administration was a conservative one that placed great emphasis on reducing crime, 
strengthening ‘morality’ and ‘family values’ across policy areas, but particularly when it came to 
drugs.1119  Rising drug use was seen as a threat to one of the key tenets of conservative doctrine, that 
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of the creation of a moral society.1120   This concern was illustrated in a 1984 public address on the 
international dimensions of drug use made by Secretary of State George Shultz1121 in which he argued 
that  
Drug Abuse is one of the lingering symptoms of a deeper social and cultural phenomenon: the 
weakening of traditional values of family and community and religious faith that we have 
suffered for some time in Western Society… The carefully constructed edifice of a free society 
had to be buttressed by an enduring public and private morality.1122  
The ‘war on drugs’ also connected with another concern of conservative Republicans: that of rising 
crime rates.  Nixon had previously launched his ‘war on drugs’ as part of his fight against crime,1123 and 
Reagan replicated this pattern.  This was illustrated in his 1981 speech to the International Association 
of the Chiefs of Police when he referred to speeches he had made in 1967 and 1974 linking drugs and 
crime as evidence of his long-held interest in the topic.1124   This ‘New Conservatism’ and the emphasis 
on ‘family values’ and morality was further played out through Ronald and Nancy Reagan’s speeches 
identifying drugs as a threat to the family and the ‘Just Say No’ campaign with its focus on abstinence 
rather than substance maintenance and its simplification of the reasons why people use drugs 
problematically.  These contextual factors contributed to the both the acceptance of drugs as a threat 
to US society and national security and the rhetorical strategies used by the Reagans.  They also 
contributed to the belief that external enemies were behind this threat and that increased 
criminalisation and militarisation of the ‘war on drugs’ were the correct responses to these threats.      
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the processes through which drugs were securitized by the Reagan 
administration.  The securitization of drugs was an intersubjective process that functioned on multiple 
levels.  It was not a ‘top-down’ process.  Rather, there were a range of different agents that all 
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contributed to creating a ‘moral panic’ about drug use and drug trafficking.  These agents included the 
Reagan administration and the First Lady, Congress, the media and the general public as well as 
domestic and international practices carried out in the name of the ‘war on drugs’.  It is too simplistic 
to identify these groups as ‘actors’ and ‘audiences’.  Instead, it is more useful to see them all as agents 
that facilitate, or oppose, the securitizing move(s).  Furthermore, in order to fully deconstruct the 
processes through which drugs became securitized during the Reagan era, it is important to analyse 
both the context in which the securitizing moves were made as well as the practices that contributed 
to acceptance of the ‘drugs as an existential threat’ narrative.  This lends further weight to Balzacq’s 
conceptualisation of the securitization process as ‘agents’, ‘acts’ and context1125, which more 
comprehensively captures the processes through which drugs became securitized during the Reagan 
era than the Copenhagen School framework. 
 
NSDD-221 and the accompanying speech acts can be seen as meeting Salter’s securitization 
threshold1126 because the ‘drug threat’ was debated at all levels of society in America and drug use 
and drug trafficking were accepted as being threatening by the vast majority of US citizens.  The 
Reagan administration also introduced a new referent object, that of the nation state.  The solutions 
proposed to counteract the threat including ‘certification’ and military involvement in drug law 
enforcement overseas, as well as random drug testing, increased criminal penalties and a zero-
tolerance approach to drug use at home were also widely accepted even though giving the military 
the power of arrest was not.  These practices gave the US state new powers both internationally and 
domestically.  The Reagan administration’s approach to drugs involved both domestic and 
international speech acts and practices that fundamentally re-shaped the drug control dispositif at 
home and abroad.  Within the US, after the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) was amended and NSDD-221 
was drawn up, it became accepted that the military and intelligence agencies had an important role 
to play in drug law enforcement; something that had been resisted since the late nineteenth century 
when the PCA was created.  Also, in the domestic sphere, there was an emphasis on demand-
reduction, but unlike under the Nixon administration when the first ‘war on drugs’ was launched, little 
money was actually provided for education and treatment.  Instead, US citizens were expected to ‘Just 
Say No’, and those that failed to do so, were demonised as funding ‘terrorists’ and endangering the 
‘family’ and threatening ‘our children’.  This led to an increase in incarceration alongside a reduction 
in treatment facilities that has created the situation whereby the US now has more citizens in prison 
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that any other developed nation in the world1127 as well as damaging race relations on the country1128 
and increasing the marginalisation of problematic drug users.1129  
 
Internationally, the impacts of the Reagan era securitization have also been profound.  Since NSDD-
221 was instituted, drug law enforcement has become increasingly militarised and drug trafficking has 
been accepted as being a threat to the security of nation states, both the US and allies.  The drug 
‘certification’ policy has also had far reaching effects, legitimising the role of the US as the enforcer of 
the international drug control system and allowing US presidents to limit access to multilateral loans 
for those countries that are deemed not to be carrying out their commitments under the UN drug 
conventions.  As will be seen in the next chapter (Chapter Six), the US castigates countries, and 
international bodies,1130 that do not commit themselves fully to not only the letter but also the ‘spirit’ 
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Harm Reduction, Decriminalisation and Regulation as Challenges to the ‘Drugs as a Threat’ 
Discourse 
1. Introduction 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, drug control varies from place to place and over time and the UN 
conventions allowed a certain amount of flexibility for signatory states in order to gain maximum 
adherence (see Chapters Three and Four).  This chapter will analyse in more detail the variations within 
the international drug control system and the policy experimentation that is currently going on at the 
margins - as well as beyond the boundaries - of the system, in order to show how the ‘drugs as a 
threat’ discourse is being challenged but the drug control dispositif remains as strong as ever.  As 
illustrated in Table 1 (the Drug Control Dispositif, p. 18), drugs and drug policy have been 
problematized in different ways.  Those states that institute policies that are overwhelmingly 
prohibitionist in orientation and see ‘drugs’ as a threat, articulate their desire for a ‘drug-free world’.  
Other states carry out policies under the assumption that a ‘drug-free world’ in not a realistic goal and 
therefor work to ameliorate the negative impacts of illicit drug use and see other issues – such as 
crime and marginalisation, or overdoses and infectious diseases – as greater problems than the ‘drug 
threat’.  These new policy developments largely reinforce the concept that drugs (and drug users) 
need to be controlled in some form, but they are a shift away from the securitized system of control 
and in some cases, represent desecuritizations or counter-securitizations as will be discussed in this 
chapter.  Indeed, in 2009 the Ecuadorian representative to the Commission of Narcotic Drugs (CND) 
called for a “desecuritization of drug policy which allows us to address the problem from the 
perspective of health and human rights”.1131  
Even as the securitization of drugs seemed to be becoming the predominant way of understanding 
the ‘drug problem’, and the prohibition of the non-medical use of drugs was seen to be the best way 
of limiting the threat posed by the use and trade of these substances, at a local level the ‘drugs as a 
threat’ discourse was being challenged as this chapter will show.  Furthermore, the negative impacts 
of over 50 years of prohibition have also been recognised at the international level.  In 2008 the head 
of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) outlined five unintended consequences of 
the international drug control system these were: a “huge criminal black market”; “policy 
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displacement” that emphasises law enforcement over public health; “geographical displacement” 
which is also known as the balloon effect; “substance displacement” which characterises how users, 
faced with a lack of access to one substance, will switch to using another substance; and the 
stigmatisation and marginalisation of drug users.1132  These unintended consequences have caused 
some countries to shift their priorities to some extent as will be explored below.   
This chapter will initially examine some examples of how the securitization of drugs has been put into 
practice across the globe in order to show the variation of policies that continue to exist within the 
drug control dispositif and how these policies have had negative impacts on health, violence and 
security.  It will then analyse one of the first major challenges to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse: the 
‘harm reduction’ movement that arose in response to the discovery that HIV/AIDS was spreading 
rapidly amongst injecting drug users (IDUs).  Harm reduction practices such as opiate substitution 
therapy (OST) and needle and syringe exchange programmes (NSP) were put forward in order to 
reduce the spread of HIV amongst vulnerable and marginalised populations.  Supervised drug 
consumption rooms (DCRs) were also introduced to reduce overdoses amongst illicit drug users.  
Other forms of harm reduction that aim to ameliorate some of the harms of illicit drug production and 
trade will then be analysed.  Examples include Bolivia’s withdrawal from the Single Convention and 
re-accession with a reservation on coca growing in order to protect licit coca production;1133 and US 
police forces, such as in Boston, that have attempted to reduce the violence associated with street 
drug markets through “smart policing”.1134  Nevertheless, most policy changes have been carried out 
by developed states and have focused on users rather than producers and traffickers.  The chapter 
will then explore the decriminalisation of the personal use of drugs which has been carried out most 
notably in Portugal.  The Dutch variant of cannabis decriminalisation – the ‘coffee shop’ system – will 
also be discussed here.  Finally, the recent development of legally regulated systems for the use and 
supply of cannabis will be scrutinised.  These regulatory systems are the most serious challenge yet to 
the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse and the international drug control system as it currently stands.  
Instead of seeing ‘drugs’ (or drug users, dealers, producers and traffickers) as a threat, other aspects 
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of the ‘drug problem’ are seen as being more damaging to society and citizens.  These include the 
marginalisation and stigmatisation of drugs users, public health issues relating to drug use or public 
nuisance due to open air drug use or dealing and the violence associated with it.   
Though these changing practices often represent a shift away from the prohibitionist paradigm, they 
continue to operate within the drug control dispositif.  The forms of control shift from a criminal justice 
approach to medical, social and regulatory frameworks.  It is important to emphasise that, apart from 
a few examples, these changing practices overwhelmingly aim to deal with the negative impacts of 
illicit drug use, rather than addressing illicit drug production or trade.  In other words, they aim to 
reduce the harms connected to illicit drug use (demand control) rather than concerning themselves 
with problems related to drug supply.  This is in contrast to the Single Convention, and later drug 
control treaties that emphasised supply control.  However, the harm reduction policies tend to focus 
on problematic drug use such as heroin injecting, rather than recreational use even though the United 
Nations Office on Drug Control (UNODC) recognise that almost 90% of those that use drugs do so non-
problematically.1135 
Notably, each time a territory takes a step away from the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse and the 
prohibitionist paradigm they earn a stern rebuke from the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) and often the US as well, even when these policies are permitted under the Single Convention.  
This illustrates the range of competing threat discourses that are now occurring within the drug 
control dispositif.  Some states regard increasing HIV infections, marginalisation and public nuisance 
as greater problems within their societies than illicit drug use itself, in opposition to the INCB and US 
who see any move away from the prohibitionist paradigm as a threat to the drug control system itself.         
2. The securitization of drugs in the 21st century  
As Chapters Four and Five have shown, drugs have become securitized since the 1961 UN Single 
Convention came into force.  The 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances internationalised US President Reagan’s securitization that established drugs 
not only as a threat to humankind, but also as a threat to the state.  In the wake of these international 
securitizations, prohibition has become the norm is much of the world.  This section explores some 
recent examples of how the securitization of drugs has been interpreted through national policies on 
drugs and those that participate in the illicit trade.  By highlighting how these policies have negatively 
                                                          




impacted human and national security, this section aims to question whether reliance on the ‘drugs 
as a threat’ discourse as the basis for the securitizations can benefit the referent objects of humankind, 
society and the state.   
2.1. Russia’s ‘war on drugs’  
Russia’s ‘war on drugs’ encompassed both domestic and international aspects of the ‘drug threat’ as 
it focussed on domestic drug use and the international trade that supplies it.  In this way, it was similar 
to the securitization carried out by the Reagan administration (see Chapter Five).  After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Russia saw a huge explosion of drug use and related negative health impacts.  The 
Russian Ministry of Health estimated that drug use rose by 400% between 1992 and 2002.1136  Whilst 
Russia experimented with decriminalisation of drug possession in the early 2000s, by 2006 this policy 
had been overturned in favour of a return to criminal sanctions and a refusal to support harm 
reduction methods such as NSPs and OSTs.1137  OSTs were banned in 1997 because it was argued that 
they simply replaced one addiction with another.1138 By contrast, until 2009 NSPs had been prevalent 
across Russia, funded largely by international organisations such as the Global Fund.  When this 
external money was withdrawn, the Russian government refused to replace it and therefore access to 
these programmes has become severely limited.1139    These restrictions on OSTs and NSPs have caused 
a huge increase in HIV infections amongst injecting drug users, who it is estimated account for 80% of 
all those newly infected with the virus.1140  In 2013, the Russian administration changed the law to 
allow courts to sentence drug users to compulsory drug treatment1141 despite this being widely 
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criticised as undermining human rights.1142  As well as exacerbating the HIV/AIDS crisis in Russia, the 
Putin administration’s policies have increased the marginalisation of drug users and those attempting 
to provide support to such people.1143  A vast amount of the heroin entering Russia comes from 
Afghanistan: data from 2008 suggests that 21% of global illicit opiates end up in the Russian 
Federation.1144  This led the Russian government to turn its attention to the opium production, 
particularly in Afghanistan.  In 2010 the Russian government launched its ‘Rainbow-2 Plan’ that 
identified Afghan opium as a threat to “global peace and security”.1145  From a domestic perspective, 
‘Rainbow-2’ should be seen as an attempt to blame external forces - in this case, Afghan opium 
production - for internal problems such as the rise in heroin use and HIV infections in Russia.1146  At 
the international level however, ‘Rainbow-2’ called for NATO forces to carry out poppy eradication in 
Afghanistan despite this policy having been rejected by the Afghan government, the UK and the US as 
being counter-productive to the long term goal of improving security and governance in the 
country.1147  Whilst ‘Rainbow-2’ failed at the international level to persuade the  International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to prioritise eradication strategies, at the domestic level Russia’s 
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2.2. Mexico’s ‘war on drug cartels’  
Corruption had long been a problem in Mexico and the older drug cartels – such as the Sinaloa cartel 
– built close associations with the political classes and law enforcement agencies.1149  The escape – 
twice – of ‘El Chapo’ Guzman of the Sinaloa cartel from prison in Mexico is illustrative of this 
corruption.1150  The newer cartels – such as Los Zetas – preferred to use violence rather than corruption 
to establish their role in the drug trade.1151  In 2006 Mexico’s president Felipe Calderon launched a 
‘war on drugs’ targeting the drug cartels.  The aim was to decapitate the cartels by imprisoning or 
assassinating their leaders and therefore reduce their capacity to operate in the country.1152  However, 
a side-effect of this strategy was a huge increase in violence as the cartels fractured and fought 
amongst themselves to gain control over the trade.1153  It is estimated that since the ‘war on drugs’ 
was launched up to 200,000 people have been killed in drug-related violence in Mexico.1154  Not only 
has there been a sharp increase in conflict since the ‘war on drugs’ began, but the violence has become 
increasingly brutal as perpetrators attempt to intimidate opponents and the general public.1155  In 
response to the violence carried out by the drug cartels, local community defence groups have been 
formed.  Known as the ‘autodefensa’, they have further contributed to the rising death toll and human 
rights abuses.1156    The ‘war on drug cartels’ has not only caused rising levels of violence, but it has 
also created a culture of impunity where crimes are not solved, or perpetrators punished.  An example 
of this is the 2014 murder of 43 students in the southern state of Guerrero for which no one has been 
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held accountable despite wide-spread evidence of complicity by the local police force.1157  In Mexico, 
drug cartels were identified as a threat to the state but the ‘kingpin’ strategy as it was known, has only 
escalated the violence whilst at the same time failing to reduce the amount of drugs flowing through 
the country to the US.1158         
2.3. The Philippine ‘war on drug users’  
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was elected in 2016 on a platform of law and order and during 
his campaign he particularly identified drug users as a threat to society.1159  Duterte argued that drug 
users and dealers were hindering economic and social development in the country, and that they 
needed to be eliminated.1160  He has openly supported ‘death squads’, actively encouraged the general 
public to kill drug users and refused to criticise the Philippine National Police despite claims that they 
have carried out extra-judicial killings.1161  This has led to fears that there is a culture of impunity 
operating in the Philippines today.1162  The bodies of those killed are often left in public spaces and 
identified as drug users and dealers by signs attached to them; this contributes to the dehumanisation 
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and ‘othering’ of such people.1163  Furthermore, Duterte publicly proclaimed his desire to have drug 
users and dealers wiped out.  In a press interview Duterte referenced Adolf Hitler’s extermination of 
Jewish people and then stated that “There are 3 million drug addicts [in the Philippines]. I’d be happy 
to slaughter them.”1164  It has been estimated that between June 2016 when Duterte came to power 
and April 2017, over 7000 people have been killed in the ‘war against drug users’.1165  Despite 
international criticism and a threat to take him to the International Criminal Court, Duterte seems 
unrepentant and the general public continue to overwhelmingly support the policies.1166 
These examples illustrate some of the more extreme policies carried out in order to protect citizens, 
society and the state from the threat posed by drugs.  In each case drug users, dealers or traffickers 
have been identified as threatening but the practices that have been put in place to mitigate these 
threats have had far reaching negative consequences, suggesting that these securitizations have 
undermined, rather than protected the referent object(s).  For example, rising HIV infections, spiralling 
violence and a culture of impunity, as well as exacerbating human rights abuses, inequality and 
marginalisation.  What follows next in this chapter is analysis of practices that deviate from the ‘drugs 
as a threat’ discourse, and in some cases the prohibition paradigm as well, in the name of improving 
the health and welfare of drug users and the wider general public.    
3. Harm reduction: the medical and social control of drug users 
Whereas the examples cited above serve as illustrations of a further embedding of the ‘drugs as threat’ 
discourse in different national contexts, the following sections seek to identify and analyse a range of 
policies that operate outside of the ‘drugs as a threat’ narrative.  Instead these policies attempt to 
mitigate some of the negative impacts of illicit drug use such as the spread of blood-borne viruses and 
overdoses.  Three of the most commonly recognised forms of harm reduction for problematic drug 
users are needle and syringe exchange programmes (NSPs), substance maintenance, most commonly 
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opiate substitution therapy (OST) and drug consumption rooms (DCRs).1167  Whilst maintenance 
therapies are allowed under the Single Convention,1168 and currently the INCB and UNODC recognise 
the importance of harm reduction methods, this has not always been the case.  The INCB initially 
argued that such methods encouraged people to use drugs and were therefore in contravention of 
the conventions, whereas the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP, the pre-cursor to the 
UNODC) recognised the utility of such practices as a facet of drugs treatment.  These tensions were 
exemplified by contrasting statements issuing from the INCB and a section of the UNDCP in 2002.  
Philip Emafo, the head of the INCB argued that supporters of harm reduction were on a ‘crusade’ and 
he believed that  
to promote drug use illicitly through the giving out of needles or through providing rooms for 
drug abusers to inject themselves without supervision of medical practitioners would, to me, 
amount to inciting people to abuse drugs, which would be contrary to the provisions of the 
conventions.1169  
However, a document by the Legal Affairs section of the UNDCP recognised that harm reduction 
methods were a way to “alleviate the human suffering associated with drug abuse”.1170  The 
disagreement over harm reduction continues to exist today.  At the United Nations General Assembly 
Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) held in April 2016, although the discussion document drafted at 
the preceding Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meetings recognised the importance of harm 
reduction methods,1171 the Political Declaration that was agreed at the meeting failed to reference 
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these approaches explicitly.1172  It has been argued that this was due to pressure from countries still 
committed to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.1173  As has been shown earlier in this thesis (Chapters 
Three and Four), some countries have tended to perceive the drug problem more as a medical issue 
than a criminal justice one, in contrast to prohibition-minded states.1174  That is not the say that these 
countries do not apply criminal sanctions to those involved in the drugs trade, but they combine 
criminal justice policies alongside maintenance systems and other harm reduction methods for 
dependant drug users.  As will be seen below, these programmes aimed to improve the health and 
welfare of problematic drug users and gradually reintegrate them back into society, as well as enhance 
safety for all citizens in public spaces.  Harm reduction programmes offer alternative forms of control 
to criminalisation, and as such, they continue to operate within the drug control dispositif (see Table 
1 the Drug Control Dispositif, p. 18).  Indeed, a number of scholars have noted that treatment is still a 
form of control, and that methadone maintenance can often require burdensome restrictions to be 
placed on dependent users.1175     
3.1. Needle and syringe exchange programmes (NSPs) 
In the 1980s, it became recognised that HIV infections were rising rapidly amongst drug injecting 
populations in European cities and so various organisations started to distribute clean needles to 
injecting drug users (IDUs) as a way of mitigating this problem.1176  Growing awareness of HIV led some 
governments to reframe their priorities.  The British government’s Advisory Council of the Misuse of 
Drugs (ACMD) produced a report in 1988 on AIDS and Drugs Misuse which stated that “the spread of 
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HIV is a greater danger to individual and public health than drug misuse”.1177   Therefore, the British 
government allowed organisations to experiment with distributing clean needles and syringes to those 
in need.  However, this was accompanied by the US-style ‘Just Say No’ education campaign targeting 
heroin use.1178  Some other countries with high levels of injecting drug use also instituted NSPs, such 
as the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Australia.1179  For these countries, preventing the 
spread of HIV and other infectious diseases, became more important than eliminating illicit drug use 
itself.     
By the 1990s, there was growing evidence that the distribution of clean needles slowed down the rate 
of new HIV infections amongst IDUs.1180  As a result of engaging with IDUs through needle exchange 
programmes, service providers were also able to gain access to previously marginalised 
populations.1181  The combination of improved outreach programmes and a desire to move users away 
from the riskiest behaviours such as sharing needles, also contributed to opiate substitution therapies 
to becoming accepted practice as will be seen below.1182  Initially these harm reduction methods were 
strongly criticised by the INCB, CND and the UNDCP for being antithetical to the ‘spirit of the 
conventions’ even if they were not directly in contravention of the conventions.1183  The US also took 
a strong stance against these harm reduction methods under President Reagan and instituted a 
federal ban on funding for needle and syringe exchange programmes in that was only lifted under 
President Obama.1184  Whilst the NSPs sit within the prohibition system because illicit drug use it still 
                                                          
1177 Quoted in Duncan Raistrick, ‘Report of Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs: AIDS and Drug Misuse 
Update’, Addiction, Vol. 89: 10, 1994, p. 1211. 
1178 The British government’s first major drug education programme in the 1980s centred on the ‘heroin 
screws you up’ campaign.  See, Harry Shapiro, ‘Dances with Drugs: Pop Music, Drugs and Youth Culture’, in 
Drugs: Cultures, controls and Everyday Life, ed. by Nigel South, (London: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 25.  
Anti-drug storylines were also incorporated into television programmes such as the children’s programme 
Grange Hill.  The Grange Hill cast went on to record a pop song called ‘Just Say No’ and were invited to meet 
Nancy and Ronald Reagan at the White House.   
1179 Cook at al. p. 37. 
1180 World Health Organization (WHO), Evidence for Action Technical Papers Effectiveness of Sterile Needle and 
Syringe Programming in Reducing HIV/AIDS Among Injecting Drug Users, (Geneva: WHO, 2004), p. 5. 
1181 Cook et al., p. 39. 
1182 Cook et al., p. 40. 
1183 Buxton, The Political Economy of Narcotic Drugs, pp. 161-162. 
1184 Buxton, The Political Economy of Narcotic Drugs, p. 161; Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
Federal Funding Ban on Needle Exchange Programs, The White House, President Barack Obama, January 
222 
 
banned, they directly challenge the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse because they place the emphasis on 
other problems such as the spread of HIV and the marginalisation and stigmatisation of drug users.  
Yet these practices still continue to function within the drug control dispositif through medico-social 
forms of control: instead of police officers enforcing control, it is social workers, psychologists, medical 
professionals and other NGO bodies that do so by engaging with problematic drug users and 
attempting to reintegrate them into society.  
3.2. Opiate substitution therapies (OSTs) 
Alongside NSPs, some countries, particularly in Europe, have instituted opiate substitution therapies 
(OSTs).  Whilst the ‘British System’ (see Chapter Three) has always included drug maintenance within 
its remit, in other countries the introduction of OSTs has been more recent.  Analysis of the Swiss 
experience illustrates the shift from an abstinence, strictly prohibitionist-based approach to the use 
of OSTs as a response to public concerns about open air drug use and associated public nuisance, 
property crime and the marginalisation of problematic drug users.  
The Swiss experience: from ‘needle park’ to heroin prescription 
In the 1970s the federal government of Switzerland was focussed on abstinence and in 1975 they 
enacted a law that banned the distribution of syringes as a public health measure as well as making 
the prescription of methadone much harder for doctors.1185  However, despite this, heroin users 
continued to inject and became a noticeable social phenomenon.1186   By the 1980s Switzerland had 
the highest prevalence of HIV amongst injecting drug users in Western Europe1187 and therefore the 
authorities felt that they needed to address the situation in some way.  In 1987 the authorities in 
Zurich decided to allow drug users to congregate in Platszpitz park near the central train station, which 
become known as ‘needle park’.1188  Medical and social professionals were then allowed to work with 
users in the park, distributing clean needles and providing support and health advice.1189  However, in 
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1992 the Zurich authorities closed ‘needle park’, in part due to the fact that many of the visitors to 
Platszpitz were not from Zurich, and came into the city specifically to use the park.1190  In response to 
the closure of the park, the authorities established drop-in centres for users but these made little 
difference to the visibility of IDUs who began to congregate in another park in the city.1191  The shifting 
nature of the open air drug markets, along with calls from medical and social professionals to provide 
easier access to treatment and support for drug users, changed the national debate around how drug 
users were treated.1192  In 1992, the Swiss federal government passed a new law allowing NSPs and 
the prescription of heroin and methadone for problematic drug users (OSTs).1193  Once enrolled into 
an OST programme, the participant was also given support finding housing and employment in order 
to reduce their marginalisation.1194  This change in policy to allow OST was aimed at reducing public 
drug use and the crime and nuisance, such as drug litter, that accompanies it.  It was also concerned 
with re-engaging problematic drug users with the health and social systems1195 in order to reintegrate 
them into society.1196  The Swiss experience of OST therefore established a medical and social system 
for the control of problematic heroin drug users as opposed to a criminal one.  The narrative changed 
from a ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse to one that focussed on other problems related to illicit drug use 
including public drug use, the marginalisation of users and the spread of HIV.  The Swiss experience 
can therefore be seen as a form of desecuritization as drug policy was moved back into the realm of 
normal public policy making and practices that had been banned or heavily restricted, such as NSPs 
and OSTs, became accepted tools to deal with the ‘drug problem’.  
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3.3. Drug consumption rooms (DCRs) 
Drug consumption rooms (DCRs) have been defined as “legally sanctioned and supervised facilities to 
reduce the health and public order problems associated with illegal… drug use”.1197  The aim of these 
facilities is to address public health and disorder issues associated with large scale public drug use, 
such as reducing overdoses; reducing public nuisance e.g. discarded needles and syringes, public 
injecting and visible drug dealing; reducing infections of blood-borne viruses; and improving access to 
health and welfare services.1198  DCRs were first was established in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 
were then introduced into Switzerland in 1986 and Germany in 1994 and have since spread more 
widely.1199  In order to improve the health and welfare of problematic drug users, they were staffed 
by both medical professionals and social workers1200 who offered a range of services beyond simply a 
safe space to use drugs.  These included showers, laundries, food, legal services and referrals to 
housing and employment support.1201  In Europe, law enforcement and local government officials gave 
their support to the DRCs.1202  However this has not been the case in North America.   The Insite DCR 
in Vancouver, Canada, opened in 2003 but its legal status remained precarious because it was only 
granted short term, although regularly extended, support from the police and local government.1203  
The federal government under Stephen Harper objected to Insite, arguing that “We as a government 
will not use taxpayers’ money to fund drug use” and attempted to have it closed down.1204  This 
argument, just like INCB’s stance against NSPs and DCRs in 2002, attempted to portray harm reduction 
practices as encouraging drug use rather than as an attempt to deal with the harms associated with 
illicit drug use.  As such it is commonly used to undermine support for practices that deviate from the 
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‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.  However, in 2011 the Canadian Supreme Court struck down the 
proposed, stating that  
the effect of denying the services of Insite to the population it serves and the correlative 
increase in the risk of death and disease to injection drug users is grossly disproportionate to 
any benefit that Canada might derive from presenting a uniform stance on the possession of 
narcotics.1205     
Most of the European DRCs operate under strict guidelines whereby visitors must show proof of age 
– most DRCs only provide services to those over the age of 18 – and sometimes proof of residency in 
the area. The users must also already have a history of problematic use and injecting. Furthermore, 
no drug dealing is allowed on the premises and staff are not allowed to help the user inject, although 
they are on-hand to provide medical support should the user overdose.1206  Whilst the DCRs can be 
seen as a challenge to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse because they fail to prevent illicit drug use, 
they clearly function as a part of the drug control dispositif.  They aim to re-engage marginalised drug 
users with medical and social services in order to reintegrate them back into society and improve their 
health and welfare.       
The success of the needle and syringe exchange programmes and opium substitution therapies in 
preventing the spread of blood-borne viruses (HIV/AIDS as well as Hepatitis C) has a strong evidence-
base and over time these practices have become accepted by many of the UN agencies, initially the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and UNAIDS, but more recently the INCB and UNODC.1207  These 
harm reduction policies operate as medico-social modes of control within the drug control dispositif, 
but they still function largely within the prohibition framework because drug use is still illegal.  
However, these policies do challenge to ‘drug-free world’ and ‘drugs as a threat’ discourses because 
they fail to oppose illicit drug use.  Harm reduction policies such as NSPs, OSTs and DCRs are still a 
form of drug control.  In order to access the NSPs or OSTs, the user must engage with various service 
providers whether NGOs handing out clean needles and syringes or medical, pharmaceutical 
practitioners and social workers who are allowed to prescribe these substances as well as providing 
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access to education, employment and housing support.  DCRs also provide access to support 
structures.  Rather than focussing on illicit drug use as a threat however, these practices concern 
themselves with the marginalisation of users and health and public nuisance problem. 
3.4. Harm reduction for drug producers and dealers 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are only a few instances of harm reduction 
applied to the production, manufacturing and sales of drugs.  Alternative development programmes 
that support opium and coca producers to grow substitute crops have been applied to producer 
countries, but these sit firmly within the prohibitionist system and the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.1208  
There have been occasional instances when drug eradication has been downgraded as a priority in 
favour of other objectives.  An example of this was US policy in Afghanistan from 2009 onwards where 
counter-insurgency objectives took precedence over counter-narcotics operations because it was felt 
that destroying impoverished farmers’ crops could lead them to support the Taliban.1209  This policy 
did little to challenge the ‘drugs as a threat’ narrative and was sharply criticised by the Russian 
government.1210 
More of a challenge to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse was Bolivia’s approach to coca growing where 
the coca leaf is used in a wide range of products from flour to toothpaste.1211  In 2011, Evo Morales, a 
former coca grower and president of Bolivia since 20061212 argued that the country should withdraw 
from the Single Convention and then re-accede with a reservation that coca growing was legitimate 
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as long as it was for licit purposes.1213  It was argued that this reservation was necessary in order for 
Bolivia’s international obligations to be compatible with their new constitution and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.1214  Whilst they followed the process laid out in the 
Single Convention, Bolivia received condemnation from a wide range of sources including the INCB 
who argued that this action was against the “spirit of the convention”.1215  Furthermore, the US 
attempted to create of coalition of countries to block Bolivia’s re-accession to the treaty although they 
failed to gain the requisite number of opponents.1216  These objections to Bolivia’s reservation were 
put forward despite the Morales government confirming its commitment limiting the illicit production 
of coca and the manufacture of cocaine.1217  This illustrates how the INCB, and some states, see the 
‘drugs as a threat’ discourse as paramount to other concerns. 
A few harm reduction programmes have been instituted in relation to violence associated with the 
illicit drug trade.  The first, and most successful, of these was Operation Ceasefire in Boston in the 
1990s.1218  This programme of focussed deterrence aimed to reduce the number of deaths caused by 
gang violence by targeting law enforcement strategies against the most brutal offenders, rather than 
all criminal activity.1219  This practice was highly publicised so that all gang members were aware of the 
approach and modified their behaviour accordingly.1220  The strategy was successful in reducing the 
number of homicides in areas where gangs operated by 66%.1221  Similar focussed deterrence 
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strategies have been carried out in Brazil with varying degrees of success.1222  These law enforcement 
strategies still sit within the prohibition paradigm but the focus on other threats such as youth 
homicide and violence rather than the drug trade itself.  Indeed, gangs that reduce their violence but 
continue to participate in drug dealing are less likely to be punished than other more violent gangs.1223  
However, these policies are rare and in general drug production, trafficking and dealing are still 
considered as threats to society and the state and as such, are harshly treated through law 
enforcement and military operations.        
4. Decriminalisation of drug possession for personal use 
The Single Convention requires signatory states to treat drug possession and use as punishable 
offences1224 but it does not stipulate what form this punishment must take.  The Commentary to the 
Single Convention states that these punishments may take the form of administrative or penal 
sanctions.1225  This allows governments a certain amount of leeway in how they deal with drug 
possession and use including decriminalisation and depenalisation.  Decriminalisation occurs in very 
different forms in across the world and there are few agreed definitions.  The European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) defines decriminalisation as the “removal of a conduct 
or activity from the sphere of criminal law. Prohibition remains the rule, but sanctions for use (and its 
preparatory acts) no longer fall within the framework of the criminal law ....”1226   
There are also two types of decriminalisation, de jure and de facto.  These terms have been defined 
by the UNODC as follows: 
De jure decriminalisation is the removal of criminal sanctions with the optional use of civil or 
administrative sanctions, such as fines or education. De facto decriminalisation (sometimes 
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called depenalisation) is the decision in practice or as policy to not apply criminal or 
administrative penalties for certain offenses.1227  
The EMCDDA states depenalisation “generally signifies the elimination of custodial penalties.  
Prohibition remains the rule, but imprisonment is no longer provided for, even if other penal sanctions 
may be retained (fines, establishment of a police record, or other penal sanctions).”1228  Unlike moist 
harm reduction practices, decriminalisation of drug use is concerned with all illicit drugs users rather 
than just problematic users.  Decriminalisation aims to reduce the marginalisation and stigmatisation 
of illicit drug users by reducing, or eliminating, penal sanctions.  In the Dutch case, decriminalisation 
was also established to create a separation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ drug markets as discussed in 
Chapter Four.  Decriminalisation has been carried out in a number of different countries.  In some, 
decriminalisation operates almost as an absence of control, whereas in other countries, medico-social 
and regulatory systems of control can be seen.  Russia in the early 2000s - when possession of drugs 
was decriminalised, but no extra support services were provided for dependent users1229 - is an 
example of this lack of control where the drug control dispositif almost disappears.  However, the 
examples discussed below, show how decriminalisation of possession and use can be incorporated 
into different frameworks of control whether through licensing and taxation, such as the Netherlands’ 
‘coffee shop’ system or in conjunction with well-funded treatment, education and social care, such as 
Portugal.  A growing number of countries, and a diverse group of international bodies including the 
WHO, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), The World Bank and International 
Labour Organization (ILO) for example, have begun to challenge the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, 
arguing that decriminalisation alongside harm reduction practices are needed to improve the “health 
and welfare of mankind”.1230 
4.1. The Netherlands ‘coffee shop’ system 
As has been mentioned earlier in this thesis (Chapters Three and Four), the Netherlands has tended 
to see problematic drug use as a medical and social problem rather than a criminal justice one.  As 
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with the so-called ‘British System’ (see Chapters Three and Four), Dutch medical professionals were 
given the power to prescribe drugs to users and their independence to do so was vigorously 
protected.1231  Dutch law enforcement professionals also tended to view recreational users with 
‘tolerance’ although that was not always the case.1232  The emphasis on ‘tolerance’ was shaped by 
concerns that the marginalisation and criminalisation of drug users was damaging to the users and 
wider society.1233  Under the 1976 Opium Act, use of drugs is not illegal, however producing and 
trafficking these substances is prohibited.1234  During the 1970s, the sale of small amounts of cannabis 
by ‘house dealers’ was tolerated in private spaces and government subsidised ‘youth clubs’ in order 
to prevent violence and competition between different suppliers.1235  In 1979, the Department of 
Justice released guidelines as to how these ‘house dealers’ and spaces should operate: there was to 
be no advertising, no ‘hard’ drug sales, no public nuisance, no sales to underage persons and no sales 
of large amounts.1236  The toleration of these house dealers led to de facto decriminalisation of 
cannabis and by the 1980s, ‘coffee shops’ began to proliferate in Amsterdam and other big cities as a 
more formalised version of the ‘house dealer’.1237  These ‘coffee shops’ are licensed by local 
government1238 and pay corporate taxes1239 and are seen to limit the exposure of cannabis users to 
‘hard’ drugs.1240  However, the ‘coffee shops’ continue to exist within a legal grey area because whilst 
the proprietors are allowed to sell small amounts of cannabis to consumers, they have no legal access 
to their supply of the drug and so they are forced to purchase it from illicit traffickers.1241  The system 
of ‘tolerance’ and ‘coffee shops’ in the Netherlands was brought about due to a range of different 
factors: the recognition that drug use was a medical and social issue rather than a criminal justice one, 
a desire to address the marginalisation and criminalisation of drug users and reintegrate them into 
society, and a view that the law must only be prosecuted if it is expedient to do so.1242  With both 
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recreational and problematic use, it was generally thought not to be expedient to prosecute because 
this could bring about marginalisation, stigmatisation and negative health impacts.1243 
Neighbouring countries such as France and Germany had long been critical of the Dutch ‘coffee shops’ 
for encouraging drug tourism and after the Schengen Agreement came into force, there was a concern 
that this would increase on a large scale.1244  The US was highly critical of the Dutch approach, 
portraying the country as a haven for drug tourism and trafficking1245 and the INCB has also censured 
the Dutch position with regard to the cannabis ‘coffee shops’.  In 1997, they argued that the ‘coffee 
shops’ were “indirect incitement [to cannabis use, and] ... not in accordance with the spirit or the 
letter of the international drug control treaties.”1246  However, the Dutch argue that they are not in 
contravention of the UN drug control treaties because the Opium Act makes the sale and trafficking 
of drugs illegal (Article 36 of the Single Convention and Article 3 of the 1988 UN Convention) but that 
there is nothing in the conventions about the need to enforce these laws.1247  Furthermore, for the 
Dutch, the separation of markets for ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ drugs as well as limiting the criminalisation of 
drug users and the provision of harm reduction for problematic users has been overwhelmingly 
successful and therefore worth the censure at the international level.1248  Whilst cannabis is de facto 
decriminalised and ‘coffee shops’ have to purchase their supplies from the illegal market, there is 
strong local government involvement in the licensing of ‘coffee shops’ including controlling where 
they are situated, how many are allowed to operate in each locality and what hours they are allowed 
to open.1249  Therefore the drug control dispositif in the form of regulation and licensing continues to 
play an important part in the cannabis control in the Netherlands.  The Dutch have contested the 
‘drugs as a threat’ discourse in relation to cannabis; instead, seeing the criminalisation and 
marginalisation of drug users as bigger challenges to society.               
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4.2. Portugal’s decriminalisation of drug possession 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, drug use became seen as a huge social problem in Portugal.1250  
Although usages rates of drugs were not especially high compared to other countries, in the minds of 
the general public, the country had a serious drug problem.1251  A survey carried out in 1997 showed 
that the Portuguese general public considered drug use to be the predominant social issue of the 
day.1252  The disconnect between public perception and actual rates of use was partially caused by the 
fact that Portugal did have very high rates of problematic use - especially heroin - and that much of 
this drug use was carried out in public spaces.1253  At this time, needle and syringe exchanges 
programmes were deemed to encourage drug use and were therefore illegal.1254  Furthermore, whilst 
the government and other agencies did establish treatment centres, the stigma of being criminalised 
prevented large scale take up of these provisions.1255  The combination of growing levels of 
problematic use, increased public drug use and a rise in public concern about the drug problem led 
the government to appoint a committee of specialists including doctors, lawyers, social workers and 
academics, to explore these issues and offer alternative policy recommendations.1256  The committee 
proposed that possession and use of all illicit drugs should be formally decriminalised as a way to 
reduce drug consumption and problematic drug use.1257  Whilst the aim of decriminalisation was to 
reduce drug use, it was accompanied by the recognition that a ‘drug-free world’ was unachievable.1258  
This conclusion reflects the idea that once states move away from the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, 
the aim of a ‘drug-free world’ becomes less important, and instead the emphasis is placed on 
improving the health and welfare of citizens.  As with the Swiss experience, Portugal’s change in drug 
policy represents a desecuritization.  Drug policy became the responsibility of a range of professionals 
and open to public scrutiny, practices such as NSPs that had once been banned, were promoted along 
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with public health and social care measures.  The focus shifted away from the ‘drugs as a threat’ 
discourse towards the idea that other side effects of illicit drug use, such as overdoses, increasing HIV 
infections and public drug use were more damaging to society than the drugs themselves.1259 
In 2001 the Portuguese government revised the legal code to decriminalise personal drug possession 
and use.  This is an example of de jure decriminalisation and Portugal is the one of only two European 
countries to decriminalise drugs in this way, the Czech Republic being the other.1260  The law stated 
that citizens were allowed to be in possession of up to ten days supply of a drug.1261  The purchasing, 
consumption and possession of a drug became a civil offence rather than a criminal one.1262  Drug 
trafficking however, continued to be a crime and drug users still have to purchase their supply from 
the illicit market.1263   The new policy had five key aspects: education and prevention, drug dissuasion 
commissions, harm reduction measures (including NSPs, OSTs), treatment and reintegration into 
society.1264  When drug users are caught by the police their details are taken and if it is their first 
offence they can be issued with a low level fine or a warning, alternatively these sanctions may be 
suspended unless they reoffend.1265  If the person caught by the police is clearly dependent on the 
substance, or a repeat offender, they are issued with an appointment to attend a drug dissuasion 
commission, usually within 72 hours of the notice being given, to discuss their drug use and ultimately 
try to persuade them to enter treatment.1266 These drug dissuasion commissions are staffed by a three-
member team made up of a representative appointed by the Ministry of Justice and two appointed 
by the Ministry of Health and the government’s drug policy advisor - typically psychologists, addiction 
specialists, mental health workers and social workers.1267  The members of the commission will discuss 
the reasons for a persons’ drug use, their health and social circumstances and any other relevant 
information; if it seems pertinent, they will also offer advice about treatment options.1268  The main 
aim of the dissuasion commissions is the destigmatise drug use and to eliminate the perceived guilt 
                                                          
1259 Domoslawski, p. 18. 
1260 Greenwald, p. 2; Release, 2016, p. 20. 
1261 Greenwald, p. 3; Domoslawski, p. 21; Laqueur, p. 752. 
1262 Domoslawski, p. 21; Greenwald, p. 2. 
1263 Laqueur, p. 752. 
1264 Domoslawski, p. 23. 
1265 Greenwald, p. 3; Laqueur, p. 752. 
1266 Greenwald, p. 3; Domoslawski, p. 26. 
1267 Domoslawski, p. 25; Greenwald, p. 4. 
1268 Domoslawski, p. 26. 
234 
 
of being a drug user.1269  Ultimately, the aim is to improve the users health and reintegrate them back 
into society through providing support to find accommodation, education and employment.1270  
Alongside the drug dissuasion committees, the government funds outreach programmes that include 
teams of social workers and psychologists on the streets and in centres who distribute methadone to 
dependent users, as well as clean needles and syringes and treatment information.1271  As a result of 
the decriminalisation policy, there are more, better funded treatment options than ever before and 
more drug users have entered treatment.1272  Furthermore, the prevalence of HIV infections amongst 
injecting drug users has decreased as have drug overdoses.1273  
As with other alternatives to the prohibition paradigm discussed in this chapter, the drug control 
dispositif remains dominant in Portugal but the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse is in decline.  The 
Portuguese system of decriminalisation functions within as a medico-social mode of control, although 
law enforcement plays an important part as well.  However, criminalisation is seen as causing greater 
harm than the use of these substances themselves and therefore is used only as a last resort.  Instead, 
the emphasis is on improving the social and physical capital of the drugs user in order to reintegrate 
them back into society.  Again, as with the harm reduction policies, the INCB initially criticised this 
innovation.1274  Over time, however, they have gradually accepted this approach because 
decriminalisation is legitimate within the UN drug conventions.1275   
4.3. International health organisations (IHOs) and UN agencies call for decriminalisation 
Since the beginning of the twenty first century, a number of international health organisations (IHOs) 
and UN agencies have called for drug decriminalisation in order to reduce the stigma associated with 
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1274 The 2001 annual report for the INCB suggested that Portugal was not living up to its commitments under 
the UN drug conventions.  See, International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report for the International 
Narcotics Controls Board for 2001, E/INCB/2001/1, (New York: United Nations, 2002), p. 74.  
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illicit drug use and end the human rights abuses that are carried out in the name of prohibitionist drug 
control.  By doing so, these agencies are challenging the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, instead focussing 
alternative threats such as HIV/AIDS or on the negative impacts of drug prohibition including social 
exclusion and criminalisation.  As such this represents an attempt at desecuritizing drug policy.      
In 2010, at the 18th International AIDS Conference the ‘Vienna Declaration’ was launched which called 
for an end to criminalisation of people who use drugs.  It stated that “the criminalisation of illicit drug 
users is fuelling the HIV epidemic and has resulted in overwhelmingly negative health and social 
consequences. A full policy reorientation is needed.”1276  In 2012, the International Federation of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies argued that drug users needed treatment rather than 
criminalisation1277 and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Global Commission on HIV/AIDS and 
the Law further reinforced the call for a shift in emphasis from a criminal justice perspective to one of 
public health and human rights, noting that there was a need to  
Reform approaches towards drug use. Rather than punishing people who use drugs but do no 
harm to others, governments must offer them access to effective HIV and health services, 
including harm reduction programmes and voluntary, evidence based treatment for drug 
dependence.1278   
In 2014, the WHO publicly stated their support for decriminalisation of drugs arguing that, “Countries 
should work toward developing policies and laws that decriminalize injection and other use of drugs 
and, thereby, reduce incarceration.”1279  More recently, several other organisations have formally 
stated their support for some form of decriminalisation of drug use in order to shift policies away from 
incarceration and towards a public health approach.  The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 
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UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), The World Bank, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), UNODC, UNAIDS, International Labour Organization (ILO), UN Children's 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) all supported a WHO-produced report in 2015 calling for decriminalisation 
of drugs and improved access to harm reduction for everyone but especially young people in order to 
reduce marginalisation and improve health.1280 Also in 2015, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon stated 
that “We must consider alternatives to criminalization and incarceration of people who use 
drugs...”1281  The new UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, who as Portugal’s Prime Minister 
instituted decriminalisation, has also spoken out in support of such polices.1282    
Perhaps in response to these calls from so many international bodies the UNDOC prepared a briefing 
paper for the International Harm Reduction Conference in Malaysia in 2015 stating that 
“Decriminalising drug use and possession for personal consumption is permitted by the international 
drug control conventions and is a key element of the HIV response among people who use drugs”.1283  
However, they quickly rolled back on this and claimed the paper was a discussion document that was 
not meant for publication.1284  This was despite having produced a discussion paper in 2009 that called 
for drug policies to be based on a health-based approach rather than criminalisation.1285  Yet a clear 
case can still be made that in the view of many international health and human rights organisations, 
the prohibition paradigm itself creates more harms than the illicit use of drugs themselves.  These 
organisations are now regularly challenging the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, instead calling for more 
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humane policies that improve public health, human rights and the marginalisation and stigmatisation 
of drug users. 
5. Legally regulated markets for the supply of cannabis 
Whilst this thesis has argued that the US has been at the forefront of promoting a prohibitionist 
paradigm for drug control, notable challenges to the ‘drugs as threat’ discourse have also come from 
within the US.  As mentioned in the previous chapter (Chapter Five), the legal status of cannabis has 
been discussed in the US since the early 1970s: the Shafer Commission, established by US President 
Richard Nixon, proposed removing criminal sanctions for cannabis use in 19721286 but this was ignored.  
In 1972, the state of California held a ballot initiative to decriminalise cannabis but this failed by 66-
33.1287  However, the Supreme Court of the state of Alaska, in 1975, ruled that an adult could possess 
and use up to one ounce of cannabis for personal use within their own home without criminal or civil 
penalty.1288  The US state of Oregon first attempted to overturn cannabis prohibition through a ballot 
initiative in 1986, but at the height of Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’, this failed to pass by 74-26%.1289  Even 
so,  there was a growing debate about the use of cannabis for both recreational and medical purposes.  
Under the Single Convention, medical use of cannabis was not recognised outside of South Asian 
indigenous medicine and it was a deemed to have no legitimate medical use and be liable to abuse 
under the US Controlled Substances Act of 1970.1290  By the mid-1990s, the debate about medical 
cannabis use was increasing in the US and in 1996 California passed the Compassionate Care Act which 
established a legally system for access to medical marijuana.1291  Since this time, many other US states 
have established systems for medical cannabis use. 1292  Under these systems, which vary greatly from 
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state to state, a prescription is given for medical cannabis by a doctor and can then be used to 
purchase the drug from a registered provider.1293   
Since the early 2000s, a number of US states have discussed going further than the Dutch ‘coffee shop’ 
system by introducing legally regulated systems of the production, sale and use of cannabis in their 
jurisdictions through voter initiatives.1294  Legal regulation of cannabis is the clearest challenge yet to 
the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse and some of the campaign messages highlight alternative narratives 
including how prohibition has failed to protect people and that regulation of the trade would improve 
safety and undermine the role of organised crime in the trade.  Some have also called for cannabis to 
be regulated like alcohol.1295  In 2010, California voted on legally regulating cannabis but the ballot 
initiative failed, largely due to a poor regulatory framework and opposition from the medical 
marijuana industry.1296  In 2012, learning from California’s experience, ballot initiatives proposing 
much stricter regulation were held in Washington state and Colorado, and these passed.1297  A ballot 
measure was also held in Oregon in 2012 but again this failed, partially because of the poor regulatory 
system that was put forward.1298   However, in 2014 Oregon held a new vote on legally regulated 
cannabis markets that was successful, in part because it proposed a more rigorous form of 
regulation.1299   The states of Alaska and Oregon and the district of Washington D.C. also voted to tax 
and regulate cannabis in 2014 and California, Massachusetts, Maine and Nevada voted in favour of 
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similar systems in 2016.1300  In January 2018, the Vermont legislature voted to regulate recreational 
use of cannabis, making it the first state to do so through the legislature rather than public ballot.1301  
What the votes in California in 2010 and 2016, and Oregon in 2012 and 2014, suggest is that voters 
want tightly regulated systems of control for the supply of cannabis rather than weaker systems.1302  
In the country that argued strongly for drugs to be considered a threat and that strict prohibition of 
non-medical use was a necessity, now over half of US states have some form of legally regulated 
system of cannabis use, whether medical or recreational.1303  Under these regulated systems the 
production and sales of cannabis is tightly controlled.  Producers must apply for a licence to grow, 
state the relative strength of the active components in cannabis, and in some cases, record what 
pesticides are used on the plants.1304   Distributors must also apply for a licence to operate and limit 
access to people over the age of 21.1305  Both producers and distributors must also pay taxes to the 
state and local governments.1306  These regulatory systems have put the federal US government in a 
difficult position in relation to the UN drug control treaties because legally regulated systems for the 
supply of cannabis are in contravention of the Single Convention as they do not comply with the 
commitment to limit drug use to medical and scientific purposes.  Under the Obama administration, 
the US federal government argued that firstly, it had no power to interfere in state laws, and secondly, 
that the UN treaties allow for a certain amount of flexibility.1307  President Trump’s Attorney General, 
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Jefferson Sessions, however, has recently rescinded this previous guidance and reaffirmed the federal 
government’s commitment to the idea that “marijuana activity is a serious crime”.1308 
In light of the development of regulatory systems for the control and taxation of cannabis in the US, 
other states have begun to explore alternatives to the prohibitionist system.  In 2013, the Uruguayan 
legislature voted in favour of establishing the legally regulated supply of cannabis, arguing that this 
would end the role of organised crime in the cannabis trade.1309  Uruguayan president Jose Mujica, in 
effect, attempted to create a form of counter-securitization whereby he argued that the role of 
organised crime in the cannabis trade represented a threat to public security1310 and therefore this 
trade needed to be controlled and regulated by the government.  Whilst public opinion did not 
indicate overall acceptance of this framing - indeed polling suggests that almost two thirds opposed 
the law1311 - the formal audience of the Senate voted in favour of the measure by 16 to 13 votes.1312  
In defence of their stance, the Uruguayan government argued that the creation of a legally regulated 
market for the supply of cannabis was in line with the objectives of the UN drug control system – that 
of protecting the “health and welfare of mankind”1313 – and that the new system would be better for 
health, human rights and the security of the country.  They also argued that their adherence to the 
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UN’s human rights principles overrides their adherence to the drug control treaties.1314  In 2015 the 
Canadian government announced that they would establish legally regulated systems for the 
production, sale and use of cannabis in the near future, which is due to come into force in 2018, to 
protect society, particularly children.1315  During his successful election campaign, Justin Trudeau 
argued that his party  
took the position we have to control and regulate marijuana primarily for one reason.  Mr 
Harper’s current approach is not protecting children... it [is] easier for young people to buy a 
joint than it is for them to buy cigarettes or alcohol…1316  
These developments have been highly criticised by the UN drug control bodies, particularly the INCB.  
Raymond Yans, then president of the INCB, accused Washington and Colorado’s regulatory systems 
of being “a violation”1317 of the Single Convention and strongly criticised Uruguay, arguing that the 
country had “knowingly decided to break the universally agreed and internationally endorsed legal 
provisions of the treaty”.1318  At the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) in 
2016, the current president of the INCB, Werner Sipp reinforced the criticism of legally regulated 
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markets in cannabis but supported a more flexible approach to the drug control system in order to 
improve the health and human rights of citizens.1319   
With all of these regulatory systems for the supply of cannabis, much of the discourse centres around 
regaining the control of the trade and improving the health and welfare of citizens.  From protecting 
children (Canada and Washington state)1320 to protecting national security (Uruguay)1321 and 
eliminating the role of organised crime (Uruguay and Colorado),1322 the emphasis has been on how the 
prohibition of cannabis has forced governments to “deregulate”1323 or relinquish control of the trade 
altogether.  Legally regulated markets for the supply of cannabis are the clearest examples of a 
challenge to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, as well as putting states that establish such systems in 
contravention of the UN drug treaties.  However, the UN bodies have little power to do more than 
just criticise these states.  The UNODC and INCB’s lack of power has been exacerbated by the fact that 
the US – which, since the amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1986 gave US presidents the 
power to ‘certify’ or ‘decertify’ countries according to their commitment to the UN drug control 
treaties (see Chapter Five) - has often positioned itself as the enforcer of the drug conventions1324 but 
now has some states that are themselves in contravention of the conventions.  This has made it much 
harder for the US to censure other states for such practices.     
6. Conclusion 
Whilst these alternative forms of drug control continue to proliferate and to challenge the 
prohibitionist drug control system and the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, it is not possible to say that 
the securitization of drugs has yet collapsed as the examples of the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse in 
practice included in this chapter have shown.  This is despite the prohibition of non-medical use of 
drugs having had huge negative impacts for drugs users and wider society including increasing 
infections of blood-borne viruses amongst drug users, exacerbating marginalisation and poverty, as 
well as escalating violence and conflict.  The majority of states still hold fast to the prohibitionist logic 
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even whilst they institute harm reduction policies.  The provision of drug consumption rooms (DCRs), 
needle and syringe exchange programmes (NSP), opiate substitution therapies (OST) and 
decriminalisation all aim to address other harms that are considered a greater problem than illicit drug 
use itself.  For example, DCRs address public nuisance, outdoor drug use and overdoses; NSPs tackle 
HIV and other blood-borne viruses and the marginalisation of drug users; OST focusses on the threat 
posed by HIV and other blood-borne viruses and overdoses and marginalisation; and decriminalisation 
attempts to reduce the marginalisation and criminalisation of users.  All these practices attempt to 
provide users with medical and social/welfare support in order to improve their health and wellbeing 
and to protect non-users from the negative impacts of illicit drug use. 
As has been discussed in this chapter, harm reduction and decriminalisation are allowed under the 
Single Convention but have been strongly criticised in international public discourse, especially by the 
INCB and US.  This is where the securitization of drugs can be seen most strongly.  The US and other 
states such as Russia, China, Sweden and Japan,1325 and the INCB continue to promote the ‘drugs as a 
threat’ and ‘drug-free world’ discourses and criticise harm reduction methods for undermining these 
discourses.  This tension is an example of how powerful the securitization of drugs has been: that the 
guardian of the treaties (INCB) and the policeman of the treaties (US) continued to censure states for 
carrying out harm reduction practices aimed at improving the health and welfare of citizens even 
though these practices are explicitly allowed under the Single Convention.  Whilst these policies sit 
within a prohibitionist framework, they are not based on the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, indeed most 
of these practices are aimed at reducing other threats to the drug user (HIV and other blood-borne 
infections, and overdose) or society in general (public nuisance, open air drug scenes, the 
marginalisation of users).  Rather, as has been discussed in detail above, they function within 
alternative control frameworks such as the medico-social model or regulatory systems.         
  
                                                          





This thesis has combined securitization theory with the concept of the dispositif in order to analyse 
the development of the international drug control system and the accompanying ‘drugs as a threat’ 
discourse.  The securitization framework helps explain how drugs have been framed as a threat to 
humankind and the state at the national and international levels and how this understanding of drugs 
as a threat contributed to the prohibition of drugs for all but medical and scientific purposes becoming 
seen as the most effective way of dealing with the ‘drug problem’.  Securitization theory also 
contributes to understanding how the international consensus around drug policy was established 
and maintained, and why it has been so hard to challenge this perspective - with states that deviated 
from the prohibitionist norm being heavily criticised.  The thesis concludes that the drug 
control dispositif has continued to evolve over time but that the securitization of drugs in the 
twentieth century attempted to restrict the options available to states to prohibition of non-medical 
use only.  Whilst prohibition remains the overriding paradigm through which drugs are controlled, 
more and more states are now experimenting with alternative approaches as evidence of the harms 
caused by prohibition to the “health and welfare of mankind”1326 and the state mount up.  This 
suggests that the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, although still highly prevalent, is increasingly coming 
under strain.  By using securitization theory, particularly the work of ‘second generation’ securitization 
scholars who emphasise a more context-laden, process-orientated approach, I identify key points in 
the development of the ‘drugs as an existential threat’ narrative and show how they have re-shaped 
the drug control dispositif.         
1. The ‘sociological’ interpretation of securitization theory in application 
In terms of developing and contributing to securitization theory, this research has used an empirically 
embedded ‘sociological’ interpretation and has focussed on understanding the processes through 
which an issue becomes securitized.  Whilst the original Copenhagen School framework was 
innovative in its explanation of how non-traditional security threats come into being, it has been 
widely criticised for being under-theorised in relation to some of its core elements.1327  ‘Second 
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generation’ securitization scholars, have built upon the original conceptualisation in order to develop 
the theory in new ways.  This thesis finds that when applying securitization theory to empirical case 
studies, the ‘sociological’ variant of securitization theory is better able to capture the processes 
through which an issue becomes constructed as an existential threat than the Copenhagen School 
framework.  This is because it places more emphasis on analysis of the intersubjective relationship 
between actor and audience as part of the securitizing agent, the role of everyday security practices 
in securitization and the context in which securitization takes place.  ‘Second generation’ securitization 
theory therefore, provides a more in-depth framework of analysis that can be applied to empirical 
examples of threat-construction.  This section will summarise the strengths of ‘second generation’ 
securitization theory when applied to empirical analysis of threat-construction using examples from 
the case studies under investigation here.      
This thesis finds that, contra to the CS framework in which actors and audiences are separate 
components of the securitization process, actors and audiences operate as integral facets of the agent 
of securitization.1328  This approach allows the analyst to explore how these groups contribute to, or 
resist, the construction of an issue as a security threat.   The audience is not a passive recipient of the 
speech act but an active participant that plays an important role in both how the threat-construction 
is framed and received.  Actors tailor their message to the audience(s), but these audiences have 
agency in the way they process the messages.  This thesis has also shown that actors and audiences 
are not distinct and unchanging groups, instead, agents of the securitization can play the part of both 
actor and audience at different points in the process.  Examples of this include UN members states 
during the drafting and ratification process of the Single Convention, or the role of the media and 
general public in the Reagan administration’s ‘war on drugs’.  Furthermore, whilst the CS are 
contradictory about the importance of the intersubjective relationship between actor and 
audience,1329 this thesis shows that the intersubjective negotiation between facets of the agent is an 
important part of the process of securitization.        
The CS framework’s emphasis on the extraordinary nature of security, emergency/extraordinary 
measures, and the speech act,1330 means that it fails to account for the everyday practices that 
contribute to creating, or reinforcing, the construction of an issue as a security threat.  Analysis of the 
                                                          
1328 Balzacq, ‘Enquiries into Methods’, p. 35. 
1329 Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization’, pp. 175-176; Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’, p. 
376; McDonald, p. 16. 
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empirical case studies in thesis show that, as Balzacq and Bigo have already noted,1331 everyday 
security practices such as border controls and law enforcement policies, play as important a part as 
discourse, in creating the conditions for successful securitizations.  This thesis has also shown that 
international trade, licensing, medical and pharmaceutical practices can also contribute to the 
establishment of an issue – in this case drugs – becoming constructed as a security threat.  These 
practices function as part of the drug control dispositif and they were often profoundly affected by 
the securitization of drugs.  For example, despite the Single Convention confirming the importance of 
drugs for pain relief, the identification of drug misuse as a threat to humankind severely restricted the 
availability of these substances for such purposes.      
Buzan et al.’s emphasis on the speech act event1332 and the moment of acceptance fails to fully capture 
the processes through which an issue becomes identified as an existential threat.  The analysis in this 
thesis shows that the securitizing move can take place over a relatively long period of time – the 
drafting of the Single Convention for example, took thirteen years to complete and even longer for it 
be integrated into domestic laws – and often consists of multiple speech acts – such as those carried 
out by Ronald and Nancy Reagan, as well as other members of the Reagan administration - that are 
reinforced by a wide variety of everyday practices.  Rather than attempting to pinpoint the moment 
the securitization becomes successful, an empirical application of ‘second generation’ securitization 
theory suggests it is more realistic to analyse whether an issue has reached the threshold of 
securitization as proposed by Salter.1333  This approach better describes the processes through which 
an issue becomes accepted as a security threat than focussing on the speech act event and its 
reception by an audience.   
This thesis has also found that seeing the speech act as the “analytical but not ontological starting 
point”,1334 allows the analyst to work backwards from the speech act in order to analyse the 
antecedents of the threat designation and how it came to be constructed in the way that it did.  This 
technique helps to place the speech act event within its historical and social context and also provides 
a methodological guide for how to apply securitization theory to empirical case studies. Thus for 
example, whilst Buzan et al. recognise context as one of their ‘facilitating conditions’, other scholars 
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have argued that it is one of the most under-developed aspects of their framework.1335  Exploration of 
the social and historical context in which the securitizing moves are made highlights the external 
factors that contribute to the success of a securitizing move, such as the changing balance of power 
in the international system after World War II, and the Cold War in the 1980s.  Analysis of the context 
illuminates the pre-existing narratives that are used in the securitization process, such as the ‘othering’ 
of those that participate in the illicit drug trade and the establishment of a dichotomy between ‘good’ 
drug use and ‘bad’ drug use.  The context also shapes the ways in which the securitizing moves are 
received and actualised by the agent(s) and the relationship between the securitization(s) and the 
dispositif.    
2.  Securitization and the drug control dispositif 
Whilst this thesis has shown that ‘second generation’ securitization theory is more useful to empirical 
analysis of the processes by which an issue becomes identified as a security issue than the CS 
framework, it is important to recognise that using any form of securitization theory has constraints.  
In particular, by focusing the construction of an issue as a security threat, other ways of interpreting 
the issue can be overlooked.  For example, analysing the development of the international drug 
control system through the lens of the development of the internationalisation of Western medical 
discourse, may highlight the role of alternative processes and influences.  Analysing the dispositif, in 
conjunction with securitization theory, aims to overcome some of the limitations of a security-
focussed approach.  Deployment of the concept of the dispositif highlights the connections between 
the wide range of practices and discourses, agents and contexts, that play a part in establishing a 
successful securitization.  Identification of the dispositif also illustrates the range of options that have 
been used to control drugs before they became securitized, therefore bringing to the fore alternative 
ways that the issue has been perceived.  Analysis of how the drug control dispositif has been affected 
by the securitization of drugs, highlights the power and resilience of the prohibitionist nature of the 
international drug control system.  
This thesis has shown that drug control and drug prohibition are not synonymous: that many forms of 
drug control have existed through the period under investigation, and prohibition is only one of them.  
However, the two case studies of securitization analysed in this thesis have contributed to drugs being 
constructed as a threat to humankind and the state which has led to a punitive system of prohibition 
being established across most of the world.  Each of these speech acts was a key nodal point in the 
                                                          




securitization of drugs and the development of the international drug control system.  They have also 
caused the drug control dispositif to be reoriented and have limited the range of options for control 
open to states, even if this is now being challenged in numerous ways.  The construction of drugs as 
an existential threat to humankind and the state has become so widely accepted that this has led to 
prohibition becoming a hegemonic discourse whereby even now, states that deviate from the status 
quo are criticised for not abiding by the ‘spirit’ of the conventions1336 and the ‘drug-free world’ 
continues to be articulated as the aim in many states and international organisations.1337 
In-depth analysis of the dispositif of the control of drugs brought to light the practices that operate 
within it: ranging from strict criminal justice policies such as the death penalty and life imprisonment 
on the one hand to harm reduction practices including opiate substitution therapies and legal 
regulated systems of cannabis on the other.  Though these practices operate through different modes 
of control, whether prohibition, medico-social frameworks or regulatory systems, they all aim to 
control either the substances themselves (such as quality controls and licensing) or users (punishing 
them or treating them) and traffickers/producers (punishing them or supporting them).  This thesis 
has shown that the drug control dispositif came into being first in individual states in the mid-
nineteenth century and then developed into an international system during the twentieth century.  
Initially, the dispositif evolved around the need for drugs to be controlled and a wide range of options 
were available to governments in order to do this.  In the early phase of the drug control dispositif, 
control was instituted through domestic pharmaceutical and medical regulations with a focus on 
quality controls and licensed distributors, with little regard for who was using these drugs and for what 
purposes.  However, moral and political entrepreneurs argued that drug use (including alcohol), was 
a moral failing and that it impeded a persons’ ability to function as a useful member of society.  This 
then led to questions around what forms of drug use should be acceptable and a long-running debate 
about what constituted ‘legitimate’ use.  The use of drugs was not, however, simply identified as a 
moral and social failing, drug use was also regularly associated with minority groups and foreigners 
across the industrialised world.  In the US, for example the Chinese were linked with opium smoking, 
African-Americans with cocaine and the Mexicans with cannabis.1338  It was also claimed that drugs, 
particularly opium, were used by foreign and minority groups in order to seduce young white 
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women.1339  The identification of these drugs, rather than alcohol and tobacco, as needing to be 
prohibited was underpinned by xenophobia and racism.   
Later in the twentieth century, as patterns of drug use changed, drugs became negatively associated 
with others such as the working classes and counter-culture movements who were seen as a threat 
to the status quo.1340  Illicit drug users became identified as ‘deviant’1341 and therefore threatening.  
Identifying drug users and those that produce or sell the substances as the ‘other’ situates them 
outside of normal society.  This then allows them to be subject to a wide variety of responses in order 
to reintegrate them back into society.  This ‘othering’ of drug users, particularly as immoral, deviant 
or foreign, reoccurs regularly throughout the period under investigation in this thesis.  The framing of 
drug use as a moral failing, and then the ‘othering’, initially, of drug users and dealers, but later also 
including drug traffickers and drug producers, contributed to ‘drugs’ (and drug users, dealers and 
producers) being constructed as threatening.   Initially drugs were identified as being a threat to 
humankind, but later, the state was also identified as being threatened by the drug trade.  The result 
of the widespread acceptance of drugs as existentially threatening has been the establishment of 
prohibition as the primary mode of drug control for the majority of states.  This has undermined the 
welfare of humankind and national security, the very referent objects that were identified as being in 
need of protection in the case studies analysed in this thesis and reoriented the drug control dispositif 
away from regulatory systems towards one based on prohibition. 
3. From regulation to prohibition 
The second phase in the development of the drug control dispositif centred around international trade 
controls and criminal laws in the domestic sphere.  The US argued that drugs were a threat to 
humankind and that international cooperation was needed in order to deal with the problem.  They 
proposed that the best way to deal with this issue was to prohibit drugs for all but medical and 
scientific use.  However, the European colonial states (Britain, France and the Netherlands), many of 
whom also had well-developed pharmaceutical industries, were in favour of keeping international 
controls to a minimum in order to make sure their economic interests were not harmed.  During the 
League of Nations period, various states challenged the US perspective that prohibition was the most 
effective form of drug control, indeed the European colonial states claimed that their opium 
monopolies were successful in controlling opium use.  The end of World War II, the rise of the US as a 
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hegemonic power and decolonisation in the 1940s and 50s, all contributed to European states 
accepting the need for stricter forms of drug control and so the Single Convention was proposed.  The 
US can be seen as the predominant actor in this phase of the development of the drug control 
dispositif although they attempted to destroy the Single Convention once it had been drafted due to 
perceived weaknesses in the proposed regime.  However, once they overcame their concerns and saw 
that the international system had been strengthened by the treaty, they became a key player in the 
development of the drug control dispositif once again.  The US was not the only important actor in 
shaping the drug control system in the twentieth century however.  As the international drug control 
system developed, administrative bodies were established to monitor and evaluate it.  The 
bureaucrats who were members of these bodies such as the Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) 
and the Drug Supervisory Board (DSB) - who were later merged to become the International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB) - held a great deal of influence in shaping the drug control system and discourses 
associated with it.  
The Single Convention was proposed as a way to rationalise the multitude of drug control treaties 
drafted by the League of Nations, as well as to introduce controls on the production of raw materials 
(coca, cannabis and opium) that had been left out of previous treaties.  Whilst the convention did not 
comply with many of the US’s objectives such as mandatory embargoes on states that overproduced 
or a ‘closed list’ or opium and coca producers, they did gain one major concession.  This was the 
commitment by signatory states to limit all drugs to medical and scientific purposes only, something 
the US had been calling for since the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909.  Over time, the Single 
Convention has become one of the most ratified UN treaties and, along with the 1971 UN Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, became the cornerstone of the international drug control system.  Though 
the Single Convention, did not stipulate that signatory states must prohibit all non-medical use of 
drugs, as it became integrated into domestic laws, it caused a reorientation of the drug control 
dispositif so that prohibition became seen as the primary solution to the ‘drug problem’.         
Crucially, the practices that were established within the drug control dispositif shaped the boundaries 
between licit and illicit drug use and therefore laid the groundwork for the identification of 
threatening forms of drug use, as well creating whole groups of people who were potentially 
threatening because they participated in the illicit drug trade.  These practices were accompanied by 
discursive constructions of certain forms of drug use as being threatening which reinforced the 
dichotomy between ‘good’ drug use (medical and scientific) and ‘bad’ drug use (non-medical/non-
scientific).  The achievements of the international drug control system are measured through data 
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that further underpin the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.  Examples include measurements of drug crops 
eradicated, amounts of drugs seized and numbers of people prosecuted rather than health or human 
rights-based measures.  Where data on drug overdoses, levels of incarceration and violence or rates 
of HIV infections are recorded, they are seen as reasons to commit further resources to the system, 
rather than as measures of the failure of it to improve the health and welfare of citizens.   
4. Re-evaluating NSDD-221 and the US ‘war on drugs’ 
Though Richard Nixon is commonly credited with launching the ‘war on drugs’, this thesis argues that 
this was only a rhetorical ‘war’ and in fact the Nixon administration’s drug policy was based on 
education and treatment.  By contrast, the Reagan administration not only launched a real ‘war’ by 
involving the military in drug law enforcement overseas, but also slashed federal treatment budgets 
and called for Americans to ‘Just Say No’.  The practices and discourses that followed Reagan’s 
securitization represented another reorientation of the drug control dispositif that resulted in growing 
concern about how the international drug trade could undermine national security and an increasing 
role for the military in the ‘war on drugs’.  Reagan’s creation of drug ‘certification’ policy has also had 
profound effects.  It legitimised the role of the US as the enforcer of the international drug conventions 
and allowed US presidents to prevent access to aid for those states that are deemed not to be carrying 
out their commitments to the international drug control system.  US concern about the threats posed 
by drug use and drug trafficking were reflected in the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Trafficking 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances as were US-influenced law enforcement measures such 
as asset seizures.  
As part of the original research that I have undertaken, I have examined documents in the Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library and Museum that had not been viewed before.  Some broad conclusions 
can be drawn from the combination of newspaper and archival analysis as well as first person accounts 
by key players that have not been elucidated previously.  My research suggests that Reagan himself 
had little interest in drug policy except where it intersected with his other interests: fighting 
Communism, particularly in Central America, and a revival of conservatism and ‘family values’.  
However, there were those in the Reagan administration who did appear to have had a more 
substantive interest in drug policy: Vice President George H.W. Bush who took an active interest in 
issues relating the drug trafficking and interdiction; and Carlton Turner who, archival documents show, 
had a deep antipathy to non-medical drug use.  Turner promoted the idea of blaming drug users for 
the ‘drug problem’, criticised the Democrats for being soft on recreational users, and emphasised that 
the administration should not engage in any discussion of legalisation.  Nancy Reagan also seems to 
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have taken a sincere interest in reducing drug use, even if her call to ‘Just Say No’ seemed somewhat 
naïve and failed to take into account the myriad reasons why people take drugs.   
A further original contribution that this research makes to understandings of US and international 
drug policy in the 1980s is through in-depth analysis of which states were named in NSDD-221 and 
how their identification had little to do with actual levels of participation in the drug trade.  This has 
been made possible because the document was fully declassified in 2011 but documents in the Reagan 
archives elucidate some of the reasons why Bulgaria, Cuba and Nicaragua were named rather than 
other countries that were well-known as participating in the drug trade.  As discussed in Chapter Five, 
it is more likely that these states were named because they were Soviet allies or were engaged in 
supporting ‘terrorists’.  Vice President Bush’s announcement about NSDD-221 named Cuba and 
Nicaragua in connection with drug trafficking but did not publicly name Bulgaria, despite the country 
being listed in NSDD-221.  Archival documents show that the administration knew that Bulgaria was 
no longer involved in drug trafficking by the time that NSDD-221 was drafted.  They also show that 
Bulgaria was suspected of being involved in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II and it 
was suggested that public criticism of the country should be restrained until the outcome of the 
investigation.   
5. Challenges to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse 
As has already been noted, even as the securitization of drugs was becoming the predominant way of 
conceptualising the ‘drug problem’, and the prohibition of the non-medical use of drugs was accepted 
as being the best way of reducing the threat posed by the use of these substances, at the local 
government level the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse was being challenged in myriad ways.  The negative 
impacts of prohibition were recognised in 2008 by the head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) when outlined five unintended consequences of the international drug control 
system: a “huge criminal black market”, “policy displacement”, “geographical displacement”, 
“substance displacement” and the stigmatisation and marginalisation of drug users.1342  Some of these 
unintended consequences have caused some states to shift their priorities in drug control.  Chapter 
Six, therefore, has explored recent developments within the drug control dispositif.  As was illustrated 
in Table 1 (the Drug Control Dispositif, p. 18), some of these practices function within the prohibition 
paradigm, and some exist outside it, but they all challenge the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.  Many of 
the more recent policy innovations problematize various outcomes of illicit drug use – such as the 
                                                          
1342 Costa, pp. 10-11. 
253 
 
marginalisation of drug users, the spread of infectious diseases and public nuisance – rather than illicit 
use itself.  Instead of aiming for a ‘drug-free world’ these practices aim to improve the health and well-
being of drug users and the society they live in.  These new policy developments largely reinforce the 
concept that drugs (and drug users) need to be controlled in some form and therefore function within 
the drug control dispositif, but they are a shift away from the securitized drug control system and in 
some cases, represent desecuritizations or counter-securitizations.   
Despite the flexibility built into the international drug control system, wherever a territory enacts 
policies that move away from the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse and the paradigm of prohibition, they 
are castigated by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and in many cases, the US as well.  
This illustrates not only how international drug control bodies such as the INCB portray themselves as 
guardians of the treaties, but it also shows the range of competing threat discourses that are evolving 
within the drug control dispositif.  Some states are now beginning to see HIV/AIDS, the marginalisation 
of drug users and public nuisance related to the illicit drug trade as greater problems than illicit drug 
use itself.  Whereas the INCB and others see any policy development that does not comply with the 
prohibitionist paradigm as a threat to the system itself.  The ‘drugs as a threat’ and ‘drug-free world’ 
discourses continue to be popular across the world and prohibition-minded states continue to criticise 
harm reduction methods and decriminalisation of possession for challenging these discourses even 
though they are explicitly allowed under the Single Convention.  This conflict is an example of how 
powerful the securitization of drugs still is today.  The alternative policy innovations discussed in this 
thesis – such as needle and syringe exchange programmes, opiate substitution therapies, drug 
consumption rooms, decriminalisation, and especially legally regulated markets for drugs - all 
challenge the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse, even though many function within a prohibitionist 
framework.  Instead, these practices are aimed at reducing other issues related illicit drug use such as 
HIV and other blood-borne infections, overdoses, violence, open air drug markets and the 
marginalisation of users, and as such, they establish alternative control frameworks such as the 
medico-social model or regulatory systems.   
6. Conclusion 
In answering the primary research question – how have drugs been constructed as an existential 
threat at the international level and how has this construction changed over time? - this thesis has 
shown that in the early stage of the drug control dispositif there was no overall acceptance that non-
medical/non-scientific was a threat to humankind and at this point, the emphasis was on regulating 
the sale and quality of substances.  In the early twentieth century, the US began to construct drugs as 
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a threat to citizens and societies and argue that prohibition was the most effective way of dealing with 
this threat.  Though this was disputed by many of the European states, by the time that the Single 
Convention entered into international law, there was a growing consensus that drug addiction was 
harmful, and that non-medical use of drugs should be prohibited.  There was little recognition that 
not all recreational use caused addiction and the 1972 Amending Protocol explicitly broadened the 
threat out to include all ‘drug abuse’ rather than just drug addiction.  Throughout the twentieth 
century, practices – such as the estimates and statistics and the identification of licit and illicit forms 
of drug use – contributed to the discursive construction of drugs as being threatening.  At this point 
the drug control dispositif reoriented from a largely regulatory system of control to a prohibitionist 
form of control.   
The Reagan administration reoriented the drug control dispositif once more by articulating a new 
referent object – the state – that was threatened by illicit drug trafficking, as well as illicit use.  The 
administration also put forward new ‘emergency measures’ by legislating for the military to 
participate in counter-narcotics operations overseas and establishing the policy of ‘certification’ that 
gave the US the power to punish those states that it felt were not carrying out their commitments 
under the UN drug conventions.  This new referent object and threat was then integrated into the 
1988 UN Convention.  Both at home and abroad, the US articulated the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse 
and reaffirmed the desire for a ‘drug-free world’.  This has led to drug law enforcement programmes 
becoming increasingly militarised, as well as a vast upsurge in the number of people incarcerated for 
drug offences.  The prohibitionist nature of the drug control dispositif has caused a great number of 
unintended consequences that have harmed the very referent objects that the Single Convention and 
NSDD-221 aimed to protect whilst at the same time, failing to eliminate the illicit market.  By placing 
analysis of these specific examples of the securitization of drugs within the wider drug control 
dispositif, this research has shown that prohibition is not the only form of drug control that has existed 
and that it is the result of political, economic and social choices that were taken decades or more ago 
and based on outdated moral assumptions that designate certain forms of drug use as ‘bad’ and other 
forms as ‘good’.     
In addressing the second research question – to what extent does the ‘sociological’ interpretation of 
securitization theory, in conjunction with deployment of the concept of the dispositif, provide a better 
understanding of the processes of threat-construction than the Copenhagen School framework? - this 
thesis has shown that the ‘sociological’ variant allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the 
processes by which an issue becomes constructed as an existential threat than the original 
Copenhagen School perspective.  A ‘sociological’ interpretation of securitization theory places greater 
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emphasis on the analysis of the intersubjective relationship between actor and audience and sees 
them both as important facets of the agent of securitization.  The ‘sociological’ variant also considers 
in more depth the context in which the speech acts were carried out and the practices that contributed 
to the securitizations.  These are all areas which have been underdeveloped in the CS version of the 
theory but have been found, in this thesis, to be key factors when analysing empirical examples of 
threat-construction.  Furthermore, this form of securitization theory incorporates an exploration of 
the relationship between the dispositif and the securitizing moves which draws connections between 
disparate discourses and practices that are integral to the way that drugs have been, and are now, 
controlled.  Deployment of the concept of the dispositif has drawn out the pre-existing narratives, 
such as the ‘othering’ of drug users, that contributed to the acceptance of drugs – and drug users, 
dealers and producers – as a threat to humankind and national security.  At the same time, analysis of 
the dispositif also brings to light the range of drug control models that have existed over time and 
shows how the securitization(s) of drugs has reduced the options available to states when dealing with 
non-medical and non-scientific drug use and the trade that supplies it.  However, the drugs as a threat 
narrative is under threat, not least in the United States where more and more states are establishing 
legally regulated markets for recreational cannabis use.     
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